British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-45 (Cass Series--Military History and Policy, No. 17)

BOOK COVER......Page 1
HALF-TITLE......Page 2
TITLE......Page 4
COPYRIGHT......Page 5
CONTENTS......Page 6
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 8
SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE......Page 10
FOREWORD......Page 12
NOTE ON JAPANESE NAMES......Page 14
INTRODUCTION......Page 16
Introduction......Page 22
Grand strategy......Page 23
Prioritising Britain’s global security interests, 1931–41......Page 25
Britain’s grand strategy with its allies—overcoming the differences......Page 27
The European factor......Page 31
The China factor......Page 33
The defeat of Japan......Page 36
Conclusions......Page 38
‘War Lords Anonymous’......Page 40
Institutional constraints......Page 41
Tojo’s leadership style......Page 42
Strategy for defeating Britain......Page 44
India and Burma......Page 47
Conclusion......Page 50
3 THE ARMY LEVEL OF COMMAND......Page 54
Introduction......Page 68
The logic of Japan’s war plan......Page 69
Complications surrounding the ‘outline of the conduct of war’ and second-phase operations......Page 72
Conclusion......Page 76
5 CRISIS OF COMMAND......Page 78
I......Page 79
II......Page 81
III......Page 82
IV......Page 83
V......Page 85
VI......Page 86
6 GENERAL YAMASHITA AND HIS STYLE OF LEADERSHIP......Page 88
General Yamashita and the planning of the Malaya/Singapore campaign......Page 89
Malaya campaign......Page 90
The Singapore campaign......Page 95
Inside the ‘joint operation’......Page 97
Conclusion......Page 99
7 BRITISH TACTICAL COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP IN THE BURMA CAMPAIGN, 1941–45......Page 102
Introduction......Page 118
Prior to the Mutaguchi Plan: plans for a campaign against India and the impact of Wingate’s Chindits......Page 120
From planning to approval: bypassing the opposition......Page 122
1943: Change in the position of the Burma theatre in British strategy, the tides of war, and political factors......Page 126
Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi’s execution of the operation......Page 127
THE ORDER TO RETREAT BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL YANAGIDA, COMMANDER OF 33 RD DIVISION......Page 128
THE BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD DIMAPUR......Page 129
REASSIGNMENT OF THREE DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS......Page 130
DELAYING THE CANCELLATION......Page 131
The reason for the cancellation by the Imperial General Headquarters......Page 132
Conclusion: Mutaguchi’s war-leadership......Page 133
9 BRITISH LEADERSHIP IN AIR OPERATIONS......Page 136
Introduction......Page 146
Introduction of the air operations concepts as an 'air force' and the adoption of 'aerial exterminating action'......Page 147
The process of planning the Malaya offensive air operation and the awareness of control of the air......Page 150
The endeavor to carry out independent air operations in Malaya......Page 152
The operational concept of Sugawara......Page 155
Sugawara’s leadership in the Malaya offensive air operation......Page 156
The pitfalls in Tanigawa and Sugawara’s operational concept of an ‘air force’......Page 159
Conclusion......Page 160
Michioho SUGAWARA—a chronology......Page 161
NOTES......Page 164
INDEX......Page 190