System Criminality in International Law

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 9
ICTR......Page 11
ICTY......Page 12
International Court of Justice......Page 14
Chile......Page 15
Poland, Supreme National Tribunal......Page 16
United States, Military Court......Page 17
United States of America, Supreme Court......Page 18
UN Charter (1945)......Page 19
Geneva Convention III (1949)......Page 20
Genocide Convention (1948)......Page 21
ICTY Statute (1994)......Page 22
Rome Statute (1998)......Page 23
UN Convention on State Immunity (2004)......Page 24
International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (1996)......Page 25
International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)......Page 26
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006)......Page 27
United Nations Security Council......Page 28
United Nations General Assembly......Page 29
Abbreviations......Page 30
List of contributors......Page 33
1 Introduction......Page 39
1. The role of systems in international crimes......Page 41
2. Causal mechanisms......Page 44
3. Some possible objections......Page 46
4. The individualistic nature of international law with regard to system criminality......Page 50
1. General definition......Page 53
2. Modes of involvement......Page 54
3. Types of collectivities......Page 55
4. System criminality and international crimes......Page 57
III. The role of international responsibility in respect of system criminality......Page 58
IV. Roadmap......Page 62
I. Crimes of obedience......Page 64
II. The policy context......Page 67
III. The use of torture as an instrument of policy......Page 70
IV. Social processes facilitating a policy of torture......Page 72
V. Social processes facilitating participation in torture......Page 74
VI. Conclusion......Page 78
I. Introduction......Page 80
1. Police corruption......Page 84
2. Corporate crime......Page 87
3. Corporate violence......Page 92
III. Corporate killing......Page 94
IV. Getting away with murder......Page 103
V. Conclusion......Page 105
I. Bosnia v Serbia......Page 107
II. Men not abstract entities......Page 110
III. State crime and individual responsibility......Page 116
IV. The liability of men and things......Page 125
V. Three Eichmanns......Page 131
I. Introductory remarks......Page 139
II. The tradition: international responsibility of states as 'collective' responsibility......Page 140
III. State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility in the aftermath of the Second World War......Page 142
IV. In the twilight: the debate on collective responsibility and its repercussions on the solutions adopted towards Germany with regard to both state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility......Page 145
V. After the storm: industrialists and soldiers in the follow-up trials before the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg......Page 151
VI. Making peace in the Cold War: the Allied Powers' change of paradigm with Japan......Page 154
VII. Back to the past: Iraq's responsibility after the Second Gulf War......Page 156
VIII. Back to the future? Individual responsibility in the ICTY trials and state responsibility in the Genocide Case before the ICJ......Page 158
IX. Concluding remarks......Page 164
I. Introductory remarks......Page 165
1. The basics......Page 167
2. Doctrinal considerations......Page 169
III. Command responsibility and JCE compared......Page 176
IV. The doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft as an alternative form of attribution......Page 180
1. Domination of the organization versus freedom of the immediate perpetrator......Page 182
2. Delimitating (indirect) perpetration through another person and co-perpetration along levels of hierarchy......Page 189
V. Conclusion......Page 194
I. Introduction......Page 196
II. JCE: its legal pedigree and further developments of the concept......Page 198
III. Incongruities between the joint criminal enterprise doctrine and system criminality......Page 204
IV. Putting the JCE doctrine to the test: some recent developments in the case law of the ICTY......Page 208
V. In search of alternatives......Page 214
VI. The JCE doctrine revisited......Page 219
I. Introduction......Page 221
II. Superior responsibility......Page 222
a. Scope, nature and punishment......Page 223
b. Superior-subordinate relationship......Page 224
2. System criminality and superior responsibility......Page 226
III. Joint criminal enterprise......Page 227
a. Trial Chamber judgment......Page 230
b. Appeals Chamber judgment......Page 231
2. System criminality and JCE......Page 232
IV. Liability at leadership level......Page 235
V. Concluding remarks......Page 237
I. Introduction......Page 239
II. The concept of criminal organizations......Page 240
1. Conspiracy......Page 244
2. Joint criminal enterprise......Page 245
3. Terrorist organizations......Page 247
4. Transnational organized crime......Page 250
5. Hate crime......Page 252
IV. Is there a need to engage with the Nuremberg concept of criminal organizations in the context of system criminality?......Page 253
V. Conclusion: the concept of criminal organizations in a modern setting......Page 256
I. Introduction......Page 260
II. Empirical typology of criminal responsibility – normative classifications and transgressions......Page 261
2. Cooperative criminality (group 2)......Page 262
3. 'Collective criminality' of organizations in terms of legal entities (group 3)......Page 263
5. The grey zone between 'organized crime' and 'criminality of organizations'......Page 264
III. Development of criminal responsibility of legal, corporate or otherwise collective entities in Europe......Page 265
1. Regulations in genuine criminal law......Page 266
4. Retainment of traditional individual criminal responsibility......Page 267
(b) 'Genuine' recourse to the juristic person......Page 268
2. Basic deficiencies of 'juristic persons'......Page 269
(a) 'Imputation model'......Page 270
(c) 'System contingent model'......Page 271
V. Plea for a complementary collective and individual criminal liability sui generis......Page 272
VI. Outlook......Page 274
I. Introduction......Page 276
II. Organized armed groups and system criminality......Page 279
1. Organized armed groups as 'systems'......Page 280
2. Normative and empirical developments......Page 285
1. Monitoring compliance......Page 288
2. Sanctions......Page 290
3. Reparation......Page 293
IV. From accountability to responsibility?......Page 295
1. State responsibility as a blueprint?......Page 298
2. Attribution......Page 300
3. Content and implementation of international responsibility......Page 302
4. Aggravated responsibility of organized armed groups for system crimes......Page 305
V. Conclusion......Page 306
12 Assumptions and presuppositions: state responsibility for system crimes......Page 308
I. The nature of state responsibility......Page 310
II. 'Injured' and 'interested' states......Page 315
III. Calling a delinquent state to account......Page 318
IV. Remedies and responsibility......Page 321
V. The replication of assumptions: state sovereignty......Page 322
VI. System criminality and the nationality of claims......Page 328
VII. Interested states acting in their own interest......Page 331
VIII. Does state responsibility provide an adequate response to system criminality?......Page 333
I. Introduction......Page 336
1. 'International crimes' and the guarantee of non-repetition......Page 337
2. State crimes and the possible obligation of the responsible state to alter its domestic political system......Page 339
3. State crimes and the obligation to punish individual offenders as a specific form of satisfaction......Page 340
4. State crimes and the issue of punitive damages......Page 344
5. State crimes and the obligation of non-recognition......Page 345
6. State crimes and immunity......Page 349
III. Concluding remarks......Page 350
I. Introduction......Page 352
II. Background......Page 353
III. Political barriers......Page 358
2. Political will......Page 359
3. Determination under Article 39......Page 360
5. Willing volunteers......Page 361
IV. Why responses by political organs?......Page 362
1. Limitations upon the veto......Page 367
2. Duty to act......Page 368
3. Duty on states as UN members......Page 370
4. A role for the General Assembly......Page 371
5. A role for regional organizations......Page 373
VI. Conclusion......Page 375
I. The dynamics of system criminality......Page 376
II. Forms of international responsibility......Page 378
III. Relationship between system criminality and individual responsibility......Page 382
IV. Objectives of international responsibility in regard of system criminality......Page 386
V. Final remarks......Page 390
Index......Page 393