The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic

Preface
	Reference
Acknowledgements
About this Book
Contents
About the Author
Abbreviations
Part I: The Pragmatist Basis
	Chapter 1: Pragmatism and Metaphysics: The General Background
		1.1 Metaphysics
		1.2 The Conceptual Articulation of Reality
		1.3 Assertion
		1.4 Propositions and the Formality of Logic
		1.5 Arguments, Inferences, and Argumentations
		References
	Chapter 2: Groundbreaking Principles
		2.1 Five Principles
		2.2 Two Models of Propositional Individuation
		2.3 Propositional Identification
		2.4 Logical Propositions
			2.4.1 Three Alternative Approaches
		2.5 Logic as a Science
		References
	Chapter 3: Semantic and Pragmatic Hints in Frege’s Logical Theory
		3.1 Frege’s Projects
		3.2 The Representation of Abstract Reality
		3.3 The Analysis of Discourse
		3.4 Two-factor Semantics and the Meaning of Identity
		3.5 Special Notions
			3.5.1 The Judgement Stroke
			3.5.2 The Predicables ‘Is True’ and ‘Is a Fact’
			3.5.3 Implicatures and Presuppositions
		References
Part II: Logical Constants
	Chapter 4: Implying, Precluding, and Quantifying Over: Frege’s Logical Expressivism
		4.1 Logical Expressivism
		4.2 The Conditional and Negation
		4.3 Negation, Incompatibility, Falsehood
		4.4 Expressions of Quantity and Relations Between Concepts
		References
	Chapter 5: Lessons from Inferentialism and Invariantism
		5.1 What Is the Issue with Logical Constants?
		5.2 Analytically Valid Arguments
		5.3 Inferentialist Approaches
		5.4 The Erlangen Programme
		5.5 Invariant Terms of Logic
		5.6 A Pragmatist Excursus
		References
	Chapter 6: The Inference-Marker View of Logical Notions: What a Pragmatist Proposal Looks Like
		6.1 The Proposal
		6.2 Some Consequences of (IMV)
			6.2.1 Concepts and Propositions
			6.2.2 Monadic and Binary Operators
		6.3 Inferential Significance
		6.4 Genuine Logical Notions
		References
Part III: Further Applications of Propositional Priority
	Chapter 7: Grue, Tonk, and Russell’s Paradox: What Follows from the Principle of Propositional Priority?
		7.1 Paradoxes
		7.2 Goodman’s ‘Grue’
		7.3 Prior’s ‘Tonk’
		7.4 Russell’s Paradox
		7.5 Taking Stock
		References
	Chapter 8: Visual Arguments: What Is at Issue in the Multimodality Debate?
		8.1 Multiple Modes
		8.2 Non-linguistic Aspects of Linguistic Communication
		8.3 Sentences, Pictures, and Relational Linguistic Pragmatism
		8.4 Affordances
		8.5 Ineffability and Conceptual Articulation
		8.6 Visual Thinking in Mathematics
		8.7 Some Conclusions
		References
	Chapter 9: Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski
		9.1 The Scope of Tarski’s Proposal
		9.2 Physicalism and the Unity of Science
		9.3 Correspondence and Deflationism
		9.4 Satisfaction
		9.5 Frege on Truth and Judgeable Contents
		References
	Chapter 10: Truth Ascriptions as Prosentences: Further Lessons of the Principle of Propositional Priority
		10.1 Why Truth Is So Elusive
		10.2 The Pragmatist Strategy: Truth Ascriptions and the Fregean Principle of Context
		10.3 Proforms
		10.4 Pragmatism, Expressivism, and the Priority of the Proposition
		10.5 The Prosentential Approach to Truth
		10.6 Truth and Assertion
		References
Index