Thomasson on Ontology

Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
1: Introduction
	Amie Thomasson on Ontology
	Chapter Summaries
2: How it All Hangs Together
	Introduction
	Fiction
	Phenomenological Roots
	Social and Cultural Objects
	Metametaphysics
	Functional Pluralism
	Conceptual Engineering
	Conclusion
	References
3: Thomasson on Easy Arguments
	The Problem in a Nutshell
	What Needs To Be Explained?
	Easy Ontology, Focus, and Reference
	Conceptual and Other Language-based Connections
	Conceptual Connections and Quantifiers
	Conclusion
	References
4: Realism, Deflationism, and Metaphysical Explanation
	Easy Ontology and Simple Realism
	Joint-Carving
	Fundamentality Realism
	Creeping Minimalism and Metaphysical Explanation
	‘Easy arguments’ for Fundamentality Realism
	Upshots
	References
5: Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis?
	I
	II
	III
	IV
	V
	References
6: Modal Normativism and Metasemantics
	Introduction
	Modal Normativism and Compositionality Challenges
		Modal Normativism Vs. Modal Descriptivism
		The Compositionality Challenge
	Truth Conditional Meanings and Modal Claims
	Modal Normativism and Metasemantics
		Metasemantic Explanations
		Metasemantic Explanations: Ambitious (Modal) Descriptivism and Its Problems
		Metasemantic Explanations: Two Normativist Approaches
			The Moderate Approach
			The Ambitious Approach
	Objections: Substantivity in the Metalanguage
		Are Metaphysical Explanations Substantive?
		Using Talk of Possible Worlds in the Metalanguage
	Conclusion
	References
7: Thomasson on Modal Language
	Introduction
	Thomasson’s View on Modality
	Function and Meaning
	The Frege-Geach Problem
	Metaphysical Modality and Ordinary Language
	Metaphysical Modality and Weaker Modalities
	Necessity and Analyticity
	Concluding Remarks
	References
8: Thomasson’s Social Ontology
	Introduction: Thomassonian Social Ontology
	The Rule-based Account of Social Phenomena
	The Normative Conception of Social Groups
	The Normative Conception of Social Groups is Overly Narrow
	Conclusion: A Plea for Even More Pluralism
	References
9: Easy Social Ontology
	Introduction
	Social Ontology and Social Meta-Ontology
	The Easy Approach to Ontology
		Existence and Reference
		Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Engineering
	Easy Social Ontology
		The Ontology of Social and Institutional Practices
		The Function of Social and Institutional Practice Terms
	The Prospects for Social Realism
		The Constructivist Approach to Social and Institutional Practices
	Conclusions
	References
10: Artifacts and the Limits of Agentive Authority
	Author-Intention-Based Accounts of Artifacts and Prototype Production
	Challenges for Author-Intention-Based Accounts
	Can User-Intentions Override Author-Intentions?
	The Creation Strategy: Historicity and Counter-Use
	A User-Based Account of Artifacts and Prototype Production
	The Limits of Agentive Authority
	Conclusion
	References
11: Mountains and Their Boundaries
	The Puzzle
	Robust Creationism
	Selectionism
	The Modest Creationist Compromise
	Boundaries in the Distant Past
	Modest Creationism for Permissivists
		Thomasson’s Plenitude
		Locating Mountains in the Plenitude
	References
12: Creationism, Easy Ontology, and Indeterminacy
	Introduction
	Creationism about Fictional Characters
	A New Threat from Indeterminacy
	Responding to the New Threat
	References
Index