Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Contributors
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction: Wittgenstein in 1929
	Notes
	References
Part 1: Mathematics and Thinking the New
	Chapter 1: Wittgenstein’s Struggle with Intuitionism
		1.1 Wittgenstein in 1929
		1.2 The Tractatus: Arithmetic as Equations
		1.3 The Priority of Mathematics over Logic
		1.4 Weak Counterexamples and the Law of Excluded Middle
		1.5 Toward a Better Understanding
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 2: The Origins of Wittgenstein’s Verificationism
		2.1 Verificationism in the Tractatus
		2.2 The Brouwer Lecture
		2.3 The Origins of Verificationism in MSS 105–107
		2.4 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 3: Searching in Space vs. Groping in the Dark: Wittgenstein on Novelty and Imagination in 1929–1930
		3.1 Imagination, Creativity, and Novelty in Wittgenstein’s Work
		3.2 Spatial Imagery
		3.3 Synthetic A Priori Propositions
		3.4 Searching for Spaces
		3.5 Remarks on Ramsey
		Notes
		References
Part 2: Method and Development
	Chapter 4: The Color-Exclusion Problem and the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Logic
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 The Tractatus on Logic: Key Commitments
		4.3 The Color-Exclusion Problem as a Stimulus for Rethinking Logic
		4.4 “What Becomes of Logic Now?”
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 5: What Would It Look Like? Wittgenstein’s Radical Thought Experiments
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Two Contexts, One Method
		5.3 Visual Space and Absolute Directions: Life at the Telescope
		5.4 No Subject: The Hanging Eyeball
		5.5 What Would It Be Like: Your Tooth, My Pain?
		5.6 The Despot and “I”
		5.7 Moore’s Hinge Sentence and the Limits of Thought
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 6: Phenomenological Language: “Not Possible” or “Not Necessary”?
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Outlines of a Phenomenological Language
		6.3 Phenomenological Language and Time
		6.4 Once Again: A New Method of Logical Analysis
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 7: Hypotheses as Expectations: Ramsey and Wittgenstein 1929
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Ramsey and the Tractatus
		7.3 Ramsey: Belief as Expectation
		7.4 Wittgenstein’s Turn Away from the Picture Theory and Toward Hypotheses
		7.5 Language Is Not Like a Calculus
		Notes
		References
Part 3: Phenomenology and Visual Space
	Chapter 8: Simplicity in Wittgenstein’s 1929 Manuscripts
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Color-Exclusion
		8.3 The 1929 Manuscripts and SRLF
		8.4 Are There Any Simples at All in the Visual Field?
		8.5 Wittgenstein on Nicod
		8.6 Phenomenological Language: Nicod Again
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 9: Temptations of Purity: Phenomenological Language and Immediate Experience
		9.1 Sketching the Itinerary
		9.2 Departing from Ordinary Language
			9.2.1 Ordinary Language Is “Physicalist” and “Hypothetical”
			9.2.2 Ordinary Propositions as Multidimensional Hypotheses
			9.2.3 Experienced Objects as Multifaceted Phenomena
		9.3 Toward Phenomenological Language
			9.3.1 Truth and Sense, Phenomenologically
			9.3.2 Subtracting the Hypothetical: A Reduction, Linguistically
			9.3.3 Isolating Sensory Fields: A Reduction, Experientially
		9.4 Dead End: Back to Ordinary Language
			9.4.1 Tests for Non-hypothetical Description: Biographical, Sculptural, and Cinematic
			9.4.2 A Threat to Immediate Experience: The Metaphysics of Time
		9.5 Openings Ahead
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 10: Speaking of the Given: The Structure of Visual Space and the Limits of Language
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Structural Differences between Visual Space and Language
			10.2.1 The Hypothetical Character of Language
			10.2.2 The Reality of Phenomena in Visual Space
		10.3 Speaking of the Private: Grammatical Surfaces in the Language of Experience
		Notes
		References
Part 4: Ethics
	Chapter 11: The Good, the Divine, and the Supernatural
		11.1 Introduction
		11.2 Logical Form
		11.3 Ethics without Requirements
		Notes
		References
Index