Modern Macroeconomics with Historical Perspectives (New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 67)

Preface
	References
Contents
Contributors
1 Declining Population Growth and the Serendipity Theorem
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 The Basic Overlapping Generations Model and the Serendipity Theorem
	1.3 Population Growth, Social Welfare, and Capital Accumulation
	1.4 Cobb–Douglas Preference and CES Technology
	1.5 Optimum Population Growth Rate
		1.5.1 Maximization of Indirect Social Welfare Function
		1.5.2 Optimum Population Rate
		1.5.3 Negative Optimum Population Rates
		1.5.4 Effects of Parameter Changes
	1.6 Technological Innovation and Optimum Population Growth
	1.7 Concluding Remarks
	Appendix
		Proof of   dk̃/dn < 0
		Derivation of (1Equ321.32) and (1Equ331.33)
		Proof of   dk/dn < dk̃/dn< dk/dn< 0  in Fig. 1.1a
		Proof of   dk̃/dn < dk / dn < 0 < dk / dn  in the Unstable Case
		Proof of   dk/dn < dk̃/dn< d k/dn < 0  in Fig. 1.2a
	References
2 Consumption of Leisure Goods, Leisure Time, and Inheritance of Tastes for Leisure in an Overlapping Generations Model
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 The Model
		2.2.1 Framework
		2.2.2 An Individual
		2.2.3 Firms
		2.2.4 Equilibrium
	2.3 Comparative Statics: Effects of Preference and Productivity
		2.3.1 Effects of Preference for Leisure
		2.3.2 Effects of Capital Intensity
	2.4 Numerical Example
	2.5 Conclusion
	Appendix
		Proof of Proposition 2
	References
3 Overlapping Generations Model with Relative Preference for Children\'s Human Capital
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 The Model
		3.2.1 Individuals
		3.2.2 Firms
		3.2.3 Equilibrium
	3.3 Social Optimum
	3.4 Optimal Policy
	3.5 Conclusion
	Appendix
		Derivation of the Socially Optimum Conditions for the Balanced Growth Path
		Derivation of the Optimal Subsidy/Tax Rate
		Derivation of the Interest Rate in the Case of To == 0
	References
4 The Impact of Life Insurance on Human Capital Investment During the Steady Growth Period in Japan: Simulation Analysis in an Overlapping Generations Model with Endogenous Growth
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 Model
		4.2.1 Individuals
		4.2.2 Firms
		4.2.3 Government
		4.2.4 Equilibrium
	4.3 Parameter Settings
	4.4 Simulation Results
	4.5 Conclusion
	References
5 The Effects of Patience in a Growth Model with Infrastructure and a Related Externality
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 The Model
		5.2.1 The Case of Increasing Marginal Impatience
		5.2.2 The Case of Decreasing Marginal Impatience
	5.3 Unique Equilibrium Situation
		5.3.1 The Benchmark Case
		5.3.2 Verification of Numerical Results
	5.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
	5.5 Concluding Remarks
	Appendix
		Supplementary Figures
	References
6 Intergenerational Inequalities and Policy Options for Achieving Generational Balance in Japan
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 The Methodology of Generational Accounting
		6.2.1 The Model
			6.2.1.1 The Fiscal Burden Facing Future Generation
			6.2.1.2 Indicator of Generational Imbalance
		6.2.2 Assumptions Underlying Generational Accounting Calculations
			6.2.2.1 Fiscal Data
			6.2.2.2 Growth and Discount Rates
			6.2.2.3 Population
			6.2.2.4 Reflect the Impact of Changes in the System on Generational Accounting
	6.3 Findings: Basic Results and Comparisons
		6.3.1 Generational Accounting for 2019
			6.3.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
		6.3.2 Comparison with Generational Accounts for 2010 and 2015
	6.4 Policy Options for Restoring Generational Balance
		6.4.1 Alternative Policy Measures for Restoring Generational Balance
		6.4.2 Achieving Generational Balance: Policy Simulation
			6.4.2.1 Achieving Generational Balance Through Increased Burden and Decreased Benefits
			6.4.2.2 Achieving Generational Balance Through Increased Income Tax Burden
			6.4.2.3 Achieving Generational Balance Through Increased Consumption Tax Burden
			6.4.2.4 Net Tax Burden of Future Generations When Generational Balance Achieved
		6.4.3 The Menu of Delayed Pain
		6.4.4 Policy Mixes for Restoring Generational Balance
		6.4.5 Preferable Policy Measures for Achieving Generational Balance
			6.4.5.1 Generational Conflicts of Interest
	6.5 Conclusion
	References
7 Social Security Finance in Japan: Trends, Issues, and Some Measures for Stabilization
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Benefits and Financial Resources of Social Security
		7.2.1 Outline of Social Security System and Trends of the Benefits
			7.2.1.1 Outline of the System
			7.2.1.2 Trends of the Benefits
		7.2.2 Financial Resources for Social Security
	7.3 Basic Issues Related to Social Security Finance
		7.3.1 National Burden Ratio and Latent National Burden Ratio
		7.3.2 Changes in Population and Disease Structure
	7.4 Some Measures for Stabilization of the Social Security System
		7.4.1 Comprehensive Reform of Social Security and Tax
		7.4.2 Promotion of Preventive Health Care
	7.5 Summary and Future Directions
	References
8 The Effect of Political Uncertainty and Political Lobbying
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 Model
		8.2.1 Basic Setting
		8.2.2 Effect of Political Uncertainty and Lobbying on Level of Public Investment
	8.3 Empirical Analysis
		8.3.1 Japanese Politics Between 2007 and 2017
		8.3.2 Definition of Variables
		8.3.3 Methodology
		8.3.4 Result
	8.4 Conclusion
	Appendix
	References
9 A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Electric Utility in Modern City Formation in Japan
	9.1 Introduction
	9.2 Overview of Sendai Municipal Electric Utility
	9.3 Urban Development Policy and Sendai City
	9.4 Overview of Local City Finances
		9.4.1 Local City Finances in the Late Taisho Period
		9.4.2 Finances of Sendai in the Late Taisho Period
	9.5 SMEU as a “The Fiscal Treasury”
		9.5.1 Establishment of SMEU and Increase in Electricity Demand
		9.5.2 Aspects of the Electric Utility Special Account
			9.5.2.1 Special Account Electric Utility
			9.5.2.2 Special Account Electric Utility Expenditures
			9.5.2.3 Special Account Electric Utility Reserve Fund
	9.6 Concluding Remarks
	References
10 Concentration and Agglomeration in Spatial Monopoly, Spatial Duopoly, and Spatial Competition
	10.1 Introduction
	10.2 The Model
		10.2.1 Framework
		10.2.2 Households
		10.2.3 Firms
	10.3 The Centralized and Decentralized Cities
		10.3.1 The Centralized City: Spatial Monopoly
		10.3.2 The Decentralized City: Löschian Dispersed Entry
		10.3.3 The Centralized City: Entry at Market Center à la Cournot
	10.4 Comparative Statistics
		10.4.1 Comparative Static Properties
		10.4.2 Structure of the Urban Economy
	10.5 Concentration and Agglomeration
	10.6 Concluding Remarks
	References