The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth

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The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth
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Contents
Preface
1: The Problem of Truth’s Value
	1.1 Our Interest in the Truth
	1.2 Two Conceptions of Truth
		1.2.1 Normativism
		1.2.2 Aristotelianism
	1.3 Solving the Problem of Truth’s Value
	1.4 Roadmap
	1.5 Conventions
2: Truth and Virtue
	2.1 The Value-Conferral Model
	2.2 Virtues
	2.3 Truthfulness and Its Rivals
	2.4 Why Truthfulness Is a Virtue
		2.4.1 Trustworthiness and the Collaborative Pursuit of the Good
		2.4.2 Epistemic Justice
		2.4.3 Polarization
		2.4.4 A Society Worth Having
	2.5 Beyond the Value-Conferral Model
	2.6 State-Given Reasons
	2.7 Conclusion
3: Truth-Oriented Desires
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Why Truth-Oriented Desires?
	3.3 Desiring Truth
	3.4 Horwich’s Proposal
		3.4.1 The Deflationism of Horwich’s Proposal
		3.4.2 Hasty Generalization
		3.4.3 Particularism
	3.5 Deflationism and Valuing Truth
		3.5.1 A Non-Reductive Deflationism
		3.5.2 Valuing Truth Generically
	3.6 Conclusion
4: Against Normativism
	4.1 Why Not Normativism?
	4.2 The Core Commitments of Normativism
	4.3 Blindspots and Brightspots
	4.4 Deflationary Normativism?
	4.5 The Aristotelian Advantage
5: Truth and Instrumental Value
	5.1 The Instrumental Value-Conferral Model
	5.2 The Standard Arguments
	5.3 Against Truth’s Instrumental Value
	5.4 Instrumentally Valuing Truth
6: Truth and Intrinsic Value
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 What Is Intrinsic Value?
	6.3 Pointlessness
	6.4 Minimal Intrinsic Value
	6.5 Incommensurability
	6.6 Vanishing Value
		6.6.1 Valuing Truth Is Good for Us
		6.6.2 Value Autonomization and Evaluative Conditioning
		6.6.3 Truth as the Internal Goal of Belief
	6.7 Modes of Valuing, Deflationism, and the Strong Virtue Theory
7: Truth and Epistemic Standards
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 The Regulative Epistemic Value-Conferral Model
	7.3 Horwich Against the Truth-PromotionStandard
	7.4 Rattan and Critical Reflection
	7.5 Triviality’s Return
	7.6 Reconsidering Truth’s Epistemic Value
	7.7 The Strong Virtue Theory and Truth as a Regulative Epistemic Good
8: Truth as the Goal of Inquiry
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 Against True Beliefs as the Goal of Inquiry
	8.3 Sincerely and Rationally Pursuing Goals
	8.4 Inquiring When You Have the Answer
	8.5 Sham Inquiry
	8.6 Inquisitive Attitudes
	8.7 Probabilistically “Having an Answer”
	8.8 Alternative Interpretations of the Cases
	8.9 A Different View of Inquiry’s Goal
	8.10 The Strong Virtue Theory and Final Epistemic Value
9: Conclusion: The Strong Virtue Theory
	9.1 Introduction
	9.2 Recapitulation
	9.3 Alternative Theories and Minimal Theoretical Resources
Bibliography
Index