The methods of metaphilosophy. Kant, Maimon, and Schelling on how to philosophize about philosophy

Front Cover
Impressum
Contents
0 Introduction
	0.1 Metaphilosophy
	0.2 A philosophy designed to be metaphilosophy-first
	0.3 Scientific tools for metaphilosophy: finding the right procedure
		0.3.1 Baconian and Newtonian experimentalism
		0.3.2 Galilean idealisations
	0.4 Overview
1 Kant’s propaedeutic method
	1.1 Propaedeutic philosophy is the study of philosophy
	1.2 A two-layered analogy: Baconian and Newtonian experimentalism, and chemical analysis and synthesis
	1.3 From empirical experimentation to a priori experimentation
	1.4 Kant’s conception of the philosophical experiment
	1.5 Chemical analysis and synthesis
	1.6 Philosophical procedure in the Aesthetic/Analytic and the Dialectic
	1.7 Metaphilosophy as experimentalist practice
2 Maimon’s method of fictions
	2.1 Philosophy is the science of the form of all sciences
	2.2 Against propaedeutic philosophy: quid facti? and quid juris?
		2.2.1 Quid facti?
		2.2.2 Quid juris?
	2.3 A coalition system: Maimon’s rational dogmatism and empirical scepticism
	2.4 The analogy to calculus
		2.4.1 Maimon’s philosophy of mathematics
		2.4.2 An immanent account of cognition
	2.5 The method of fictions
	2.6 Philosophical fictions
	2.7 Maimon’s metaphilosophy: philosophy as modelling practice
3 Schelling’s method of nature-construction
	3.1 Philosophy is the science of the unconditioned
	3.2 Fichte’s original insight, Schelling’s observation, and Schelling’s point
	3.3 \"Naturphilosophie\" as science of the unconditioned
	3.4 Positing an absolute hypothesis
	3.5 The Method of Nature-Construction
	3.6 Presenting nature through experiment
	3.7 Metaphilosophy as constructive and experimental practice
4 Experiments of reason
	4.1 Kant’s experiments of pure reason
	4.2 Maimon’s metaphysical modelling
	4.3 Schelling’s experimental constructions
	4.4 Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
	Abbreviations
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