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از ساعت 7 صبح تا 10 شب
ویرایش: 6
نویسندگان: Ivan Png
سری:
ISBN (شابک) : 1032145404, 9781032145402
ناشر: Routledge
سال نشر: 2022
تعداد صفحات: 341
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 17 مگابایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Managerial Economics به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب اقتصاد مدیریتی نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
Cover Half Title Endorsement Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the Author Chapter 1 Introduction to Managerial Economics 1.1 What Is Managerial Economics? 1.2 Value Added 1.3 Decision-Making 1.4 Bounded Rationality Sunk-cost Fallacy Status Quo Bias Anchoring 1.5 Organization Organizational Boundaries Outsourcing 1.6 Markets Competitive Markets Market Power Imperfect Markets Sources Part I Competitive Markets Chapter 2 Demand 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Individual Demand Construction Marginal Benefit Preferences 2.3 Demand and Income Income Changes Normal and Inferior Products 2.4 Other Factors in Demand Complements and Substitutes Advertising Business Demand 2.5 Buyer Surplus Benefit Benefit and Expenditure Price Changes Package Deals and Two-Part Pricing 2.6 Market Demand Market Demand Curve: Construction Sources Chapter 3 Elasticity 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Own-Price Elasticity Estimation Properties Accuracy Elastic/inelastic Demand 3.3 Forecasting Quantity Demanded Expenditure Pricing Strategy 3.4 Behavioral Factors Benefits/costs of Economizing Availability of Substitutes Buyer’s Prior Commitments Adjustment Time Sunk-cost Fallacy Anchoring 3.5 Other Elasticities Income Elasticity Cross-price Elasticity Advertising Elasticity Forecasting Multiple Factors Sources Chapter 4 Supply 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Short-Run Costs Fixed and Variable Costs Marginal Cost Average Cost Production Technology 4.3 Short-Run Individual Supply Production Rate Break-even Analysis Individual Supply Curve 4.4 Long-Run Individual Supply Long-run Costs Production Rate Break-even Analysis Individual Supply Curve 4.5 Market Supply Short and Long Run Properties 4.6 Elasticity of Supply Price Elasticity Intuitive Factors Available Production Capacity Adjustment Time 4.7 Seller Surplus Market Supply Curve: Construction Short Run Long Run Sources Chapter 5 Market Equilibrium 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Competition 5.3 Market Equilibrium Demand and Supply Excess Supply Excess Demand 5.4 Demand Shift Equilibrium Change Price Elasticity of Supply Price Elasticity of Demand 5.5 Supply Shift 5.6 Intermediation Buyer’s Price and Seller’s Price Incidence 5.7 Invisible Hand Economic Efficiency Two Roles of Prices Distortion Sources Part II Market Power Chapter 6 Costs 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Economic Cost 6.3 Opportunity Cost Alternative Courses of Action Identifying Opportunity Cost Decision-making 6.4 Sunk Costs Alternative Courses of Action Identifying Sunk Costs Decision-making Strategic Implications 6.5 Economies of Scale Fixed and Variable Costs Marginal and Average Costs Diseconomies of Scale Strategic Implications Sunk and Fixed Costs 6.6 Economies of Scope Joint Cost Strategic Implications Diseconomies of Scope 6.7 Bounded Rationality Status Quo Bias Sunk-cost Fallacy Fixed-cost Fallacy Sources Chapter 7 Monopoly 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Sources of Market Power Product Differentiation Intellectual Property Economies of Scale and Scope Regulation 7.3 Profit Maximum Revenue Costs Profit-maximizing Rate Break-even Analysis Profit Measures 7.4 Demand and Cost Changes Demand Change Marginal Cost Change Fixed-cost Change 7.5 Advertising Profit-maximizing Advertising Advertising–sales Ratio 7.6 Research and Development 7.7 Market Structure 7.8 Monopsony Benefit and Expenditure Maximizing Net Benefit Sources Chapter 8 Pricing 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Uniform Pricing Price Elasticity Profit-maximizing Price Demand and Cost Changes Common Misconceptions 8.3 Complete Price Discrimination Shortcomings of Uniform Pricing Price Discrimination Economic Efficiency Information and Resale 8.4 Direct Segment Discrimination Homogeneous Segments Heterogeneous Segments Implementation 8.5 Indirect Segment Discrimination Structured Choice Implementation 8.6 Selecting the Pricing Policy Technology Cannibalization Sources Chapter 9 Strategic Thinking 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Nash Equilibrium Definition Solving Equilibrium – Formal Method Solving Equilibrium – Informal Method Non-equilibrium Strategies 9.3 Randomized Strategies Nash Equilibrium in Randomized Strategies Why Randomize? 9.4 Competition Or Coordination 9.5 Sequencing Backward Induction Equilibrium Strategy First-mover Advantage 9.6 Strategic Move 9.7 Conditional Strategic Move Promise Threat Solving Nash Equilibrium in Randomized Strategies Graphical Solution Algebraic Solution Note Sources Part III Imperfect Markets Chapter 10 Externalities 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Positive Externality Individual Maximum Joint Maximum 10.3 Negative Externality 10.4 Benchmark Common Ownership Agreement Assignment of Rights Free-riding 10.5 Network Effects and Externalities Critical Mass Expectations Tipping Price Elasticity 10.6 Public Goods Rivalness Benchmark: Economic Efficiency 10.7 Excludability Content and Delivery Law Technology Sources Chapter 11 Asymmetric Information 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Imperfect Information Imperfect and Asymmetric Information Risk Risk Aversion 11.3 Adverse Selection Demand and Supply Market Equilibrium Economic Inefficiency Market Failure 11.4 Appraisal 11.5 Screening Self-selection Differentiating Variables 11.6 Signaling 11.7 Contingent Contracts Sources Chapter 12 Incentives and Organization 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Moral Hazard Asymmetric Information About Actions Economic Inefficiency Degree of Moral Hazard 12.3 Monitoring and Incentives Monitoring Incentives Risk 12.4 Holdup Specific Investments Incomplete Contracts 12.5 Ownership Residual Income Vertical Integration 12.6 Organizational Architecture Holdup Moral Hazard Internal Market Power Economies of Scale and Scope Balance Sources Chapter 13 Regulation 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Natural Monopoly Government Ownership Price Regulation Rate-of-return Regulation 13.3 Potentially Competitive Market Competition Law Conduct Regulation Structural Regulation 13.4 Asymmetric Information Disclosure Conduct Regulation Structural Regulation 13.5 Externalities User Fee/tax Quota/standard 13.6 Global Externalities Multilateral Regulation Information and Biases 13.7 Contingent Externalities Sources Index