What Should Constitutions Do? (Social Philosophy and Policy)

CONTENTS......Page 6
INTRODUCTION......Page 8
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 17
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 18
II. LAW AND THE SETTLEMENT OF MORAL CONTROVERSY......Page 22
III. THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW......Page 24
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION......Page 36
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 40
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, ORGANIC OR OTHERWISE......Page 43
VII. CONCLUSION......Page 44
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTION AS FUNDAMENTAL LAW......Page 46
II. THE ATHENIAN CRISIS OF THE LATE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.......Page 48
III. THE DEEPER CAUSE OF THE CRISIS......Page 54
IV. THE ATHENIAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS......Page 58
V. FUNDAMENTAL LAW, ANCIENT AND MODERN......Page 65
VI. CONCLUSION......Page 70
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 71
A. It never was......Page 72
B. Terms of consent......Page 74
C. How stringent are the obligations established by consent?......Page 75
D. Transgenerational consent......Page 77
E. Interpreting obligation......Page 78
III. COVENANT......Page 79
A. Actuality of covenant......Page 80
B. Terms of covenant......Page 81
C. Stringency of covenant......Page 82
D. Transgenerational covenant......Page 84
E. Covenant interpretation......Page 86
IV. CONSTITUTION......Page 87
V. CONCLUSION......Page 91
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 93
A. Model I: Whig constitutionalism......Page 100
B. Model II: Lockean and Jeffersonian constitutionalism......Page 101
C. Model III: Hamiltonian constitutionalism......Page 107
D. Model IV: Madisonian constitutionalism......Page 111
E. Summary......Page 117
A. Model I: Contemporary Whigs......Page 118
B. Model II: Contemporary Jeffersonians......Page 122
C. Model III: Contemporary Hamiltonians......Page 125
D. Model IV: Contemporary Madisonians......Page 129
IV. CONCLUSION......Page 131
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 136
A. What is a liberal constitution?......Page 139
B. Defense of liberty......Page 140
C. Promoting liberty globally......Page 144
D. The defense of liberty must not be self-defeating......Page 148
III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A LIBERAL REPUBLIC: PROSPERITY......Page 149
A. War powers......Page 151
B. The status of international law in domestic law......Page 154
C. Foreign commerce......Page 165
War Powers......Page 168
VI. CONCLUSION......Page 169
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY WRITE DOWN CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERSTANDING?......Page 171
II. THE (A)LEGAL STATUS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES......Page 178
III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A CONSTITUTION’S ENDS AND CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED MEANS......Page 179
IV. THE “NONLEGAL” FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES: DELINEATING THE NATION......Page 187
V. CONCLUSION: UNITY, MULTIPLICITY, AND PREAMBLES......Page 198
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 200
A. Charter of the Dutch West India Company of 1621......Page 201
B. Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions of 1629......Page 203
A. Grant of the Province of Maine of 1663/64 25......Page 204
B. Grant of the Province of Maine of 1674......Page 206
C. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683......Page 207
IV. THE ROYAL PERIOD, 1685–1776......Page 208
A. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1691......Page 209
B. Persistent threats to judicial independence......Page 212
V. NEW YORK CONSTITUTION OF 1777......Page 215
VI. CONCLUSION......Page 219
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 223
II. THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL POLITICAL IGNORANCE......Page 225
A. Low levels of political knowledge......Page 227
B. Illogical use of knowledge22......Page 228
C. Information shortcuts31......Page 229
A. Information acquisition......Page 231
B. Information use......Page 232
C. The role of interjurisdictional competition......Page 233
D. Implications for group migration......Page 234
E. The problem of moving costs......Page 235
A. Southern black migration during the Jim Crow era......Page 236
B. Information acquisition by southern black migrants......Page 237
C. Effective use of knowledge......Page 239
D. Comparison with contemporary southern white ballot box voters......Page 240
V. FOOT VOTING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR......Page 242
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN......Page 244
VII. CONCLUSION......Page 246
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY......Page 249
III. PLURALISM AS A BASIS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM......Page 254
A. The minimum conditions of public order......Page 257
B. Constitutionalism......Page 259
V. CONCLUSION......Page 261
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 263
II. FOUR DEMOCRATIC THEORIES......Page 265
III. THE TRILEMMA OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM......Page 269
IV. IDEAL THEORY AND SECOND BEST......Page 270
V. REALIZING CORE PRINCIPLES......Page 273
A. Convention—Deliberative Microcosm—Referendum......Page 274
B. Deliberative Microcosm—Convention—Referendum......Page 275
C. Other possibilities......Page 277
VII. DELIBERATION DAY......Page 278
VIII. CONCLUSION......Page 279
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 282
II. NONDOMINATION, DISPERSION OF ECONOMIC POWER, AND FREE ENTRY......Page 285
III. MANIPULABILITY, COMPOSSIBILITY, AND DOMINATION......Page 290
IV. PLURALITY OF SUPPLIERS AS A STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF A FREE MARKET......Page 296
A. Misguided strategies......Page 297
B. The structural argument......Page 301
V. CONCLUSION......Page 308
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 311
B. The institutions of government......Page 312
III. LOCKEAN VERSUS PROGRESSIVE VISIONS......Page 313
IV. THE NATURE OF MAN......Page 317
V. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS......Page 321
A. Democratic elections......Page 322
B. Federalism......Page 323
C. Separation of powers......Page 328
D. Judicial power......Page 335
VI. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES......Page 339
VII. CONCLUSION......Page 343
INDEX......Page 346