Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

PART I: INTRODUCTION --
1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior
 Carl Dahlstr̲m and Lena W̃ngnerud --
2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash
 S̲ren Holmberg and Bo Rothstein --
3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?
 Susan Rose-Ackerman --
4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption
 Ann Towns --
PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING --
5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior
 Anna Persson and Martin Sj̲stedt --
6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood
 Ulrika M̲ller and Isabell Schierenbeck --
7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
 Michelle D\'Arcy --
8. Stability and Stagnation
 Anders Sundell --
PART III: POWER-SHARING --
9. Democratic and Professional Accountability
 Carl Dahlstr̲m and Victor Lapuente --
10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites\' Rotation and Asset Ownership
 Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev --
11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior
 Petrus Olander --
12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior
 Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes --
PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES --
13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government
 Philip Keefer --
14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties
 Helena Stens̲ta, Lena W̃ngnerud and Mattias Agerberg --
15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government
 Andreas B̄genholm and Nicholas Charron --
16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship
 Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg.