The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic

Cover
The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant’s Dialectic
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Introduction
	0.1 The fiery test of critique
	0.2 Method and experiment
	0.3 The sceptical method
	0.4 Pyrrhonian postponement
	0.5 Kantian charity
	0.6 Denying knowledge
	0.7 Speculation
	0.8 The pre-eminence of the Antinomies
	0.9 Four masters of method
	0.10 Approach
	0.11 Rigour
	0.12 Typographical conventions
	0.13 Jargon and dating the reflections
	0.14 Acknowledgements
Part I: Rational Psychology
	Chapter 1: Transcendental Illusion
		1.1 Introduction
		1.2 Illusions: logical, empirical, and transcendental
		1.3 The sources of transcendental illusion
		1.4 The simplified account
		1.5 The necessity of transcendental illusion
		1.6 Some recalcitrant texts
	Chapter 2: Empirical and Rational Psychology
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 Wolff
		2.3 Gottsched
		2.4 Baumgarten
		2.5 Meier
		2.6 Rational psychology in the Metaphysics L1
		2.7 Pure rational psychology
		2.8 Pure rational psychology as the science of self-consciousness
		2.9 The critique of pure rational psychology
		2.10 Two ways of proceeding in pure rational psychology
	Chapter 3: The First Paralogism: Preliminaries
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Substance
		3.3 Transcendental illusion in the first Paralogism
		3.4 Kant’s notion of a paralogism
		3.5 Transcendental paralogism
	Chapter 4: The B-Edition First Paralogism
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 The paralogism
		4.3 Objections and replies
		4.4 Ameriks’s interpretation
	Chapter 5: The A-edition First Paralogism
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 A closer look at transcendental illusion
		5.3 Wuerth’s interpretation
		5.4 A problem with Kant’s characterization of a paralogism
		5.5 Two ways of viewing a paralogism
	Chapter 6: The Second Paralogism
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 The Achilles
		6.3 The A-edition second paralogism as a paralogismk
		6.4 Kant’s criticism evaluated
		6.5 A Cartesian application of the major premise
		6.6 The I as ‘simple in concept’
		6.7 The B-edition second Paralogism
		6.8 The possibility of monism
	Chapter 7: The Third Paralogism
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 The major premise
		7.3 The minor premise
		7.4 The practical use of the concept of a person
		7.5 The B-edition third Paralogism
		7.6 Immortality
		7.7 Mendelssohn’s argument
		7.8 Fordyce’s argument
		7.9 Fordyce’s argument evaluated
	Chapter 8: The Fourth Paralogism
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 The paralogism
		8.3 External-world scepticism rejected
		8.4 Anti-materialism
		8.5 Monism
		8.6 The B-edition fourth Paralogism
		8.7 Transcendental illusion again
		8.8 Architectonic and method
		8.9 Descartes
Part II: Rational Cosmology
	Chapter 9: The Mathematical Antinomies Presented
		9.1 Introduction
		9.2 The phenomenon of antinomy
		9.3 The form of an antinomy
		9.4 The thesis of the first antinomy: time
		9.5 Infinity
		9.6 The antithesis of the first antinomy: time
		9.7 The thesis of the first antinomy: space
		9.8 The antithesis of the first antinomy: space
		9.9 The second antinomy: preliminaries
		9.10 The thesis of the second antinomy
		9.11 The antithesis of the second antinomy
	Chapter 10: The Mathematical Antinomies Resolved
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 The first line of resolution
		10.3 The second line of resolution
		10.4 Proofs by reductio
		10.5 Regresses ad infinitum and ad indefinitum
		10.6 The cosmological syllogism
		10.7 The sceptical representation
		10.8 The Lambert analogy
		10.9 The indifferentists
		10.10 The indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism
		10.11 The road not taken: nonsense
		10.12 Zeno
	Chapter 11: The Third Antinomy Presented
		11.1 Introduction
		11.2 The thesis and antithesis
		11.3 Terminology
		11.4 Causes in Kant
		11.5 Kant’s determinism
		11.6 The antinomies: lessons learned
		11.7 The thesis argument
		11.8 The antithesis argument
	Chapter 12: The Third Antinomy Resolved
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Empirical and intelligible character
		12.3 What kind of freedom?
		12.4 Another indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism
		12.5 Moral responsibility, moral growth, and rational blame
		12.6 The moral argument for freedom
		12.7 Is Kant a compatibilist?
		12.8 Against Leibnizian compatibilism
		12.9 Kant’s alleged libertarianism
	Chapter 13: The Fourth Antinomy
		13.1 Introduction
		13.2 The thesis argument
		13.3 The antithesis argument
		13.4 The resolution
		13.5 De Mairan and the moon
Part III: Rational Theology
	Chapter 14: The Ontological Argument
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 Kant’s presentation of the ontological argument
		14.3 What is a ‘real predicate’?
		14.4 Wolff and Baumgarten on existence
		14.5 The ‘inconsistency’ objection
		14.6 Existence, being, and actuality
		14.7 Actuality is not a real predicate
		14.8 The ‘hundred thalers’ argument
		14.9 Evaluation of the argument
		14.10 The disputational form of Kant’s criticism
	Chapter 15: The Cosmological Argument
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 Kant’s presentation of the cosmological argument
		15.3 The role of contingency
		15.4 The remaining phases of the argument
		15.5 Contingency and the PSR
		15.6 Kant’s third main criticism: the nervus probandi and its converse
	Chapter 16: The First Critique on the Physico-Theological Argument
		16.1 Introduction
		16.2 The ordinary physico-theology
		16.3 Kant’s revised physico-theology
		16.4 The pre-critical revised physico-theology: concluding remarks
		16.5 The revised physico-theology in the first Critique
		16.6 The first Critique on the physico-theological argument
		16.7 Kant’s criticisms of the dogmatic physico-theological argument
		16.8 Do we observe end-directedness?
		16.9 The doctrinal belief in an Author of Nature
		16.10 The non-dogmatic argument: criticisms and prospects
	Chapter 17: The Regulative Use of the Ideas
		17.1 Introduction
		17.2 The Idea of the soul as a regulative principle
		17.3 The Idea of God as a regulative principle
		17.4 Laws expressing the purposes of nature
		17.5 Lazy reason and perverted reason
		17.6 The Idea of systematic unity
		17.7 The first Critique on the courses of the heavenly bodies
		17.8 The transcendental principles
		17.9 The co-applicability of the logical principles
		17.10 The focus imaginarius
	Chapter 18: Closing Reflections
		18.1 Further conclusions
		18.2 Denying knowledge (again)
		18.3 Transcendental Realism as a logical impossibility
		18.4 The loss of innocence
		18.5 Exhaustiveness
Appendix: Abbreviations
Abbreviations of Works
Bibliography
Index