Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays

Where Biology Meets Psychology......Page 1
CONTENTS......Page 3
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 5
INTRODUCTION......Page 6
I FUNCTIONS AND TELEOLOGY......Page 10
1 Is Teleosemantics Adaptationist?......Page 11
2 The Adaptationism Debate......Page 13
3 Teleonomy and Panglossian Sin......Page 17
4 Teleosemantics......Page 21
5 Specific Teleosemantic Theories......Page 26
Notes......Page 32
References......Page 33
1 The Philosophical Project......Page 35
2 Functional Explanations in Science: A First Pass......Page 37
3 Philosophical Analyses......Page 39
4 A Different Approach......Page 45
References......Page 49
II EVOLUTIONARY PHYCHOLOGY......Page 52
1 The Two Projects of Evolutionary Psychology......Page 53
2 The Explanatory Project......Page 54
2.1 Panglossianism......Page 56
2.2 The Complexity Defense......Page 57
3 The Predictive Project......Page 60
3.1 Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Function......Page 62
3.2 Ultra-adaptationism......Page 63
Not All Adaptive Problems Are Solved.......Page 64
Multiple Realizability Problems.......Page 65
Ancestral Environment.......Page 66
3.3 Summary of Our Critique......Page 67
4 Concluding Reflections on Explanation and Prediction......Page 68
Acknowledgments......Page 69
References......Page 70
4 The Conflict of Evolutionary Psychology......Page 73
1 The Methods of Evolutionary Psychology1......Page 74
2 Recent Work......Page 78
3 Idle Methods......Page 80
4 History and Cognitive Psychology......Page 83
Acknowledgments......Page 84
Notes......Page 85
References......Page 86
1 Evolutionary Psychology and the Behavior-to-Mind Inference......Page 88
2 Two Claims about What Minds Do......Page 91
3 Justifying the BTM Inference......Page 99
4 The Nature of Psychological Processes......Page 101
References......Page 102
6 DeFreuding Evolutionary Psychology: Adaptation and Human Motivation......Page 104
References......Page 118
III INNATENESS......Page 120
7 Innateness Is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness......Page 121
1 Lorenz\'s Theory of Instincts......Page 122
2 The Lorenz-Lehrman Debate......Page 123
3 Apportioning Casual Responsibility between Genes and Environments......Page 127
(b) Environmental Stability.......Page 130
4 The Canalization Account......Page 131
5 Innateness and Natural Selection......Page 135
6 Critique of Stich\'s, Sober\'s, and Wimsatt\'s Theories of Innateness......Page 136
Acknowledgments......Page 140
References......Page 141
Optimal Design and Historical Contingency......Page 143
Genera five Entrenchment and Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Dynamics......Page 145
Engineering a Dynamical Foundationalism......Page 149
Darwin\'s Principles Embodied: The Evolution and Entrenchment of Generative Structures......Page 152
Developmental Constraints, Generative Entrenchment, and the Innate-Acquired Distinction......Page 156
Claims about Innateness from the Philosophical Tradition......Page 157
Claims for Innateness in the Ethological Tradition......Page 159
A Comparison of the Generative Entrenchment and Ariew\'s Canalization Accounts......Page 163
A Closer Look at Canalization......Page 167
Relations between Canalization and Generative Entrenchment.......Page 168
On the plasticity of canalization.......Page 169
Conclusion......Page 176
Notes......Page 177
References......Page 180
9 Feelings as the Proximate Cause of Behavior......Page 184
Two Distinctions......Page 186
Feelings in Nonhuman Species.......Page 187
How Feelings are Evoked.......Page 188
The Feeling Profile.......Page 189
Hierarchical Causation.......Page 190
A Developmental Model......Page 191
Entrenchment, Vagueness, and Feelings.......Page 192
The Specification of Feeling in Development.......Page 193
Cognition as the Slave of the Feelings.......Page 195
Cognition Alone Cannot Cause Behavior.......Page 196
Other Issues.......Page 197
3 The Nature-Nurture Problem......Page 198
Genes vs. Environment.......Page 200
4 Summary......Page 201
Acknowledgments......Page 202
References......Page 203
IV PHILOSOPHY OF MIND......Page 204
1 Situated Agents......Page 205
2 Thought in a Hostile World......Page 208
3 Nike-Organisms......Page 211
Acknowledgments......Page 219
References......Page 220
1 What Naturalists Believe......Page 222
2 The Natural Method......Page 224
2.1 The Natural Method at Work......Page 225
2.2 Historical and Ahistorical Questions about Consciousness......Page 226
3.1 What Is Consciousness For?......Page 228
3.2 Obstacles to Historical Questions, and Their Solutions......Page 229
4 An Ahistorical Question......Page 231
4.2 Obstacles to Naturalistic Answers to the Mind-Brain Question......Page 232
4.3 Solutions to Skeptical Obstacles......Page 234
4.4 Color Vision and the Structure of Consciousness......Page 237
5 Dreams: A Case Study......Page 240
6 Reactions to the Natural Method......Page 243
6.1 The Bottom Line......Page 244
Notes......Page 245
References......Page 246
V PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE......Page 248
12 Mental Functions as Constraints on Neurophysiology: Biology and Psychology of Vision......Page 249
1 Is Biology (Neurophysiology) \"More Basic\" than Psychology?......Page 250
2.1 Newton: Binocular Single Vision......Page 255
2.2 Stereoscopic Depth Vision and Binocularly Driven Neurons......Page 257
2.3 Color Vision and Opponent Pathways......Page 259
3 Are These Teleofunctions?......Page 260
4 Functions of Color Vision......Page 261
5 Conclusion......Page 265
Notes......Page 266
References......Page 267
13 Ontogeny, Phylogeny, and Scientific Development......Page 270
1 The Background in Nineteenth-Century Biology......Page 272
Recapitulationist Accounts of Scientific Development......Page 276
2 Problems with the Recapitulationist Account of Scientific Development......Page 278
3 Conclusions......Page 280
Notes......Page 281
References......Page 282
1 Supple Laws in Psychology......Page 283
2 Emergent Models of Supple Biological Laws......Page 289
References......Page 296
VI PARALLELS BETWEEN PHILOSPHY OF BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY......Page 299
15 Genes and Codes: Lessons from the Philosophy of Mind?......Page 300
1 The Genetic Code and the \"Gene for\" Concept......Page 302
2 Indicative and Imperative......Page 305
3 Analyses in Terms of Developmental Role......Page 308
4 Analyses in Terms of Evolutionary History......Page 313
5 Distality: Amino Acid Sequences, Folded Proteins, and Traits......Page 318
6 Summary......Page 322
Acknowledgments......Page 323
Notes......Page 324
References......Page 325
1.1......Page 327
2.1......Page 330
2.2......Page 331
2.3......Page 332
2.4......Page 334
2.5......Page 335
2.6......Page 336
2.7......Page 339
3.1......Page 340
3.3......Page 341
Notes......Page 346
References......Page 349
17 The Individual in Biology and Psychology......Page 351
1 The Extended Phenotype......Page 352
2 Causal Powers and Encoding......Page 358
3 Individuality, Complexity, and the Locus of Control......Page 361
4 Concluding Examples and Remarks......Page 364
References......Page 367
B......Page 369
C......Page 371
D......Page 373
E......Page 374
F......Page 375
G......Page 376
H......Page 377
K......Page 378
M......Page 379
N......Page 380
P......Page 381
R......Page 382
S......Page 383
T......Page 384
Y......Page 385