Game Theory with Applications in Operations Management

Preface
	How to Use This Book
	Acknowledgements
Contents
About the Author
1 Operations Management: A Curtain Raiser
	References
2 Game Theory: Primitives and Representations
	2.1 Preferences and Utility
	2.2 Representations of Games
		2.2.1 Normal-form (or Strategic-form)
		2.2.2 Extensive-form
		2.2.3 Characteristic-form
	2.3 Game Theory Meets Operations Management
	References
3 Games in Normal Form
	3.1 Examples
	3.2 Mixed Strategies in Normal-form Games
	3.3 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
		3.3.1 Computing the Optimal Strategies for Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
	3.4 Solution Concepts for Games in Normal Form
		3.4.1 Pareto Optimality
		3.4.2 Domination
		3.4.3 Nash Equilibrium
		3.4.4 Preplay Communication and Correlated Equilibrium
		3.4.5 Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
	References
4 Games in Normal Form: Applications in OM
	4.1 Inventory Games
	4.2 Traffic Planning
	4.3 Airline Alliances
	4.4 Supply Chain Contracts
		4.4.1 Wholesale-Price Contract
		4.4.2 Buyback Contract
		4.4.3 Revenue-Sharing Contract
	4.5 Blockchains
	References
5 Games in Extensive Form
	5.1 Examples
	5.2 Strategies in Extensive-Form Games
	5.3 Solution Concepts for Games in Extensive Form
		5.3.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
		5.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium
	References
6 Games in Extensive Form: Applications in OM
	6.1 Capacity Decisions
	6.2 Leadership in Supply Chains
	6.3 Cheap Talk in Operations Management
	6.4 Extensive-Form Inventory Games
	References
7 Games in Characteristic Form
	7.1 Examples
	7.2 Some Definitions for Characteristic-Form Games
	7.3 Solution Concepts
		7.3.1 The Core
		7.3.2 Shapley Value
	References
8 Games in Characteristic Form: Applications in OM
	8.1 Inventory Centralization in Supply Chains
	8.2 Service Systems
	8.3 Towards Sustainability
		8.3.1 Recycling Coalitions
		8.3.2 GREEN Game
	8.4 Logistics Networks
	8.5 SHAP Algorithm
		8.5.1 Explanation Models
		8.5.2 Explanation Models in Quality Modeling
	8.6 Aumann–Shapley Pricing
	References
9 Mechanism Design and Auctions
	9.1 Examples
		9.1.1 Procurement Problem
		9.1.2 Mechanism Design: Comments
		9.1.3 More Examples
	9.2 Mechanism Design: Formalism
		9.2.1 Revelation Principle
		9.2.2 Procurement Problem Revisited
	9.3 Auctions
		9.3.1 Desiderata for Auctions
		9.3.2 Efficient Auctions
		9.3.3 Optimal Auctions
		9.3.4 Combinatorial Auctions
	References
10 Mechanism Design and Auctions: Applications in OM
	10.1 10.2 Sponsored Search Markets
		10.1.1 Generalized Second-Price (GSP) Auction
		10.1.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism
	10.2 Community Sensing
	10.3 Physical Internet
	10.4 Mechanism Design for Systems Engineering
	References
Index