The WTO Case Law of 2002: The American Law Institute Reporters' Studies (The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law)

Contents......Page 7
Foreword......Page 9
A note on the American Law Institute......Page 10
American Law Institute Reporters......Page 11
1 The project......Page 13
2 The Reporters\' Studies on the WTO Case Law of 2002......Page 16
1 The Factual And Legal Issues......Page 24
2.2.1 The legal benchmark to establish a violation......Page 27
2.2.2 What does Section 129 actually do?......Page 29
2.3.1 The legal benchmark to establish a violation......Page 31
2.3.2 Section 129 and methodology cases......Page 32
2.3.3 Section 129 and revocation cases......Page 33
3.1 Mandatory vs. discretionary legislation......Page 35
3.2 Prospective against retrospective duty assessment mechanisms: does it really matter?......Page 39
3.3 Beating around the bush: the burden of proof ploy......Page 41
3.4.1 An unresolved issue in WTO law......Page 43
3.4.2 Prospective remedies: enjoy the benefits of cheating without facing the costs of retaliation......Page 44
References......Page 47
1 Introduction......Page 48
2.1 The original FSC scheme......Page 49
2.2 The WTO procedure......Page 51
3.1 Relevant provisions......Page 52
3.2 The concept of appropriate countermeasures......Page 53
3.3 Assessment of the countermeasures proposed by the EU......Page 55
4.1 Countermeasures in international law......Page 57
4.2 The analysis of the panel......Page 60
4.3 The prohibition of export subsidies as an \"Erga Omnes\" obligation......Page 65
4.4 Alternative approaches to quantum......Page 68
5 Can countermeasures induce compliance?......Page 70
6 Conclusion......Page 74
References......Page 75
1 Facts of the Case......Page 76
2 Issues raised before the Panel......Page 77
4 The Appeal and the Appellate Body Decision......Page 78
5.1 The function of sunset reviews......Page 79
5.2.1 The Panel\'s reasoning......Page 81
5.2.2 The AB reversal: silence must mean something......Page 82
5.2.3 In support of the AB ruling......Page 83
5.3 Evidentiary standards in self-initiated sunset reviews......Page 85
5.4 The likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization......Page 86
5.5 The opportunity to present evidence in sunset reviews......Page 87
7 Post Scriptum......Page 88
References......Page 89
1 Facts of the Case......Page 90
2 Panel Ruling......Page 91
3 US Appeal and AB Ruling......Page 93
4 Discussion of the AB Ruling......Page 95
References......Page 99
1 Introduction......Page 100
2 Jurisdiction of 21.5 Panels in Relation to Panels Seized of a New Matter......Page 102
3 The Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction and Brazil\'s Claims......Page 106
4 The Relationship of the SCM Agreement to the OECD Arrangement......Page 108
1 Facts of the Case......Page 111
2.1 The relevant provisions of GATT and SGA......Page 113
2.2 Prior WTO case law......Page 115
2.3 Discussion of previous jurisprudence......Page 118
2.4 The legal context for Line Pipe: summary......Page 120
3.1 Safeguards as compensation for losers......Page 121
3.2.1 Promoting investments to restore competitiveness......Page 123
3.2.2 Promoting efficient adjustment......Page 124
3.3 Safeguards as political safety valves......Page 126
4.1 USITC investigation and findings......Page 128
4.2 The Panel ruling......Page 129
4.3 Appellant arguments and the AB ruling......Page 131
5.1 Attributing the causes of injury......Page 134
5.2 The allowable extent of a safeguard measure......Page 139
6 Conclusions......Page 140
References......Page 142
1 Introduction......Page 145
2.1 Description of the price band system......Page 147
2.2.1 Article II of GATT 1994......Page 149
2.2.2 Article 4 of the Agriculture Agreement......Page 150
2.3 The Panel decision......Page 151
2.3.1 Analysis under the Agriculture Agreement......Page 152
2.4 The Appellate Body decision......Page 154
2.4.1 Analysis of the Agriculture Agreement......Page 155
2.4.2 Analysis under Article II of GATT 1994......Page 157
3.1.1 The Agriculture Agreement......Page 158
3.1.2 Article II......Page 160
3.2.1 Factor one: the benefits of tariffication......Page 161
3.2.2 Factor two: the effect of a tariffication requirement on the average tariff level......Page 166
3.2.3 Summary of implications......Page 167
References......Page 169
1 Introduction......Page 170
2.1 The history and nature of the measures at issue......Page 172
2.2.1 Relevance of prior proceedings on India – Quantitative Restrictions......Page 173
2.2.2 Analysis of challenged measures under GATT 1994 and TRIMs......Page 174
3.1 Legal commentary......Page 178
3.2 Economic commentary......Page 181
Model 1: competitive final good market, small domestic country......Page 182
Model 2: monopoly final good market, small domestic country......Page 185
Model 3: monopoly final good market, large domestic country......Page 187
Summary......Page 188
References......Page 189
1 Introduction......Page 191
2 Facts and procedure......Page 192
3 Background......Page 194
3.1 Social and economic functions of trademarks......Page 195
3.2 International trademark rules......Page 199
3.3 Positive international law of trademark protection......Page 201
Article 6 quinquies of the Paris Convention......Page 204
TRIPs 15.1 and 15.2......Page 210
TRIPs Article 16.1......Page 211
TRIPs Article 42......Page 215
Paris Convention Article 8......Page 216
National Treatment and MFN......Page 218
References......Page 231
1 Introduction......Page 232
2 The purpose of the CVD instrument in the SCM Agreement......Page 234
3 Do Canadian provincial governments \"provide goods\"?......Page 238
4 Is \"a benefit thereby conferred\"?......Page 241
4.1 How could stumpage programs benefit lumber producers?......Page 242
4.2 What should be the no-subsidy benchmark?......Page 243
4.2.1 A conceptually desirable, but impracticable, no-subsidy benchmark......Page 245
4.3 The solution in the SCM Agreement: a private sector benchmark......Page 246
4.3.1 Problems with a domestic private sector benchmark......Page 248
4.3.2 Problems with a foreign private sector benchmark......Page 250
4.3.3 Does the degree of vertical integration matter for the benefit conferred on Canadian lumber producers?......Page 252
5 Do benefits to Canadian lumber producers cause injury to US competitors?......Page 254
6 Concluding discussion......Page 256
References......Page 258
1 Introduction......Page 260
2 The AB\'s textualist approach to legal interpretation......Page 263
2.1 The legitimacy of international standards......Page 266
2.2 The meaning of \"…as a basis for…\"......Page 268
2.3 Seemingly innocuous discrete determinations may have significant cumulative consequences......Page 270
2.4 Naming and labeling......Page 271
3 EC – Sardines and the evidentiary rules in the TBT......Page 272
3.1 What yardstick to use when evaluating evidentiary rules for the DS system?......Page 273
3.2 Who bears the \"burden of proof\"?......Page 275
3.2.1 Allocating the burden of proof to the more informed party......Page 276
3.2.2 Allocating the burden of proof to the party claiming an exception......Page 277
3.2.3 Allocating the burden of proof to the complainant or to the party making an affirmative assertion......Page 280
3.3 How convincing should proofs be?......Page 282
3.3.1 The limited burden of persuasion that suffices for a complainant to show that an international standard is effective and appropriate......Page 283
3.3.2 Do evidentiary standards in the TBT effectively restrain regulatory autonomy?......Page 285
4 Concluding remarks......Page 286
Index......Page 288