The Scope of Moral Protest: Beyond Blame and Responsibility

Preface
Contents
1 Introduction
	1.1 Set-Up
	1.2 The Project
2 Moral Responsibility and Blame
	2.1 Moral Responsibility
		2.1.1 Moral and Other Responsibilities
		2.1.2 Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment
		2.1.3 Faces of Responsibility and Attributionism
		2.1.4 Holding Someone Responsible
	2.2 Blame
		2.2.1 Some General Characteristics of Blame
		2.2.2 The Mainstream View: Conflicting Attitudinal Responses
		2.2.3 Contrast 1: Scanlon’s Account of Blame
		2.2.4 Contrast 2: Functionalist Views
		2.2.5 Brief Thoughts About Methodology and the Subject of Investigation
3 The Protest View of Blame
	3.1 Variants of the Protest View in the Literature
		3.1.1 Pamela Hieronymi
		3.1.2 Matthew Talbert
		3.1.3 Angela Smith
		3.1.4 R. Jay Wallace
		3.1.5 Derk Pereboom
	3.2 Summary
	3.3 Attractions of the Protest View of Blame
	3.4 Problems for the Protest View of Blame
		3.4.1 Problems for a Claims View of Wrongdoing and Protest
		3.4.2 Protest and Disagreement: A Problem for Claims and Communication Views
		3.4.3 More General Problems for the Protest View of Blame
4 Moral Protest and its Attitudes
	4.1 Example Cases
	4.2 The Objects of Protest and Blame
	4.3 Some Data Points
	4.4 A Pointer from Speech Act Theory
	4.5 Objecting as Stance-Taking
	4.6 Emotions of Protest
	4.7 Implications
		4.7.1 Moral Responses Irrespective of Responsibility
		4.7.2 The Relation between Blame and Protest
		4.7.3 The Respective Fittingness of Protest and Objection
	4.8 A (Brief) Ethical Case for Practicing Protest without Blame
5 Objectionability
	5.1 Motivating Examples
	5.2 Some Features of Objectionability
	5.3 Theorising Objectionability
		5.3.1 First Pass: The Breached Obligation View
		5.3.2 Second Pass: The Content View
		5.3.3 Third Pass: The Criticisability View
	5.4 Objections and Implications
		5.4.1 Objectionability of Fitting Attitudes
		5.4.2 Attitudinal Duties
		5.4.3 Objectionability, Judgment-Sensitivity, and Answerability
		5.4.4 Objectionability of Factually Ignorant Wrongdoing
	5.5 Excursus: The Ought of Objectionability
	5.6 Summary
6 The Larger Picture and Its Implications
	6.1 Recapitulating the Argument
	6.2 The Emerging Picture
	6.3 Implications for the Protest View of Blame
	6.4 Implications for Attributionism about Blameworthiness
		6.4.1 The Attributionist View of Blameworthiness
		6.4.2 Evaluating Attributionist Views of Blame and Blameworthiness
		6.4.3 The Significance of Attribution
7 Talbert’s Victim Objection
	7.1 The Objection
	7.2 Victims’ Needs
	7.3 Rejecting the Victim Objection: Objecting and Demanding Redress
	7.4 A Possible Worry: Protestable Acts That Do Not Victimise
	7.5 Turning the Perspective Around: A Reductio of the Victim Objection
	7.6 Summary
8 Conclusion. Responding to Immoral Conduct Beyond Responsibility and Blame
References