The Sinews of State Power : The Rise and Demise of the Cohesive Local State in Rural China

Content: Cover
 The Sinews of State Power
 Copyright
 Dedication
 Contents
 Acknowledgments
 Introduction. The Basics of Government: Cohesive and Robust Local States
 The Limits of State Adaptability and Local States
 Locating the Local State
 Elite Coherence and Its Conditions
 Elite Alliances, Collusion, and Institutional Corruption
 Conditions for Elite Cohesion and Incentives in Time
 Research Methodology, Sources, and Organization
 1. Rural Government and Farmer Protest in Comparative Perspective
 Protests and Riots in the Maoist Era
 Reactive Farmer Protest
 Explaining Farmer Protest Protests and Petitions in the Reform EraReactive Farmer Protest
 Explaining Farmer Protest
 Protest Leaders after the Reform Era
 Rural Activists
 Village Cadres
 Conclusion
 2. The Formation and Institutionalization of Intrastate Cohesion
 The Making of New Elites: The Origins of Power and Survival
 Rational Goals and the Origin of Power
 Rational Mechanisms to Remain in Power
 Structural Orientation and Personal Networks
 Active Coordination and External Threats
 Active Coordination
 External Threats
 Reforms in the 1980s and Remaining Memories: Survival and Material Benefits Restructured Administration and Continuous PersonnelPolitical Reforms and the Rising Importance of Patronage
 Institutionalization of Alliances in the 1990s: Local Interests and Personal Networks
 The Stabilization of Leading Cadres and Local Interests
 Interdependence and Networks within the Alliances
 Conclusion
 3. The Changes and Continuity of Local State Cohesion
 Alliance of Survival during the Maoist Era
 Alliance of Benefits in the 1980s
 Forced Implementation of National Policies
 Rural Industrialization and Collective Deviation Distinctive Localism and Collective Deviation in the 1990sOrganizational Expansion
 Excessive and Arbitrary Extraction from Society
 Covering Up for Each Other
 Run-​on Debts
 Conclusion
 4. Dismantling the Local State: The Isolated Village Cadres
 The Structural Origin of Isolated Villages
 Fiscal Reforms: Emergence of a County Leviathan
 Further Changes from Within
 Abandoned Villages
 Scapegoating of Village Cadres
 Diverging Interests among Elites and Their Reproduction
 Institutional Changes and Unexpected Scapegoats
 Case Studies: Sichuan versus Jiangsu County-​Township Fiscal ArrangementsVillage Affairs
 Conclusion
 5. Implications: Declining Coercive and Extractive Capacities of the State
 Declining Coercive Capacity in Maintaining Order
 Village Cadres Respond
 Towns and Counties: The Cat-​and-​Mouse Game
 Declining Extractive Capacities and Tax Games
 At the County Level: Individual Agendas and Economic Policies
 At the Township Level: The Illegal Tax Trade and the Accounting Game
 Case Studies: Sichuan versus Jiangsu
 Discontented Village Cadres and Their Responses
 State-​Business Relations and Taxation
 Conclusion
 Conclusion