Games of Strategy

Cover (Games of Strategy) ... 1
Front Matter ... 2
	Title page ... 4
	Copyright ... 5
	Contents ... 8
	Preface ... 21
Part One - Introduction and General Principles ... 24
	1 - Basic Ideas and Examples ... 26
		1 What is a Game of Strategy? ... 27
		2 Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games ... 29
		3 Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy ... 37
	2 - How to Think about Strategic Games ... 40
		1 Decisions Versus Games ... 41
		2 Classifying Games ... 43
		3 Some Terminology and Background Assumptions ... 50
		4 The Uses of Game Theory ... 59
		5 The Structure of the Chapters to Follow ... 61
Part Two - Concepts and Techniques ... 68
	3 - Games with Sequential Moves ... 70
		1 Game Trees ... 71
		2 Solving Games by Using Trees ... 75
		3 Adding More Players ... 80
		4 Order Advantages ... 85
		5 Adding More Moves ... 86
		6 Evidence Concerning Rollback ... 94
		7 Strategies in Survivor ... 98
	4 - Simultaneous-Move Games: Discrete Strategies ... 114
		1 Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games with Discrete Strategies ... 115
		2 Nash Equilibrium ... 117
		3 Dominance ... 122
		4 Best-Response Analysis ... 129
		5 Three Players ... 131
		6 Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies ... 134
		7 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies ... 141
	5 - Simultaneous- Move Games: Continuous Strategies, Discussion, and Evidence ... 156
		1 Pure Strategies that are Continuous Variables ... 157
		2 Critical Discussion of the Nash Equilibrium Concept ... 166
		3 Rationalizability ... 172
		4 Empirical Evidence Concerning Nash Equilibrium ... 178
	6 - Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves ... 203
		1 Games with both Simultaneous and Sequential Moves ... 204
		2 Changing the Order of Moves in a Game ... 210
		3 Change in the Method of Analysis ... 217
		4 Three-Player Games ... 223
	7 - Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies ... 237
		1 What is a Mixed Strategy? ... 238
		2 Mixing Moves ... 239
		3 Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Responses ... 244
		4 Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games ... 245
		5 General Discussion of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria ... 250
		6 Mixing When One Player has Threeor More Pure Strategies ... 256
		7 Mixing When Both Players have Three Strategies ... 260
		8 How to Use Mixed Strategies in Practice ... 265
		9 Evidence on Mixing ... 267
Part Three - Some Broad Classes of Games and Strategies ... 292
	8 - Uncertainty and Information ... 294
		1 Imperfect Information: Dealing with Risk ... 296
		2 Asymmetric Information: Basic Ideas ... 302
		3 Direct Communication, or “Cheap Talk” ... 304
		4 Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening ... 317
		5 Signaling in the Labor Market ... 327
		6 Equilibria in Two -Player Signaling Games ... 333
		Appendix: Risk Attitudes and Bayes’ Theorem ... 358
		1 Attitudes Toward Risk And Expected Utility ... 358
		2 Infering Probabilities from observing consequences ... 361
	9 - Strategic Moves ... 365
		1 A Classification of Strategic Moves ... 366
		2 Credibility of Strategic Moves ... 369
		3 Commitments ... 371
		4 Threats and Promises ... 375
		5 Some Additional Topics ... 383
		6 Acquiring Credibility ... 385
		7 Countering Your Opponent’s Strategic Moves ... 391
	10 - The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games ... 400
		1 The Basic Game (Review) ... 401
		2 Solutions I: Repetition ... 402
		3 Solutions II: Penalties and Rewards ... 412
		4 Solutions III: Leadership ... 415
		5 Experimental Evidence ... 418
		6 Real-World Dilemmas ... 422
		Appendix: Infinite Sums ... 437
	11 - Collective-Action Games ... 440
		1 Collective-Action Games with Two Players ... 441
		2 Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups ... 446
		3 Spillovers, or Externalities ... 454
		4 A Brief History of Ideas ... 466
		5 “Help!”: A Game of Chicken with Mixed Strategies ... 477
	12 - Evolutionary Games ... 488
		1 The Framework ... 489
		2 Prisoners’ Dilemma ... 493
		3 Chicken ... 502
		4 The Assurance Game ... 505
		5 Three Phenotypes in the Population ... 507
		6 The Hawk–Dove Game ... 511
		7 Interactions by Population and Across Species ... 518
		8 Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism ... 522
	13 - Mechanism Design ... 538
		1 Price Discrimination ... 539
		3 Cost-Plus and Fixed-Price Contracts ... 545
		4 Evidence Concerning Information Revelation Mechanisms ... 550
		5 Incentives for Effort: The Simplest Case ... 552
		6 Incentives for Effort: Evidence and Extensions ... 560
Part Four - Applications to Specific Strategic Situations ... 580
	14 - Brinkmanship the Cuban Missile Crisis ... 582
		1 A Brief Narrative of Events ... 583
		2 A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation ... 590
		3 Accounting for additional complexities ... 592
		4 A Probabilistic Threat ... 598
		5 Practicing Brinkmanship ... 602
	15 - Strategy and Voting ... 612
		1 Voting Rules and Procedures ... 613
		2 Voting Paradoxes ... 617
		3 Evaluating voting systems ... 623
		4 Strategic Manipulation of Votes ... 627
		5 The Median Voter Theorem ... 636
	16 - Bidding Strategy and Auction Design ... 655
		1 Types of Auctions ... 656
		2 The Winner’s Curse ... 659
		3 Bidding Strategies ... 662
		4 All-Pay Auctions ... 665
		5 How to Sell at Auction ... 668
		6 Some Added Twists to Consider ... 672
		7 aditional reading ... 679
	17 - Bargaining ... 686
		1 Nash’s Cooperative Solution ... 688
		2 Variable-Threat Bar ... 695
		3 Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays ... 697
		4 Experimental Evidence ... 700
		5 Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience ... 703
		6 Manipulating Information in Bargaining ... 708
		7 Bargaining with Many Parties and Issues ... 711
Glossary ... 718
Index ... 735