What are we to Understand Gracia to Mean?: Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Neutralism (Value Inquiry Book Series 177)

Contents......Page 8
Foreword......Page 12
Editor’s Introduction......Page 14
Acknowledgments......Page 16
1. Preliminaries......Page 18
A. Reasons for Studying Being as Being......Page 21
B. Gracia’s Objections......Page 23
3. God......Page 26
4. Conclusion......Page 27
1. Where Sullivan and Pannier Go Astray......Page 30
2. Response to the Criticism of My Objections to the Being as Being View......Page 33
4. Conclusion......Page 36
1. On Metaphysics and its Tasks......Page 38
A. Being as Being and the Tasks of Metaphysics......Page 39
B. The Source of Being and the Tasks of Metaphysics......Page 47
A. Ambiguities of the Notion of Category......Page 49
B. Neutrality of the Notion Category: Contentlessness or Non-Reductionism?......Page 53
C. The Irreducibility of Metaphysics to a Study of Categories......Page 55
D. Responses to Gracia’s Attack on Metaphysics as the Science of Being as Being......Page 56
3. Closing Remarks......Page 58
1. Response to the Direct Objections Against My View......Page 64
2. Response to My Objections Against Being as Being......Page 67
3. Conclusion......Page 69
1. Gracia’s View of Metaphysics......Page 70
2. Aristotle’s View of Metaphysics......Page 73
3. Aristotelian Objections to Gracia’s Position......Page 76
4. Conclusion......Page 82
SIX: Metaphysics and Meta-Metaphysics: Response to Sanford......Page 86
1. The Necessary Focus on Being......Page 87
2. Metaphysical Progress......Page 88
3. The Rationale for the Metaphysical Enterprise......Page 89
4. Conclusion......Page 90
1. The Object of Metaphysics......Page 92
2. The Division of the Speculative Sciences......Page 93
3. Abstraction and the Operations of the Intellect......Page 95
4. Gracia’s Metaphysics......Page 98
5. Neo-Thomism and Gracia’s Metaphysics......Page 99
6. Conclusion......Page 102
1. Thomas and Thomists......Page 106
2. Delfino’s Neo-Thomism in Metaphysics......Page 108
NINE: Gracia and His Task......Page 112
TEN: The Nature of Philosophy: Response to Redpath......Page 146
1. The Source of My Errors: Ordinary Language......Page 147
A. Philosophy as Habit......Page 149
B. Philosophy and Truth......Page 155
C. Philosophy as a System......Page 156
D. The Charge of Exclusivity......Page 157
3. A Crucial Correction: Categories are not Sentences......Page 158
4. Conclusion......Page 160
ELEVEN: Spirits and “Things”: Ritschl’s Critique of Metaphysics in Light of Gracia’s Definition of Metaphysics......Page 162
1. Ritschl’s General Critique of Metaphysics......Page 164
2. Ritschl’s Critique of Natural Theology......Page 167
3. Ritschl’s Critique of the Classical Doctrine of God......Page 170
4. Ritschl’s Defense of Personalism......Page 177
5. Ritschl’s Personalism and Gracia’s Conception of Metaphysics......Page 186
6. Conclusion......Page 190
TWELVE: Is Hume A Metaphysician?: Aristotle vs. Gracia......Page 196
1. Did Hume Think He Was a Metaphysician?......Page 197
A. “Metaphysics” Means “Any Profound Reasoning”......Page 198
B. Good and Bad Metaphysics......Page 199
C. The Science of Human Nature as Good Metaphysics......Page 201
A. Hume Is Not an Aristotelian or a Rationalist Metaphysician......Page 202
B. Hume Is a Metaphysician in Gracia’s Sense......Page 203
3. Conclusion......Page 206
THIRTEEN: Making Sense of the History of Metaphysics: Response to Kronen and Novotny......Page 210
1. Metaphysics Conceived Too Narrowly......Page 211
2. A Broad Conception of Metaphysics......Page 214
A. Ritschl......Page 215
B. Hume......Page 216
4. Conclusion......Page 218
FOURTEEN: Gracia on the Ontological Status of Categories......Page 220
1. Gracia’s Preliminary Characterization of the Class of Categories......Page 221
A. The Distinction Between Categories and Universals......Page 227
B. Are Categories Sets, on the One Hand, or Are They Entities that May or May Not Be Instantiable, on the Other?......Page 228
C. Gracia’s Account of the Traditional Theories of Categories......Page 229
D. Gracia’s Account of Categories as Neutral Entities......Page 235
3. Conclusion......Page 244
FIFTEEN: Categorial Neutralism: Response To Pannier, Sullivan, Seifert, and Ingala......Page 248
A. General Charge: Begging the Question......Page 249
B. Restatement of the Argument......Page 250
2. Criticism by Seifert: The Impredicability of Substance......Page 252
3. Some Questions by Ingala: Nothing, Square Circles, and the Transcendentals......Page 254
Afterword......Page 258
About the Contributors......Page 262
A......Page 266
C......Page 267
D......Page 268
E......Page 269
H......Page 270
L......Page 271
M......Page 272
P......Page 273
Q......Page 274
S......Page 275
T......Page 276
V......Page 277
Z......Page 278