The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Figures......Page 8
Tables......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
Acronyms and abbreviations......Page 14
1 Introduction: life in a nuclear-capable crowd......Page 15
The puzzle......Page 16
The answer: a theoretical and empirical preview......Page 26
2 Leaders’ national identity conceptions and\rnuclear choices......Page 30
The decision to go nuclear: a big decision......Page 31
The concept of the “national identity conception”......Page 32
Typology of national identity conceptions......Page 35
The generic pathway from NICs to choice......Page 39
NIC-linked emotions and their behavioral tendencies......Page 42
Hypotheses on NICs and nuclear choices......Page 49
Theory-testing and contextualization......Page 54
Testing the theory......Page 55
Placing decisions for nuclear weapons in context......Page 58
Operationalizing identity: concept streamlining......Page 61
A multimethod approach......Page 63
Source material......Page 64
The quantitative coding frame......Page 65
Reliability and validity......Page 70
Existing perspectives on Australian identity conceptions......Page 71
The content analysis......Page 73
Overall judgments......Page 74
Argentina......Page 77
Existing perspectives on Argentine identity conceptions......Page 78
The data sources......Page 80
The content analysis......Page 81
Overall judgments......Page 82
Existing perspectives on Indian identity conceptions......Page 84
The data sources......Page 86
The content analysis......Page 87
Overall judgments......Page 89
France......Page 91
Existing perspectives on French identity conceptions......Page 92
The data sources......Page 94
The content analysis......Page 95
Overall judgments......Page 96
Introduction......Page 99
De Gaulle in the immediate postwar period: “We have time.”......Page 101
The early years of the Fourth Republic: an “absence of\rnuclear-mindedness”......Page 102
1950–52: Discussions of German rearmament and the first\rattempted renunciation......Page 103
Dien Bien Phu......Page 107
New Look and the nuclearization of the Cold War......Page 109
Pierre Mendès France and the attempt to contain German rearmament......Page 111
Mendès France’s oppositional nationalism and the bomb decision......Page 121
After 1954: the road to the bomb......Page 123
Introduction......Page 128
The traditional Liberals, 1949–67: participation\rin free world defenses......Page 129
Still searching for a stronger guarantee: 1957–63......Page 131
Still no Plan B: 1964–67......Page 135
A new kind of Liberal: Gorton’s quest for the bomb,\r1968–71......Page 138
The fight over the NPT......Page 140
Moves toward nuclear weapons: the power reactor\rand uranium enrichment......Page 143
Labor in power, 1972–75: fear no more......Page 147
Whitlam’s nuclear stances......Page 149
The campaign against French nuclear testing......Page 151
After Whitlam......Page 153
Introduction......Page 155
Argentina’s nuclear choices to 1974......Page 156
Diplomatic policies......Page 157
Technology policies: the first power reactor......Page 159
The second power reactor......Page 160
Carter, Videla, and the Tlatelolco Treaty......Page 163
Continuing progress in the nuclear program via the tactics of\r“blackmail” and “bribery”......Page 166
Argentina’s secret uranium enrichment plant: genesis and purposes......Page 169
A Southern Cone nuclear arms race?......Page 173
The Argentine–Brazilian nuclear accord of 1980......Page 174
Argentina’s non-bomb lobby......Page 175
Nuclear policies of the Alfonsín government......Page 177
The Menem nuclear policy shift......Page 179
Introduction......Page 185
Nehruvian India’s nuclear diplomacy......Page 187
Nehruvian India’s push for nuclear development......Page 189
India in the aftermath of China’s nuclear test......Page 191
Nuclear India as of 1971......Page 195
Explaining the “peaceful nuclear explosion”......Page 197
The 1971 war and its aftermath......Page 198
India’s nuclear stance between 1974 and 1998......Page 202
The decision for “weaponization”......Page 203
The 1995 test non-decision......Page 207
The BJP bomb......Page 209
Why Vajpayee chose to go nuclear......Page 212
Identities, emotions, and the nuclear choice......Page 218
Puncturing common myths......Page 222
Myth No. 1: “States want the bomb because it is a great deterrent”......Page 223
Myth No. 2: “States want the bomb as a ticket to\rinternational status”......Page 225
Myth No. 3: “Behind the decision for the bomb stand the mean\rinterests of those who stand to benefit personally from it”......Page 226
Myth No.4: “The international non-proliferation regime is the finger in the dike protecting the world from a cascade of new nuclear wepons states\"......Page 228
Lessons for intelligence analysis......Page 230
A stricter international non-proliferation regime?......Page 233
Nuclear abolition?......Page 235
Preventive war?......Page 237
Non-proliferation today and tomorrow......Page 239
B. Coding for references to external actors......Page 243
Precisions to basic coding rules......Page 244
C. Moving from the list of external actors to assessment of national identity conceptions......Page 246
Tabular data......Page 247
INTERVIEWS......Page 250
ARCHIVAL SOURCES......Page 251
SECONDARY AND PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES CITED......Page 252
Name index......Page 275
Subject index......Page 278