A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics (Surveys on Theories in Economics and Business Administration)

CONTENTS......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Introduction......Page 14
1.1 What Are Dynamic Games?......Page 16
1.2 Open-loop Nash Equilibirum and Markov-perfect Nash Equilibrium......Page 17
1.2.1 A simple transboundary pollution game in discrete time......Page 19
1.2.2 Choice among equilibrium concepts......Page 26
1.2.3 Another simple dynamic game: non-cooperative cake eating......Page 27
1.2.4 An infinite horizon game of transboundary pollution in continuous time......Page 29
1.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium......Page 41
1.3.1 Open-loop Stackelberg Equilibrium......Page 42
1.3.2 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium......Page 46
2.1. Models of Transboundary Pollution and Global Warming......Page 50
2.2 Empirical Models of Transboundary Pollution Games......Page 52
2.3 Carbon Taxes under Bilateral Monopoly......Page 54
2.3.1 Nash equilibrium under costless extraction and non-decaying pollution......Page 55
2.3.2 Stagewise Stackelberg leadership by the seller under costless extraction and non-decaying pollution......Page 60
2.3.3 Bilateral monopoly under stock-dependent extraction cost and non-decaying pollution......Page 63
2.4 International Environmental Agreements......Page 66
2.4.1 IEAmembership game......Page 67
2.4.2 Effects of delays......Page 68
2.4.3 Games under the Kyoto Protocol......Page 70
2.5.1 Efficiency-inducing tax on emissions: monopoly or oligopoly as follower and government as leader......Page 71
2.5.3 Tax adjustment rule to achieve a long-run pollution target......Page 76
2.5.4 Non-point-source pollution taxes......Page 77
2.6.1 A static model of global pollution with and without a coupled constraint......Page 78
2.6.2 Models of environmental games with coupled constraints......Page 84
3.1.1 The tragedy of the commons......Page 86
3.1.2 Can Nash equilibria in renewable-resource exploitation be Pareto efficient?......Page 94
3.1.3 Some technical notes on feedback strategies in shery problems......Page 97
3.1.4 Differential game models of an oligopolistic shery......Page 104
3.1.5 Entry deterrence......Page 107
3.1.6 Further results......Page 108
3.2.1 Dynamic games with a non-renewable resource: open-loop equilibrium......Page 109
3.2.2 Dynamic games with a non-renewable resource: feedback equilibrium......Page 113
3.2.3 Optimal tariff on exhaustible resources: dynamic games......Page 114
3.2.4 Optimal taxation and principal-agent problems with extractive firms......Page 116
3.2.5 Dynamic games with investment in R&D for a substitute for a non-renewable resource......Page 117
3.2.6 Common property non-renewable resource and capital accumulation games......Page 118
3.3 Related Topics: Recycling, Drug Resistance, and Pesticide Resistance......Page 119
4.1 International Oligopoly and Trade Policies......Page 122
4.2 Feedback Trade Policies under Bilateral Monopoly......Page 128
4.3 Time-inconsistency of Open-loop Trade Policies......Page 130
4.4 Optimal Export Tax by a Resource-Exporting Country......Page 133
4.5.1 Optimal tariff under rational expectations, when sellers are perfectly competitive......Page 135
4.5.2 Optimal tariff when the seller is a monopolist......Page 142
4.6.1 Foreign aid as a dynamic game......Page 143
4.6.2 Capital fiights as a result of rent-seeking by powerful groups......Page 145
5.1 Dynamic Oligopoly......Page 152
5.1.1 The sticky pricemodel......Page 153
5.1.2 Investment in capacity by Cournot oligopolists......Page 156
5.1.3 Bertrand rivalry with costly price adjustments......Page 162
5.1.4 Bertrand rivalry with costly output adjustments......Page 163
5.2 Extensions of Dynamic Oligopoly Games......Page 164
5.2.1 Dynamic oligopoly with far-sighted consumers......Page 165
5.3 R&D Races and Technology Adoption......Page 169
5.3.1 R&D races......Page 170
5.3.2 Technology-adoption games......Page 178
6.1.1 Tangible public goods......Page 188
6.1.2 Trust: an intangible stock of public good that promotes co-operative behavior......Page 193
6.2 Contributions to a Discrete Public Good......Page 199
6.2.1 The co-operative solution......Page 200
6.2.2 Open-loop Nash equilibria......Page 202
6.2.3 Markov-perfect Nash equilibria......Page 203
6.3 Corrective Taxation with Far-sighted Firms......Page 206
6.4 Redistributive Taxation......Page 211
6.5 Altruism, Distributive Justice, and Intergenerational Equity......Page 212
6.6.1 Factor mobility and fiscal competition......Page 217
6.6.2 Electoral incentives, corruption, and local public goods......Page 218
7.1.1 Dynamic games between a policymaker and the private sector......Page 226
7.1.2 Political economy of monetary and fiscal policies......Page 233
7.1.3 Dynamic games of macroeconomic policies between two countries......Page 239
7.2 Wealth Distribution and Endogenous Property Rights......Page 244
7.3 Capitalists versus Workers......Page 251
References......Page 258
Index......Page 288