Essays on the Visualisation of Legal Informatics (Law, Governance and Technology Series, 54)

Preface
	References
Contents
Part I: Legal Visualisation
	Chapter 1: Introduction
		1.1 Textuality Will Decline and Programming Will Increase
		1.2 A General Schema for Visualisation
		1.3 Differences Between Verbal Writing and Pictorial Writing
		1.4 Situational Visualisation
		References
	Chapter 2: Situation Versus Case
		2.1 Examples of Situations
		2.2 Characterisation of Situations and Cases
		2.3 On a Notation for Situations
		References
	Chapter 3: Visualisation as a Tertium Comparationis Within Multilingual Communities
		3.1 A Link from the Visualisation of Meaning to Tertium Comparationis
		3.2 Communication Patterns
			3.2.1 Tertium Communicationis-The Third in Communication
			3.2.2 Communication Top-down and Bottom-up and Translation
			3.2.3 Two Directions: From Natural Language to Professional Juristic Language and Vice Versa
		3.3 From Text to Visualisation and to Model
			3.3.1 Text-Visualisation Correspondence
			3.3.2 Visual Products as Tertium Comparationis
		References
	Chapter 4: Structural Legal Visualisation
		4.1 Proposed Variants of Structural Legal Visualisation
		4.2 Motivation
		4.3 Legal Visualisation
		4.4 Dynamic SLV
		4.5 Static SLV
			4.5.1 Incremental SLV
			4.5.2 Alternate Focuses SLV
			4.5.3 Legal Narratives
		4.6 Related Work
			4.6.1 Specifics of SLV: Visualising Legal Meanings
			4.6.2 Relevance of Legal Visualisation to Computing
			4.6.3 Information Visualisation
			4.6.4 Knowledge Visualisation
		References
	Chapter 5: Distinguishing Between Knowledge Visualisation and Knowledge Representation in Legal Informatics
		5.1 On Knowledge Visualisation
		5.2 Knowledge Representation
		5.3 Legal Informatics
		5.4 Distinct Approaches in Legal Informatics
		References
	Chapter 6: Criteria for Multidimensional Visualisation in Law
		6.1 How Is Multidimensionality Exploited?
		6.2 Visualisations in JURIX 2012 Proceedings
		6.3 Visualisation Criteria
		References
Part II: On Legal Theory
	Chapter 7: Is and Ought
		7.1 Distinguishing Ought from Is and Law from Legal Science
		7.2 Two Dualisms: Is-Meaning (Sein-Sinn) and Is-Ought (Sein-Sollen)
		7.3 Is Does Not Imply Ought
		7.4 Subsumption as a Bridge Between Is and Ought
		References
	Chapter 8: Visualisation of Hans Kelsen´s Pure Theory of Law
		8.1 Legal Theory as Middle-Ranged Abstraction
		8.2 Historical Position
		8.3 Is and Ought: Causality and Imputation
			8.3.1 Central and Peripheral Imputation
			8.3.2 No Long Series of Imputation
		8.4 Interpretations
			8.4.1 The Interpretation of Factual Reality
			8.4.2 The Interpretation of Legal Texts
			8.4.3 The Interpretation of Legal Acts
		8.5 Construction
			8.5.1 Double Norm
			8.5.2 Hierarchy of Norms
		8.6 Purification: A Deconstruction
		8.7 Legal Norms, Legal Sentences and Legal Terms
		References
	Chapter 9: From Kelsen´s PTL to Yoshino´s Logical Jurisprudence
		9.1 Introduction to Yoshino´s Logical Jurisprudence
		9.2 PTL and Logical Jurisprudence as Parallel Systems to Law
		9.3 Visualisation of Yoshino´s Legal Jurisprudence
			9.3.1 Legal Sentences
			9.3.2 Three Primitives: Legal Sentence, Validity and Inference Rule
				9.3.2.1 Connections of Legal Sentences
				9.3.2.2 Legal Inference
			9.3.3 Fundamental Legal Meta-Rule Sentence (FLMRS)
			9.3.4 Basic Legal Meta-Rule Sentence (BLMRS)
		9.4 Comparison of Yoshino´s LJ with Kelsen´s PTL
		References
	Chapter 10: Semiotic Aspects of Law and Legal Science
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Separation of Law and Legal Science from the Point of View of Semiotics
		References
	Chapter 11: Content Meaning and Institutional Meaning of a Legal Act
		11.1 Content Meaning and Institutional Meaning
		11.2 Strengthening or Lessening the Meaning
			11.2.1 Strengthening or Lessening of the Content Meaning
			11.2.2 Political Frame as Context in Semiotics
		11.3 Relating Institutional Meaning with Representation
		11.4 Representing Abstract Objects in Computers
		References
Part III: Legal Norm
	Chapter 12: Extended Legal Thesaurus: Legal Terms as a Modally Indifferent Substrate
		12.1 The Granularity Problem
		12.2 The Ought-Action Structure of Norm and Deontic Modalities
		12.3 Hypothetical (Conditional) and Categorical Norms
		12.4 Taxonomy of Norms by Subject-Modus-Action-Object Structure
		12.5 Extended Legal Thesaurus
		References
	Chapter 13: Normative Resultants
		13.1 The Structural Elements of Rule
		13.2 The Unified Status
		13.3 The Summary Status
		13.4 An Example: A Girl with Her Father in a Café
		13.5 Synthesizing Normative Status
		References
	Chapter 14: Legal Frameworks of Three-Dimensional Virtual Worlds
		14.1 Need for Legal Frameworks in Virtual Worlds
		14.2 The Frame of a Virtual World
		14.3 Principles of Construction of a Virtual World Legal Framework
			14.3.1 Three Legal Stages
			14.3.2 Formalising Rules: Technical, Legal and Energy Rules
		14.4 Related Work
		References
	Chapter 15: Legal Taboos
		15.1 Definition of Taboo
		15.2 Formalising Taboo as a Prohibition to Speak
		15.3 Three Levels of Norms on Prohibition
		15.4 Taboo on a Combination of Three Elements of a Relation
		15.5 Related Work on Pluralistic Ignorance
		References
Part IV: Text-Document
	Chapter 16: Dual Textuality of Law
		16.1 Textuality of Law
		16.2 Legal Informatics: A Bridge from Law to Its Representation in Computer
		References
	Chapter 17: Legal Norms and Legal Institutions as a Challenge for Legal Informatics
		17.1 Impact of Legal Informatics from Periphery to the Centre of Law
		17.2 Legal Texts and Legal Documents
		17.3 Legal Norms and Legal Documents
		17.4 Notations for Legal Norms
		17.5 Modally Indifferent Substrate and Representing Normativity in Situations
		17.6 A Film Example: Situational Visualisation of a Court Judgment
		References
	Chapter 18: Different Views to Legal Information Systems: Separate Legal Meanings and Legal Sublevels
		18.1 The Notion of Legal Sublevel
		18.2 The Approach: Different Meanings in Distinct Representations
		18.3 A Shift from a Hierarchy to a Network
		18.4 Erich Schweighofer´s 8 Views/4 Methods/4 Syntheses Approach
		18.5 The Notion of a View
		References
	Chapter 19: Logic-Oriented Methods for Structuring in the Context of Lawmaking
		19.1 Adding Logic-Oriented Information to Legislative Documents
		19.2 Theme 1: Three Layers
		19.3 Theme 2: Logic for the Professional Quality of the Text
		19.4 Theme 3: Middle-Level Abstraction
			19.4.1 Formal Abstraction
			19.4.2 Middle-Level Abstraction
			19.4.3 Substantive Abstraction
		19.5 Only Selective Application of Logic
		19.6 Logic Expands Interpretation
		References
Part V: Subsumption. Legal Relations
	Chapter 20: Legal Subsumption
		20.1 Explaining Legal Subsumption
		20.2 Modelling Cognitive Subsumption with the Instance-of Relationship
		References
	Chapter 21: Formalising Legal Relations
		21.1 A Variety of Relations in Law
		21.2 Definition of Relation in Mathematics
		21.3 Relations in Law and the Layers of Law
		21.4 Statements About Relations
		21.5 On Peter Chen´s Entity-Relationship Model
		References
	Chapter 22: Tertium Comparationis in Law: Variations on Arthur Kaufmann´s Theme
		22.1 Legal Relations Replace Substances
		22.2 Indirect Relations and Tertium Comparationis
		22.3 Towards an Ontology of Relations
		References
Part VI: Legal Machines and Compliance
	Chapter 23: Multisensory Legal Machines and Production of Legal Acts
		23.1 Machines and Humans Are Similar in Legal Context
		23.2 Legal Machines in Context
		23.3 An Analogy Between Machines and Humans
			23.3.1 Actor, Norm and Role
			23.3.2 Situational Flexibility
			23.3.3 Multiple Human Senses: Multiple Formats
			23.3.4 Multisensory Law Is at the Periphery of Textual Law
			23.3.5 Multisensority in Procedural Law
		23.4 Formalising Legal Machine as Encapsulation
			23.4.1 Human-in-Machine Is Similar to Human-in-Animal Encapsulation in the Ancient World
			23.4.2 Transforming Humans into Animals and Machines
			23.4.3 Encapsulation and Goals
		23.5 Examples of Encapsulation
			23.5.1 Representing Communication via Phone and Skype as Encapsulation
			23.5.2 Encapsulations into Human: X-in-Human
		23.6 Related Work
		References
	Chapter 24: Formulating the Compliance Problem
		24.1 The Problem: Is Software Compliant with the Law?
		24.2 Motivating the Research
			24.2.1 E-identity and E-banking Within the STORK 2.0 Project
			24.2.2 Formulating the Regulatory Compliance Problem for Software
			24.2.3 Limitations when Representing the Law in the Context of Enterprise Architecture
		24.3 A Variety of Factors to Comply with
		24.4 Elements of Enterprise System
		24.5 Enterprise Compliance Process
		24.6 The Legal Perspective in Enterprise Engineering
		24.7 Towards a Methodology of the Compliance with the Law
		References
	Chapter 25: Software Transparency for Design of Legal Machines
		25.1 Compliance Implies Transparency
		25.2 Transparency of Legal Machines
		25.3 Notes on Compliance
		25.4 The Context of Justice in the Paradigm Change to E-Procedures
			25.4.1 The Principle of Equality Before the Law
			25.4.2 Subsumption Is Delegated to Parties in E-Procedures
		25.5 Transparency in Software Engineering
		References
Part VII: Human Digitalities
	Chapter 26: Towards Human Digitalities
		26.1 Evolution
		26.2 From Digital Humanities Towards Human Digitalities
		26.3 Technocratic Governance in Instrumentalised National States
		References
	Chapter 27: Multiphase Transformation: From Legal Text to Program
		27.1 Text to Program Transformation
		27.2 One-Bridge Formalisations
		27.3 Multi-Arch Bridge Implies Multiphase Transformation
		27.4 Approaches to the Transformation `Legal Text To Program´
		27.5 Emergence of Intermediate Phases
		References
Part VIII: Argumentation
	Chapter 28: Three Layers of Legal Argumentation: Content, Speech Act, and Role
		28.1 Content-Based Argumentation
		28.2 Speech Act Based Argumentation
		28.3 Role-Based Argumentation
		28.4 Subordination to Rationality
		28.5 Contexts
		References
	Chapter 29: Transparent Complexity by Goals
		29.1 Why Goals? A Variety of Conceptions
		29.2 Motivation
		29.3 Requirements and Goals of E-Government
		29.4 Formalisation of Goals Should Be Taken Seriously
		29.5 Structure of Teleological Notation
		29.6 Goals in Law and in Requirements Engineering
		29.7 Functions of Law as High-Level Teleological Structure
		References
	Chapter 30: Standard Cases, Hard Cases, Emergency Cases and Scurrile Cases in Jurisprudence
		30.1 Why Solving Cases by Machines?
		30.2 What Is a Case?
		30.3 Standard Cases
		30.4 Hard Cases
			30.4.1 Hard Cases with Several Plausible Solutions
			30.4.2 Hard Cases with Restrictions on the Latitude Allowed in Decision-Making
			30.4.3 Cases with an Unexpected Solution
		30.5 Emergency Cases
			30.5.1 Fast-Track Procedures
			30.5.2 Break-Glass Policy Situations
			30.5.3 Break-Glass Policies
		30.6 Scurrile Cases
		30.7 Settled Actual Cases and Settled Hypothetical Cases
		30.8 Conclusion: Classifying Cases
		References