Thinking, Language, and Experience

Contents......Page 6
Preface......Page 12
Acknowledgments......Page 16
1. Major Objective, Grand Strategy, Chief Topics......Page 20
2. The Four Mechanisms of Singular Reference: Our Chief Topics......Page 21
3. The Hierarchical Web of Reference......Page 24
4. Some Data: A Pentacostal Miracle in Reverse......Page 26
5. Strategic Plan and Major Methodological Focus and Constraints......Page 28
6. Some Major Theses Developed in the Ensuing Studies......Page 29
Notes......Page 32
Part I. The Language of Singular Reference......Page 36
1. The Intriguing and Most Revealing Story of Greta Bergman and Oscar A. A.Hecdnett......Page 38
2. Oscar Hecdnett\'s World: Exegesis of the Data......Page 39
3. Some Exegetical Morals of the Bergman-Hecdnett Story......Page 45
5. Theoretical Tasks......Page 47
6. Some Logical and Semantical Aspects of Proper Names......Page 48
7. The Restricted Variable View of the Semantic Roles of Proper Names......Page 51
8. The Sortal Properties of the Type Being Called Such and Such......Page 54
9. A Complementary View of the Semantic of Proper Names......Page 56
10. The Causal and Epistemic Roles of Ordinary Proper Names: The (Causal) Retrieval View......Page 57
11. The Restricted-Variable/Retrieval View of Proper Names: A Summary......Page 60
12. Some Types of Semantic Theories of Proper Names......Page 61
13. The Theory of Causal Reference with Rigid Designation......Page 63
14. The Attribute Approach......Page 67
15. Burge\'s Demonstrative-Variable/Descriptive View of Proper Names......Page 70
16. Howard Wettstein\'s Datum......Page 75
Notes......Page 77
1. Singular Reference and Individuation by Networks of Differences......Page 79
2. The Contextual Dimension of the Semantics of Quantification......Page 81
3. The Hierarhical Nature of Thinking......Page 82
4. The Indexical and Contextual Dimensions of Singular Descriptions......Page 83
Notes......Page 84
1. Confrontational Reference......Page 85
2. Irreducibility of Indexical Reference......Page 87
3. The Irreducibility of the Differences in Grammatical Person......Page 88
4. Three Hurdles for Reductionism of Indexical Reference......Page 90
5. Perceptual Reference and Vicarious Confrontational Reference......Page 93
6. Storytelling: Staging the Story and Telling the Story Proper......Page 96
7. Boër and Lycan\'s Waning Attack against the Irreducibility First-Person Reference......Page 97
Notes......Page 104
1. Attribution of Thought Content: Propositional Transparency......Page 105
2. Attribution of Reference: Internal/External Construal of Terms, and Proposition Transparency......Page 110
3. De re/de dicto Occurrences of Terms, and Apparent References to Nonexistents......Page 112
4. Quine\'s Referential Transparence, and the Crucial Problems of Referential Opacity......Page 114
5. Proper Names: Their Essential Opacity and Their Special Psychologico-Linguistic Attribution Cumulation Role......Page 117
6. The Propositional Opacity of Indicators in Attributions of Mental states or Acts......Page 118
7. Attribution of Indexical Reference: Quasi-Indicators and Some of Their Main Laws, Essential for the Language of Other Minds......Page 122
8. Taking Stock......Page 124
Notes......Page 125
Part II. Reference and Experience......Page 126
1. General Issues and Two Classical Views of Perceptual Accusatives......Page 128
2. Perceptual Reference: Indexical Individuals, and the Primacy of Perceptual Fields......Page 129
4. Indexical Individuals and the Substantival Role of Indicators......Page 133
5. The Ingenious Quasi-indexical Form of Attributions of Perception......Page 135
6. The Informational Package of Terms in Quasi-indexical positions......Page 139
7. An Illuminating Counterexample Proposed by William Lycan......Page 140
Notes......Page 141
1. Summary of Main Contentions......Page 142
2. The Fundamental Indexicality of Practical Thinking......Page 143
3. Attributions of Intention: Their Contextually Tacit Quasi-Indicator......Page 146
Notes......Page 147
1. Split Personality and Anaphora: A Letter to Barbara Partee and Emmon Bach......Page 149
2. Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality in Verbal Tenses......Page 152
Notes......Page 153
1. The Problem......Page 154
2. Kretzmann\'s Argument and Quasi-Indicators......Page 155
3. Knowledge of Change......Page 158
4. Self-Knowledge......Page 159
5. Omniscience and Omnipotence......Page 160
6. Knowledge and Self: A Correspondence Between Robert M. Adams and Hector-Neri Castañeda......Page 161
Notes......Page 175
1. Modest Transcendental Realism: The Cogito, The Ballon, and The True......Page 177
2. The Ontological Semantic Dimension of Ordinary Words......Page 183
3. The Fivefold Ontological Dimensions of Certainty......Page 184
4. Selves, I-guises, and the Multifarious Semiotics of First-Person Reference......Page 185
5. The I-Manifold; Strict Semantic Denotation versus Doxastic Denotation......Page 187
6. The Variegated Sameness in the I-Network......Page 189
7. The Transcendental Prefix and Experience......Page 190
References......Page 191
1. A Startling Case......Page 193
3. Some Criteria of Adequacy of Any Ontological Theory of Fiction......Page 195
4. The Fictional Actual Ambiguity......Page 197
5. Basic Ontological Theories of Fictional Truths......Page 200
6. Theory (T1): Predicate Ambiguity......Page 202
7. Theory (T2): Subject Ambiguity......Page 203
8. Theory (T4): Story Operators......Page 205
9. Theory (T3): The Fictional/Actual Ambiguity As a Copula Ambiguity......Page 207
10. Ontological Atoms of Individuation: Individual Guises......Page 210
11. A Metaphysical Note......Page 214
12. Theory of Predication......Page 215
13. Possible Worlds......Page 218
14. Conclusion......Page 220
Notes......Page 221
1. Purpose, Problem and Conventions......Page 223
2. Indicators......Page 224
3. Oo-Prefixes......Page 227
4. Indicators in Oratio Obliqua......Page 229
5. Quasi-Indicators......Page 235
6. Unanalyzability of Strict Quasi-Indicators......Page 241
7. Quasi-Indicators in N-Fold Oratio Obliqua......Page 243
8. Notation for Quasi-Indicators......Page 245
Notes......Page 247
Part III. A Semantic and Ontological Theory for the Language of Experience: Guise Theory......Page 250
Preface......Page 252
1. Ontological Data and Problems......Page 253
2. The Abstractist Ontology: Informal Presentation......Page 256
3. Properties: A Metaphysical Glimpse......Page 275
Appendix......Page 276
Notes......Page 278
1. Summary of Plantinga\'s Criticism of Guise Theory......Page 279
2. Methodology: Data versus Theories: Theoretical Pluralism......Page 280
3. Evidence for Guise Theory......Page 284
4. Plantinga\'s Wedge between Identity and True-of......Page 286
5. Things That Do Not Exist......Page 288
6. Plantinga\'s Argument for the Alleged Fission of Guises......Page 290
7. Plantinga\'s Fission Argument: The Importation of Improper Singular Terms and the Neglect of Oedipan Sieves......Page 291
8. Plantinga\'s Fission Argument: The Importation into Guise Theory of an Inimical Asymmetric Aspect-of Relation......Page 292
9. Internal Predication and Copulational Symmetry......Page 294
11. Additional Forms of Predication......Page 295
12. Copulas, Saturation, and Types of Property......Page 297
13. Plantinga\'s Aristotelian Predication......Page 298
Notes......Page 300
E......Page 304
A......Page 308
C......Page 309
D......Page 310
E......Page 311
H......Page 312
K......Page 313
O......Page 314
P......Page 315
Q......Page 316
S......Page 317
T......Page 318
Y......Page 319
P......Page 305
Z......Page 306