The Uses of Argument

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Preface to the Updated Edition......Page 9
Preface to the Paperback Edition......Page 13
Preface to the First Edition......Page 15
Introduction......Page 17
I Fields of Argument and Modals......Page 27
The Phases of an Argument......Page 31
Impossibilities and Improprieties......Page 37
Force and Criteria......Page 44
The Field-Dependence of Our Standards......Page 49
Questions for the Agenda......Page 52
II Probability......Page 57
I Know, I Promise, Probably......Page 60
‘Improbable But True’......Page 65
Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims......Page 69
The Labyrinth of Probability......Page 73
Probability and Expectation......Page 77
Probability-Relations and Probabilification......Page 82
Is the Word ‘Probability’ Ambiguous?......Page 85
Probability-Theory and Psychology......Page 93
The Development of Our Probability-Concepts......Page 98
III The Layout of Arguments......Page 103
The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants......Page 105
The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants......Page 111
Ambiguities in the Syllogism......Page 116
The Notion of ‘Universal Premisses’......Page 121
The Notion of Formal Validity......Page 126
Analytic and Substantial Arguments......Page 130
The Peculiarities of Analytic Arguments......Page 134
Some Crucial Distinctions......Page 141
The Perils of Simplicity......Page 147
IV Working Logic and Idealised Logic......Page 151
An Hypothesis and Its Consequences......Page 152
The Verification of This Hypothesis......Page 159
The Irrelevance of Analytic Criteria......Page 169
Logical Modalities......Page 172
Logic as a System of Eternal Truths......Page 179
System-Building and Systematic Necessity......Page 190
V The Origins of Epistemological Theory......Page 211
Further Consequences of Our Hypothesis......Page 217
Can Substantial Arguments be Redeemed? I: Transcendentalism......Page 222
Can Substantial Arguments be Redeemed? II: Phenomenalism and Scepticism......Page 227
Substantial Arguments Do Not Need Redeeming......Page 230
The Justification of Induction......Page 233
Intuition and the Mechanism of Cognition......Page 237
The Irrelevance of the Analytic Ideal......Page 244
Conclusion......Page 249
References......Page 255
Index......Page 257