When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers

When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers......Page 4
Contents......Page 8
Figures......Page 10
Tables......Page 12
Preface......Page 14
Part I......Page 18
1. Introduction......Page 20
The Puzzles of Deterrence......Page 24
The Requirements of Deterrence and Conflict Avoidance......Page 26
Power Capability......Page 27
Credibility and Resolve......Page 29
Commitment Theory......Page 30
A Theory of Inherent Credibility......Page 34
Theoretical Explanations......Page 36
Power Distribution......Page 38
Regional Salience or Stakes......Page 39
Domestic Audience Costs......Page 40
Commitment Strategies and Costly Signals......Page 41
2. Major Powers and Global Contenders......Page 43
The Idea of “Major Powers”......Page 44
Austria-Hungary......Page 46
France......Page 48
Great Britain......Page 49
Germany......Page 51
Russia/USSR......Page 53
Italy......Page 55
United States......Page 56
Japan......Page 59
China......Page 61
Conclusion......Page 62
3. Deterrence and Conflict......Page 64
The Notions of Deterrence......Page 65
Deterrence Success and Failure......Page 66
Major Types of Deterrence......Page 68
Extended Deterrence as the Prevalent Deterrence Form......Page 69
Basic Deterrence Stages and Decision Structure......Page 71
Deterrence Outcomes......Page 73
The Historical Cases of Major Power Deterrence, 1895–1985......Page 75
The Operational Rules for Identifying Deterrence Cases......Page 76
An Empirical Survey of Major Power Deterrence Cases, 1895–1985......Page 77
Part II......Page 86
Balance of Power......Page 88
Multiple Meanings......Page 89
Distinct Meanings of the “Balance of Power”......Page 90
The Balance-of-Power Policy and Dyadic Condition......Page 91
Balance-of-Power Structures: Bipolarity versus Multipolarity......Page 92
Power Shift Theories......Page 94
Power Transition......Page 95
Hegemonic Decline......Page 96
Global Cycles......Page 98
The World-System......Page 99
Other Power Shift Approaches......Page 100
Power Balance versus Power Shifts: Empirical Evidence......Page 102
National Power: Alternative Indicators......Page 104
The Dynamics of Power Rise and Decline, 1895–1985......Page 105
Measurements......Page 109
Empirical Analysis......Page 110
5. Credibility and Geopolitics: Regional Interests at Stake......Page 115
Old Geopolitics......Page 116
New Geopolitics......Page 117
Related Geopolitical Terms......Page 120
Regional Salience......Page 126
The Impact of Regional Salience on Deterrence......Page 127
Geopolitical Regions......Page 128
Measuring Regional Salience......Page 129
Regional Stakes in Extended Deterrence: An Empirical Test......Page 133
6. Resolve and Domestic Costs: Internal Interests at Stake......Page 141
The Democratic Peace Puzzles......Page 142
Causal Explanations......Page 143
Are Democracies Generally More Pacific?......Page 145
In Search of the Dependent Variable......Page 146
Domestic Audience Costs and Deterrence......Page 147
A Quantitative Measure of Domestic Regime Type......Page 149
The Effects of Regime Types on Deterrence Outcomes......Page 150
Part III......Page 158
7. Predicting Major Power Conflicts: High Stakes or Costly Signals?......Page 160
Deterrence and National Interest......Page 161
Empirical Evidence......Page 162
A Basic Model: Capabilities and Regional Stakes......Page 163
An Expanded Model: Relative Capabilities, Regional and Domestic Stakes......Page 167
Commitment Model......Page 171
Measures......Page 172
Empirical Evidence......Page 173
An Intraregional Version of Commitment Theory......Page 175
A Combined Model......Page 177
8. Theoretical and Policy Implications......Page 180
Theoretical Implications for the Study of Deterrence and Conflict......Page 181
Power Capability......Page 182
Credibility and Resolve......Page 183
Resolve and Domestic Costs......Page 184
Reputational or Intrinsic Interests?......Page 185
Policy Implications for the Post–Cold War Era......Page 188
Still Dominoes? Reputational Interests and “Threat Inflation”......Page 189
The Need for a Grand Strategy......Page 191
A Geopolitical Version of the Selective Engagement Strategy......Page 192
Appendixes......Page 198
1895–96 South African Crisis (Delagoa Bay and Jameson Raids)......Page 200
1897 Kiao-Chow (German Occupation)......Page 201
1897–98 Niger Dispute......Page 202
1898–99 Samoan Islands Dispute......Page 203
1899–1900 Masampo Episode......Page 204
1901–3 Manchurian Evacuation......Page 205
1904–5 Russo-Japanese War......Page 206
1905–6 First Moroccan (Tangier) Crisis......Page 207
1911 Second Moroccan (Agadir) Crisis......Page 208
1912 First Balkan War......Page 209
1914–18 World War I......Page 210
1932 Shanghai Incident......Page 211
1935–36 Outer Mongolian Frontier Dispute......Page 212
1938 Changkufeng......Page 213
1938 Sudetenland Problem and Munich Crisis......Page 214
1939 Nomonhan Incident......Page 215
1945 Azerbaijan Issue......Page 216
1946 Turkish Straits......Page 217
1950 Taiwan Strait......Page 218
1950–53 Korean War......Page 219
1956 Suez Canal......Page 220
1958 Quemoy-Matsu......Page 221
1961 Berlin Wall......Page 222
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis......Page 223
1970 Black September......Page 224
1973 Yom Kippur War......Page 225
1975 Angolan Civil War......Page 226
2. General Deterrence Failure Cases—No EID......Page 227
Power Dimension......Page 242
Status Dimension......Page 244
Previous Attempts at Major Power Classifications......Page 245
C. Sources and Data for Colonial Possessions and Foreign Trade......Page 248
D. Questions of Statistical Analysis and Discrete Choice Models......Page 253
CHAPTER 1......Page 262
CHAPTER 2......Page 263
CHAPTER 3......Page 265
CHAPTER 5......Page 267
CHAPTER 6......Page 269
CHAPTER 8......Page 271
APPENDIX B......Page 273
APPENDIX D......Page 274
References......Page 276
HISTORICAL SOURCES FOR DETERRENCE CASES (APPENDIX A)......Page 292
Index......Page 298