Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory

Table of Contents
Introduction
A. Reflexions on the general structure and problems of transcendental arguments
	Silencing the Sceptic? The Prospects for Transcendental Arguments in Practical Philosophy
	Ambition, Modesty, and Performative Inconsistency
	On Pain of Self-Contradiction? Obligatory Acceptance and Rejection in Alan Gewirth’s dialectically necessary Method
	Claims as Departure Points for Transcendental Arguments: Understanding Argumentation as a Game
	Still Lonely: The Moral Solipsist after Transcendental Argumentation
B. Uses and discussions of transcendental reasoning based on the self-reflective structure of personal autonomy, rational agency, or human self-understanding
	Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy
	Transcendental Arguments for a Categorical Imperative as Arguments from Agential Self-Understanding
	Transcendental Arguments and Practical Self-Understanding – Gewirthian Perspectives
	Transcendental Arguments in Favour of Absolute Values
	Neither for Beasts nor for Gods: Why only morally-committed Human Beings can accept Transcendental Arguments
C. Transcendental reasoning inspired by pragmatism, linguistics, and theories of intersubjectivity
	Normative Pragmatics: Approach, Promise, Outlook
	Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments
	Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of Ethics. Transcendental Arguments and Ethics
	Conceptual Pragmatism and Normativity: Clarence Irving Lewis
	Transcending Value: Two Readings of Performative Inconsistency
	Transcendental Anti-Theodicy
	Argumentative Discourse: The Transcendental Starting Point of Apelian Discourse Ethics
Notes on Contributors
Index