The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions (Clarendon Paperbacks)

Contents......Page 6
Contributors......Page 9
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION......Page 10
1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development......Page 12
2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics......Page 27
II. LAND AND LABOUR......Page 40
3. Theories of Sharecropping......Page 42
4. A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts......Page 82
5. Contracts with Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships......Page 102
6. Production Relations in Semi-arid African Agriculture......Page 131
III. CREDIT AND INTERLINKED TRANSACTIONS......Page 154
7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency......Page 156
8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure......Page 175
9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality......Page 194
10. On Choice among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts......Page 212
11.Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts among Risk-neutral Agents......Page 230
12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements......Page 246
13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition......Page 252
IV. MARKETING AND INSURANCE......Page 274
14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization......Page 276
15. Peasants\' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts......Page 306
V. CO-OPERATIVES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE......Page 326
16. Agricultural Producer Co-operatives......Page 328
17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-operatives......Page 349
18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State......Page 365
Bibliography......Page 392
E......Page 414
M......Page 415
S......Page 416
Z......Page 417