Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten

Front Matter....Pages I-IX
Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten....Pages 1-7
On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann....Pages 8-34
Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88....Pages 35-38
Introduction and Survey....Pages 39-50
A Note On Imperfect Recall....Pages 51-62
Futures Market Contracting When You Don’t Know Who the Optimists Are....Pages 63-78
Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case....Pages 79-84
Admissibility and Stability....Pages 85-99
Equilibrium Selection in Team Games....Pages 100-110
Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games....Pages 111-121
Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life....Pages 122-127
Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors....Pages 128-148
Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS’s of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles....Pages 149-170
Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning....Pages 171-184
Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative Players: A Comparison....Pages 185-197
Communication Effort in Teams and in Games....Pages 198-216
Endogenous Agendas in Committees....Pages 217-227
The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach....Pages 228-242
Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics....Pages 243-256
Equilibrium Selection in Linguistic Games: Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?....Pages 257-269
Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations....Pages 270-278
The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games....Pages 279-285
Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game....Pages 286-304
Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths....Pages 305-312
Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ....Pages 313-327
Reciprocity: The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games....Pages 328-344
Adaptation of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment -....Pages 345-364
A Model of Boundedly Rational Experienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games....Pages 365-385
Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue....Pages 386-393
Naive Strategies in Competitive Games....Pages 394-402
Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry?....Pages 403-417
Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma Games....Pages 418-429
On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners....Pages 430-443
What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets....Pages 444-463
Sequencing and the Size of the Budget Experimental Evidence....Pages 464-474
Intertemporal Speculation Under Uncertain Future Demand: Experimental Results....Pages 475-493
Endowment Effect for Risky Assets....Pages 494-512
Back Matter....Pages 513-517