The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

Cover
Title page
Editors' introduction
Introduction: Science and pseudoscience
1 Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes
	1 Science: reason or religion?
	2 Fallibilism versus falsificationism
		a Dogmatic (or naturalistic) falsificationism. The empirical basis
		b Methodological falsificationism. The 'empirical basis'
		c Sophisticated versus naive methodological falsificationism. Progressive and degenerating problemshifts
	3 A methodology of scientific research programmes
		a Negative heuristic: the 'hard core' of the programme
		b Positive heuristic: the construction of the 'protective belt' and the relative autonomy of theoretical science
		c Two illustrations: Prout and Bohr
			1 Prout: a research programme progressing in an ocean of anomalies
			2 Bohr: a research programme progressing on inconsistent foundations
		d A new look at crucial experiments: the end of instant rationality
			1 The Michelson-Morley experiment
			2 The Lummer-Pringsheim experiments
			3 Beta-decay versus conservation laws
			4 Conclusion. The requirement of continuous growth
	4 The Popperian versus the Kuhnian research programme
	Appendix: Popper, falsificationism and the 'Duhem-Quine thesis'
2 History of science and its rational reconstructions
	Introduction
	1 Rival methodologies of science; ration al reconstructions as guides to history
		a Inductivism
		b Conventionalism
		c Methodological falsificationism
		d Methodology of scientific research programmes
		e Internai and external history
	2 Critical comparison of methodologies: history as a test of its rational reconstructions
		a Falsificationism as a meta-criterion: history 'falsifies' falsificationism (and any other methodology)
		b The methodology of historiographical research programmes. History - to varying degrees - corroborates its rational reconstructions
		C Against aprioristic and anti-theoretical approaches to methodology
		d Conclusion
3 Popper on demarcation and induction
	Introduction
	1 Popper on demarcation
		a Popper's game of science
		b How can one criticize the rules of the scientific game?
		c A quasi-Polanyiite 'falsification' of Popper's demarcation criterion
		d An amended demarcation criterion
		e An amended meta-criterion
	2 Negative and positive solutions to the problem of induction: scepticism and fallibilism
		a The game of science and the search for truth
		b A plea to Popper for a whiff of 'inductivism'
4 (with Elie Zahar) Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?
	Introduction
	1 Empiricist accounts of the 'Copernican Revolution'
	2 Simplicism
	3 Polyanyiite and Feyerabendian accounts of the Copernican revolution
	4 The Copernican revolution in the light of the methodology of scientific research programmes
	5 The Copernican revolution in the light of Zahar's new version of the methodology of scientific research programmes
	6 A postscript on history of science and its rational reconstructions
5 Newton's effect on scientific standards
	1 The justificationist high road to psychologism and mysticism
		a Justificationism and its two poles: dogmatism and scepticism
		b Psychologistic justificationism
		c Justificationist fallibilism
	2 Newtonian methodology vers us Newtonian method
		a Newton's problem: the clash between standards and acheivements
		b Newtonians against metaphysical criticism
		c Newton's idea of experimental proof and its credo quid absurdum
		d Newtonians and factual criticism
		e Newton's double legacy
References
Lakatos bibliography
Indexes