Rethinking Positive and Negative Liberty

Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of tables
Preface and acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction
	1 What is freedom?
	2 Reviving the positive/negative freedom project
	3 What is the revised positive/negative freedom distinction and what are the new positive and negative freedoms?
	4 The utility of the fourfold matrix of freedom
	5 What do Constant, Green and Berlin say about the positive/negative freedom distinction?
1 Benjamin Constant on modern people and their two liberties
	Introduction
	1 Constant’s arguments in Liberty of the Ancients as Compared with That of the Moderns
	2 Justifications of the changed status of ancient liberty
	3 The curious survival of ancient liberty
		3.1 The political rationale
		3.2 The hedonic rationale
		3.3 The virtue rationale
	4 Modern liberty in the political and the moral contexts
		4.1 Modern liberty and its ‘virtue-neutral’ aspect
		4.2 Liberty, morality and satisfaction
	5 On individuality and its link to the duality of freedom
	Conclusion
2 T.H. Green’s true freedom as the paradigm positive liberty concept
	Introduction
	1 Analytical reconstruction of On the Different Senses of ‘Freedom’
	2 The features of true freedom
	3 Freedom and satisfaction
	4 The progressive nature of satisfaction and the development that underpins it
	5 True freedom as acquisition of moral agency
	6 True freedom, moral development and authorities
	7 True freedom as a normative concept: it is possible and desirable
	Conclusion
3 T.H. Green and negative freedom as well-being improvement
	Introduction
	1 Formal freedom: the first freedom and its external conceptual boundaries
	2 Juristic freedom
	3 Analytical reconstruction of the Lecture on Liberal Legislation and conceptual alignment with On the Different Senses of ‘Freedom’
	4 Green’s moral argument in defence of negative freedom
		4.1 Green’s polemic against self-reliance: why true freedom should not be seen as the only freedom
		4.2 Positive/ability freedom as based on a state of citizenship and well-being
	5 The internal freedom boundary
	6 Positive/true freedom
	Conclusion
4 Isaiah Berlin, positive freedom and the impact of moral authorities on human agency
	Introduction
	1 Historical context, ideological positioning and philosophical contribution
	2 Positive freedom as excellence in a recognised field
	3 Self-transformation as the transition from the empirical to the higher self
	4 Berlin’s positive freedom and political authorities
	5 Berlin’s theory of the empirical self and the real threat of moral authorities: positive freedom and value affirmation
	6 The pathologies of self-transformation and the normal agency capable of freedom
	7 The third criterion for the distinction between positive and negative freedom and how the two freedoms swap places
	8 Why the substantive objective of development matters for liberal theory: the issue of perfectionism
	Conclusion
5 Berlin’s negative freedom and the conceptual work of the boundaries of liberty
	Introduction
	1 Berlin’s negative freedom and personal well-being
	2 Negative freedom as non-interference: can a liberty principle really be simple?
		2.1 Non-interference and agency
		2.2 Non-interference and external factors
		2.3 Non-interference and the ideal scope of negative freedom
	3 Negative freedom as defined by a frontier and an area
		3.1 Beyond the frontier
		3.2 Within the frontier: the fluctuation between the minimal and maximal area of negative freedom
	4 The external threats to negative freedom
		4.1 The ‘open doors’ metaphor and the need for democracy
		4.2 Negative liberty and socioeconomic conditions
	5 Berlin and the fourfold freedom matrix
	Conclusion
6 Value pluralism and the duality of freedom
	Introduction
	1 Is monism the villain of value pluralism?
	2 Negative freedom and values: Gray’s provision of the missing link
	3 The moral development underpinning the practice of values
	4 The sources of incommensurability of values
	5 The implications of value pluralism for the distinction between positive and negative freedom
	6 Explaining the dynamics of the positive/negative freedom distinction
	Conclusion
Conclusion
References
Index