Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of contents
Figures
Tables
Contributors
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part I Argumentation, bias and arrogance
	1 Reassessing different conceptions of argumentation
		Introduction
		1. Argumentation as straightforwardly truth conducive
		2. Argumentation as war
		3. Argumentation as therapy
		4. Argumentation as epistemic exchange
		5. Conclusions
		Notes
		References
	2 Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues and vices
		1. Argumentation
		2. Two critics of martial metaphors: Cohen and Rooney
		3. Metaphors, virtues, and vices
		4. Metaphorical density
		5. From martial virtues to argumentative vices
		6. Metaphors, myopia, and masculinity
		Acknowledgements
		References
	3 Arrogance and deep disagreement
		1. The second-highest mountain
		2. Deep disagreement
		3. Prominence and depth
		4. Arguing virtuously or viciously
		5. Arrogance
		6. Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	4 Closed-mindedness and arrogance
		1. Closed-mindedness
		2. Arrogance
		3. Closed-mindedness without arrogance
		4. Closed-mindedness with arrogance
		Notes
		References
Part II Trust, dogmatism and arrogance in social contexts
	5 Intellectual trust and the marketplace of ideas
		1. Marketplaces of ideas
		2. The problem of offensive speech
		3. Markets and trust
		4. Intellectual trust
		5. Offensive speech
		6. Conclusion
		Notes
		Bibliography
	6 Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant?
		The conflation hypothesis and the illusion of knowledge
		From knowledge conflation to intellectual arrogance
		Extended cognition and extended knowledge
		An alternative hypothesis
		Knowledge access and intellectual humility
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	7 Intellectual humility and the curse of knowledge
		Introduction
		Epistemic egocentrism
		Intellectual humility
		Are the epistemically egocentric more likely to be intellectually humble?
		Virtues and biases
		Limitations of my account
		Conclusion
		Notes
		Works Cited
	8 Bullshit and dogmatism: A discourse analytical perspective
		Introduction
		Bullshit in the context of discursive untruthfulness
		Lying, rhetorical bullshitting and dogmatic bullshit
		Examining suspect deposits
		Ethical judgement and epistemic negligence
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Part III Polarisation
	9 Polarisation and the problem of spreading arrogance
		1. Epistemic attitudes and intellectual arrogance
		2. Epistemic spillovers and political disagreement
		3. Arrogance and deep disagreement
		Notes
		References
	10 Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to win
		1. Reasoning as a collective enterprise: individual biases as features rather than bugs
		2. Steadfastness and overconfidence: vice or virtue
		3. Transient diversity, stalemates, polarisation
		Notes
		References
	11 Partisanship, humility, and epistemic polarisation
		Introduction
		1. From partisanship to intellectual humility
		2. Study 1: A preliminary investigation
			2.1. Methods
			2.2. Results
			2.3. Discussion
		3. Study 2: Investigating epistemic polarisation
			3.1. Methods
			3.2. Results
			3.3. Discussion
		4. General discussion
		Notes
		References
	12 Science denial, polarisation, and arrogance
		The elements of science denial
		Fighting science denial
		Changing minds within an experimental setting
		Probably not online
		Changing minds in the real world
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	13 The polarisation toolkit
		1
		2
		3
		4
		Notes
		References
	14 Epistemic rights in a polarised world: The right to know and the abortion debate
		1. Why the abortion debate?
		2. Epistemic rights in the abortion debate
			2.1. Case Study 1: The right to information about abortion
			2.2. Case Study 2: The right to an informed public debate about abortion
		3. What harms are caused by epistemic rights violations in the abortion debate?
		4. Why understand the abortion debate in terms of epistemic rights?
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Index