The Physical Signature of Computation: A Robust Mapping Account

Introduction
1: Physical Computation: A Philosophical Primer
	1.1 Computation: Abstract and Concrete
	1.2 Computation and Simulation
	1.3 Extensional Adequacy: What Does and Does Not Compute
	1.4 Pancomputationalism: Insight or Illusion?
	1.5 Desiderata for Accounts of Physical Computation
	1.6 Three Accounts of Concrete Computation: Mapping, Semantic, and Mechanistic
	1.7 The Physical Church-Turing Thesis
	1.8 Summary
2: Physical and Computational Description
	2.1 What Is Physical?
	2.2 Physical Systems and Physical Description
	2.3 Classes of Physical Description
	2.4 Computing Systems and Their Formal Definition
	2.5 Similarities and Differences between Physical and Computational Descriptions
	2.6 Summary
3: Computational Description of Physical Systems
	3.1 Physical-to-Computational Mappings (PCMs)
	3.2 Computational Description of a Physical System (CDPS) Defined
	3.3 Remarks on Computational Descriptions of Physical Systems
	3.4 Summary
4: Descriptive Strength and the Adequacy of Implementation Claims
	4.1 Criterion S: Computational States
	4.2 Criterion P: Computational Processes
	4.3 Criterion PCE: Physical-Computational Equivalence
	4.4 Criterion U: Usability
	4.5 Classification of Computational Descriptions
	4.6 Evaluating Implementation Claims
	4.7 Summary
5: The Robust Mapping Account of Implementation
	5.1 The Robust Mapping Account
	5.2 The Robust Mapping Account as an Account of Physical Computation
	5.3 Formalizing the Robust Mapping Account in Physical Information Theory
	5.4 Summary
6: Unlimited Pancomputationalism
	6.1 Arguments for Unlimited Pancomputationalism
	6.2 Complex Open Systems
	6.3 Systems with Clocks and Dials
	6.4 Combinatorial State Automata
	6.5 Discussion: What Accepting Unlimited Pancomputationalism Means
	6.6 Summary
7: Limited Pancomputationalism
	7.1 Arguments for Limited Pancomputationalism
	7.2 Causal Limited Pancomputationalism
	7.3 Informational Limited Pancomputationalism
	7.4 Universal Limited Pancomputationalism
	7.5 Summary
8: Ontic Pancomputationalism
	8.1 Forms of Ontic Pancomputationalism and Their Empirical Claims
	8.2 The Metaphysical Component of Ontic Pancomputationalism
	8.3 Weak Simulationism
	8.4 Strong Simulationism
	8.5 Computational Pythagoreanism
	8.6 Computational Structuralism
	8.7 Summary
9: Computation and the Mind
	9.1 What Is a Mind?
	9.2 Levels, Powers, and Qualities
	9.3 Mechanisms, Multiple Realizability, and Medium Independence
	9.4 Organisms and Teleological Functions
	9.5 Cognitive Computation
	9.6 Computation and Consciousness
	9.7 Consciousness beyond Computation
	9.8 Summary
10: Conclusion: The Physical Signature of Computation
	10.1 Computational Descriptions of Physical Systems and the Robust Mapping Account
	10.2 The Illusion of Pancomputationalism: Why Not Everything Computes
	10.3 The Robust Mapping Account in Context
	10.4 Toward a Unified Account of Biological and Artifact Computation
	10.5 Conclusion