The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Editor’s foreword
Publisher’s acknowledgements
Preface to the first German edition, 1978
Introduction, 1978
	1. A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance
	2. Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth
Exposition [1933]
	[1.] Comments on the content
	[2.] Comments on the relationship of the book to the current theory of knowledge
Book I: The Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis)
	The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume I
	Chapter I. Formulation of the Problem
		1. The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
	Chapter II. Deductivism and Inductivism
		2. Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions
		3. Rationalism and empiricism – deductivism and inductivism
		4. The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge
	Chapter III. The Problem of Induction
		5. The infinite regression (Hume’s argument)
		6. Inductivist positions
	Chapter IV. The Normal-Statement Positions
		7. The normal-statement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism
		8. Critique of strict positivism – twofold transcendence of natural laws
		9. The transcendental method – presentation of apriorism
		10. Critique of apriorism
	Chapter V. Kant and Fries
		11. Supplement to the critique of apriorism.(Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.– On the question of the empirical basis.)
	Chapter VI. The Probability Positions
		12. The probability positions – subjective belief in probability
		13. Statements about the objective probability of events
		14. Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements
		15. One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity
		16. The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis –
positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration
		17. The infinite regression of probability statements
	Chapter VII. The Pseudo-Statement Positions
		18. The pseudo-statement positions: new formulation of the problem
		19. Natural laws as “instructions for the formation of statements”
		20. “True – false” or “useful – useless”? Consistent pragmatism
		21. Difficulties of consistent pragmatism
		22. Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs
		23. Natural laws as propositional functions
	Chapter VIII. Conventionalism
		24. The pseudo-statement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism
		25. The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism)
		26. Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation
		27. Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications
		28. Can axiomatic-deductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudo-statements)?
		29. The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications
		30. Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry
	Chapter IX. Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements
		31. Implication and general implication
		32. General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements
		33. Universal concept and individual concept – class and element
		34. Strictly universal statements – the problem of induction and the problem of universals
		35. Comments on the problem of universals
	Chapter X. Back to the Pseudo-Statement Positions
		36. Return to the discussion of the pseudo-statement positions
		37. Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws?
		38. The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudo-statements
		39. An infinite regression of pseudo-statements
		40. An apriorist pseudo-statement position
		41. Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments
on the unity of theory and practice
		42. A last chance for the pseudo-statement positions
	Chapter XI. Pseudo-Statement Positions and the Concept of Meaning
		43. The concept of meaning in logical positivism
		44. The concept of meaning and the demarcation problem
– the fundamental thesis of inductivism
		45. Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning
		46. Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statements – the antinomy of the knowability of the world (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudo-statement positions.)
	Chapter XII. Conclusion
		47. The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution
		48. Is the problem of induction solved?
	Appendix The critique of the Problem of Induction in Schematic Representations
Book II: The Problem of Demarcation: Experience and Metaphysics
	The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume II (Fragments)
	Part One Fragments 1932
		Draft of an introduction
			Is there a philosophical science? (Introductory considerations on the problem of demarcation.)
		I Formulation of the Problem
			1. The problem of demarcation
			2. Scope of the problem of demarcation
			3. The problem of induction
			4. Scope of the problem of induction
		[II] On the Question of Eliminating Subjectivist Psychologism
		[III] Transition to the Theory of Method
			1. An objection to the criterion of falsifiability
			2. Critique of non-methodological theories of knowledge
			3. Comments on the question: conventionalism or empiricism?
			4. The empiricist character of colloquial language – the logical view as a prerequisite for the methodological view
			5. Concerning the critique of non-deductive and non-transcendental theories of knowledge
			6. Is there a methodology?
			7. Universal concept and individual concept – class and element
			8. Concerning the language-critical objection to the possibility of a methodology
		[IV] The Method of Exhaustion. – “State of Affairs” and “Fact”. –Universal Diversity
		[V] Outline of a Theory of Empirical-Scientific Methods (Theory of Experience)
			Principle of falsifiability
				1. Principle of continuity
				2. Thesis against strict positivism
				3. First thesis against conventionalism: Principle of system closure
				4. Second thesis against conventionalism: principle of restricting singular auxiliary assumptions (ad hoc hypothesis)
	Part Two Fragments 1933
		Orientation
		[VI] Philosophy
			[Introduction]
				1. The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
		[VII] The Problem of Methodology
			1. Methodology and the possibility of falsification
			2. The demarcation criterion and the theory of method
		[VIII] Comments on the so-called problem of free will
			[1. Introduction]
			2. The “event” and the “slice of reality”
		[IX The Problem of Free Will]
			5. Individuals and universals
			6. The doctrine of the two worlds
			7. Has quantum physics changed the situation?
		[X] The Problem of the Randomness of Probability Statements
			[Introduction]
			6. Sets of the first kind for infinitely extendable series
			7. Conditions for infinitely extendable sets of the first kind
			8. The problem of random sequences
	Appendix Summary Excerpt (1932) from The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge
		Preliminary Note
			I. Formulation of the problem: The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
			II. The transcendental method of the theory of knowledge
			III. Deductivism and inductivism
			IV. Theoreticism. Scientific objectivity
			V. Outline of the solutions to the two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge
			VI. Prerequisites of falsifiability, construction of theories
			VII. Transcendental and psychological method. Elimination of the subjective-psychological basis
			VIII. The method of empirical falsification
			IX. Methodological principles of the conventional stipulation of some basic statements as “true” or “false”
			X. Justification of psychologism
			Concluding note
		Editor’s Postscript
			1. Introduction
			2. The original copies and editing of the manuscript
			3. Popper’s revision of the MS in 1975
			4. Title and table of contents
			5. The mottos
			6. Volume II: The Problem of Demarcation
Index of Names
Index of Subjects