Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 13
1 Electoral Courts and Actor Compliance: Opposition-Authoritarian Relations and Protracted Transitions......Page 21
the three objectives of this book......Page 25
an eddy in the third wave: contextualizing mexico’s protracted transition......Page 27
electoral institutions: optimal arena for gauging protracted transitions......Page 33
causes of postelectoral conflicts: political tensions vs. weak institutions in flux periods......Page 35
organization of the book......Page 39
research design: case selection and methods......Page 41
beyond “the opposition” as unitary actors: parties, movements, and party-movements......Page 46
fitting informal microinstitutions into formal and macrolevel processes......Page 49
2 Ties That Bind and Even Constrict: Why Authoritarians Tolerate Electoral Reforms......Page 52
why liberalize? the logic of authoritarian hand binding......Page 55
minor reforms, but catalysts of a protracted transition......Page 58
the 1988 turning point: pan and pri cohabitate the transition......Page 64
the pri loses control: the electoral reform of 1996 and the run-up to 2000......Page 69
structure vs. choice: the role of economic factors in mexico’s transition......Page 71
the pan’s “centripetal” democratization by default......Page 74
center-periphery feedback as unintended consequence and as intended strategy......Page 77
3 Mexico’s National Electoral Justice Success: From Oxymoron to Legal Norm in Just over a Decade......Page 80
the lawless dispensation of electoral justice prior to mexico’s electoral courts......Page 85
the rise of electoral justice case law in the early 1990s......Page 89
corresponding improvements in quality of most parties’ complaints......Page 95
the gradual evolution of prd compliance with electoral courts......Page 99
conclusion: actor compliance and institutional evolution......Page 105
4 Mexico’s Local Electoral Justice Failures: Gubernatorial (S)Election Beyond the Shadows of the Law......Page 113
well-oiled political machines: traditional governor impunity in mexican politics......Page 115
perfecting postelectoral poker: the opposition deals themselves in......Page 120
salinas and the renewed presidential discretion in center-periphery relations......Page 123
guanajuato as the pan’s model for salinas-era postelectoral conflicts......Page 126
michoacan and the prd’s model for salinas-era postelectoral conflicts......Page 129
zedillo’s positioning at tabasco: sana distancia and nonnegotiation of governorships......Page 131
generalizing from the governor’s shell game: institutional failure and presidential discretion......Page 133
maximatoto maximino: municipal elections and pri-state repression......Page 136
a user’s guide to postelectoral conflicts and their spoils......Page 140
opposition paper tigers vs. declawed pri-state electoral courts......Page 146
conclusions: dueling focal points and a weak rule of law......Page 148
5 The Gap Between Law and Practice: Institutional Failure and Opposition Success in Postelectoral Conflicts, 1989–2000......Page 150
descriptive analysis of the postelectoral conflict state sample......Page 155
national causes of mexico’s local postelectoral conflicts: a null hypothesis......Page 160
four subnationally determined causes of mexico’s local postelectoral conflicts......Page 163
reporting multinomial logit estimates of postelectoral conflict models......Page 172
conclusions: local politics supersede formal institutions......Page 179
6 The National Action Party: Dilemmas of Rightist Oppositions Defined by Authoritarian Collusion......Page 182
pan strategies of electoral opening: extralegal means to legal ends......Page 185
the “participate-abstain” cleavage in pan’s genteel opposition years (1939–77)......Page 188
1977–1988 and chihuahua 1986: foray into big stakes postelectoral contention......Page 190
choosing patronage over transition after 1988......Page 195
1988–1992: building the justification for concertacesión as “partial restitution”......Page 197
perfecting concertacesión: modeling the pan’s civilized disobedience......Page 199
mérida, yucatán 1993: national pri-state usurps a weak electoral court......Page 203
monterrey, nuevo león 1994: national pri-state convinces a weak electoral court......Page 206
huejotzingo, puebla 1996: national pri-state discredits a weak electoral court......Page 209
conclusion: pan’s (post)electoral innocence as a casualty of its struggle for power......Page 213
7 The Party of the Democratic Revolution: From Postelectoral Movements to Electoral Competitors......Page 218
prd’s electoral opening gambit: debate, discord, and antiregime tendencies......Page 221
consolidation (1995–1998): favoring the first round (elections) over the segunda vuelta......Page 224
michoacán 1992: rigged institutions and violent conflicts on cárdenas’s home court......Page 226
a case-based analysis of michoacán’s 1992 whitewash court......Page 229
leviathan in the tropics: striving to build electoral institutions in chiapas......Page 231
the 1995 postelectoral bazaar: paper-shuffling judges and auctioneer legislators......Page 234
the chiapas prd’s formula: mobilization plus storming of town hall equals municipal council......Page 240
demobilizing for success: the prd adapts to the electoral route in veracruz......Page 243
conclusions: party consolidation as the binding of their fate to ballots......Page 248
8 Dedazo from the Center to Finger Pointing from the Periphery: PRI Hard-Liners Challenge Mexico’s Electoral Institutions......Page 254
pri-state discretion and patronage: short-term benefits, long-term liabilities......Page 258
concertacesión as original sin: primordial wedge between local and national priístas......Page 262
southern politics, mexican style......Page 265
concertacesión but with no deal closer: the post-1997 pri effort to discredit ife......Page 270
compliant parties and risk-taking magistrates consolidate democratic gains......Page 272
pork-barreling without the chops: a downsized pri faces electoral competition......Page 274
lubricating the political machines: the pri’s struggle for competitiveness......Page 278
no grand transition coalition, but a short-lived pan-prd alliance to break the pri......Page 282
zedillo cut off a finger; fox cut off his arm: panísta restoration of the federal pact......Page 285
9 A Quarter Century of “Mexicanization”: Lessons from a Protracted Transition......Page 290
the pri under salinas-zedillo: from factions to party and back again......Page 294
bottom-up local opposition party strategies: a crucial cause of postelectoral conflicts......Page 297
from clientalism to mere “pork barreling”: electoral institutions and development......Page 300
top-down party legal strategies and the ascendance of electoral courts......Page 303
the significance of institutional lags in protracted transitions......Page 305
the need for a microinstitutional baseline of judicial behavior......Page 307
courting democracy – the art of inducing protracted transitions......Page 309
Appendix A Coding the Postelectoral Conflict Dependent Variable......Page 313
Social Conflicts Index......Page 315
PRD and PAN Organization (Poll Watchers)......Page 318
Population (Natural Log)......Page 319
Period......Page 324
Index of Electoral Fraud......Page 325
Primary Sources......Page 327
Interviews......Page 334
Secondary Sources......Page 337
Media Accounts Cited......Page 351
Periodicals Consulted Systematically (beyond those listed in Appendix A)......Page 359
Index......Page 361