The Subject’s Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body

Contents
Introduction: The Subject’s Matter
	Part I: The Body Represented
	Part II: The Sense of Bodily Ownership
	Part III: The Self Represented
	A Note on the Structure of the Book
	References
I.
The Body Represented
	1.
The Origins of Body Representations in Early Life
		1.
Introduction
		2.
Innate Body Representations? (Problems with) Lessons from Neonatal Imitation and Congenital Phantom Limbs
		3.
Body Representations in Human Fetuses and Neonates
		4.
Coming to Represent the Body in the Outside World
		5.
The Early Development of the Multisensory Underpinnings of Body Representations
		6.
Summary
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	2.
Immutable Body Representations: Lessons from Phantoms in Amputees
		How Does It Feel to Have a Phantom Limb?
		Where in the Nervous System Is the Phantom?
		Challenging the Maladaptive Theory of Phantom Pain
		What Do Neuromodulatory Therapies Tell Us about PLP Mechanisms?
		Summary and Concluding Remarks
		References
	3.
Tool Use Unravels Body Morphology Representation in the Brain
		Introduction
		1.
Tool Use Modifies the Represented Body Morphology
		2.
Tool Use: An Open Window into Body Representations
		3.
Tool Use, Body Schema, and Internal Models
		Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		References
	4.
Body Representations and the Sense of Self
		Which Body Representation Represents Me?
		Evidence for Shared Body Representations
		Absolute and Relative Body Representations
		Acknowledgments
		References
	5.
Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch
		Introduction
		Sources and Organization of Afferent Information from the Skin
		Testing the Idea of Skin Space
		Field Organization, Modality, and Perception
		Conclusions
		Acknowledgments
		References
II.
The Sense of Bodily Ownership
	6.
Ownership and the Space of the Body
		I
		II
		III
		IV
		V
		VI
		VII
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	7.
Deflationary Accounts of the Sense of Ownership
		Some Preliminaries
		The Phenomenological Sense of Body Ownership
		Veridicality
		Integrating Ownership and Agency
		Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	8.
From Pathological Embodiment to a Model for Body Awareness
		1.
When Your Hand Becomes My Hand: A Monothematic Delusion of Body Ownership in Brain-Damage Patients
		2.
The Pathological Embodiment of Another Person’s Hand Has Direct Consequences for Patients’ Representations
		3.
Differences and Similarities between Pathological Embodiment and the Rubber Hand Illusion
		4.
Toward a Model of Body Ownership
		Notes
		References
	9.
Mineness First: Three Challenges to the Recent Theories of the Sense of Bodily Ownership
		1.
Contemporary Theories of the Sense of Bodily Ownership
		2.
Depersonalization
		3.
Three Challenges
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	10.
Agency and Bodily Ownership: The Bodyguard Hypothesis
		1.
An Agentive Mark of the Sense of Bodily Ownership?
		2.
From the Rubber Hand Illusion to Tool Use
		3.
The Duality of Body Schema
		4.
The Bodyguard Hypothesis
		5.
The Function of the Sense of Bodily Ownership
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
III.
The Self Represented
	11.
Sight and the Body
		I
		II
		III
		IV
		V
		VI
		VII
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	12.
Perspectival Structure and Agentive Self-Location
		1.
Introduction
		2.
Perspectival Structure
		3.
Perspectival Self-Location
		4.
The View from Elsewhere
		5.
Locating Perspectives and Locating Subjects
		6.
Agentive Self-Location
		7.
Being Multiply or Singly Located
		8.
Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	13.
Philosophical Reflections on the First Person, the Body, and Agency
		1.
The Problem of Avoiding Redundancy
		2.
A Proposal about the Nature of the First Person
		3.
Instantiation-Dependence
		4.
Consequences of the Agency-Involving Thesis
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	14.
In and Out of Balance
		1.
Mechanism: Behind Balance
		2.
Sense: Balance as a Sense
		3.
Pathologies: Out of Balance
		4.
Function: The Physiology of Balance
		5.
Phenomenology: In and Out of Balance
		6.
Being Balanced: At One with Body in World
		7. Synthesis: Being-in-My-Body-in-the-World
		8.
Conclusion: Balance
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	15.
The Material Me: Unifying the Exteroceptive and Interoceptive Sides of the Bodily Self
		1.
Introduction
		2.
An Exteroceptive Model of the Bodily Self: The Case of Body Ownership
		3.
Interoceptive Processing and Interoceptive Awareness
		4.
Interactions between Exteroceptive Processing and Interoceptive Awareness
		5.
The Free Energy Self: Predictive Coding as a Unifying Theory of Self
		6.
Beyond the Apparent Antagonism: Self and Unity
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	16.
Why Should Any Body Have a Self?
		1.
Introduction
		2.
Bayesian Inference and Prediction Error Minimization
		3.
The Self in the Body
		4.
Body, Self, and Existence
		5.
The Model That Models Itself
		6.
Agent-Modeling, and Cultural Learning as Active Inference
		7.
Active Inference and the Reciprocal Shaping of Self-Models
		8.
Is the Bayesian Self a Narrative Self?
		Note
		References
Contributors
Index