The Politics of Order in Informal Markets: How the State Shapes Private Governance

Cover
Half-title Page
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
	1.1 Why These Private Leaders Matter
	1.2 The Argument: How Threats of State Interference Sustain Private Pro-Trade Policies
	1.3 Broader Implications
	1.4 Additional Factors That May Shape Private Good Governance
	1.5 The Context: Lagos
	1.6 Methodological Approach
	1.7 Overview of the Book
	1.8 Summary of Findings
2 Market Associations: An Overview
	2.1 Markets and Market Associations in Developing Countries
	2.2 History of Politics and Markets in Lagos
	2.3 Contemporary Lagos Market Associations
	2.4 Conclusion
3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
	3.1 Surveying Informal Traders: Sampling and Recruitment
	3.2 Policing the Sampling Strategy and Incoming Data
	3.3 Defining Market Association Membership
	3.4 Measuring Frictions to Sorting
	3.5 Summary Statistics
	3.6 Conclusion
4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
	4.1 Critiques of Literature
	4.2 Provision of Private Trade-Promoting Policies
	4.3 Competition
	4.4 Core Predictions
	4.5 Collusion
	4.6 Relational Contracting
	4.7 Alternative Explanations
	4.8 Conclusion
5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength
	5.1 A Market Where Citizens Arrest Norm Violators: The Case of Oke Arin
	5.2 ``I Don't Know What They Are Using the Money For'': The Case of Ebe Ebe
	5.3 ``They Are Nonchalant'': The Case of Unengaged Market Leaders in Dabiri
	5.4 ``Our Association Here na for Decoration'': The Case of Destiny Association
	5.5 Alternative Sources of Market Good Governance
	5.6 Conclusion
6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
	6.1 Data
	6.2 Evidence
	6.3 Assessing Alternative Explanations of PrivateGovernance
	6.4 Conclusion
7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
	7.1 Summary of Book
	7.2 When and Where Will State Threats Motivate Strong Leaders to Promote Trade?
	7.3 Broader Implications
	7.4 Private Governance and Group Member BusinessOutcomes
	7.5 Shifting Equilibria
	7.6 Private Governance and the Economy
A Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview
	A.1 Organization of Informal Trade in Lagos
B Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
	B.1 List of Market Associations in the Survey
C Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
	C.1 Relational Contracting
D Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
	D.1 Survey Questions
	D.2 Note on Land Type
	D.3 Descriptive Statistics
	D.4 Social Desirability Bias
E Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
Bibliography
Index