The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, 31)

Introduction
Contents
Contributors
1 Intellectual Autobiography
	References
Part I Philosophy of Set Theory and Mathematics
2 Generically Invariant Set Theory
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Some Philosophy
		2.2.1 Naturalism and Holism
		2.2.2 Meaning Skepticism
	2.3 Maximize and Unify
	2.4 Generically Invariant Set Theory
	2.5 Some Replies to Maddy and Meadows
	2.6 Does the Multiverse Have a Core?
	2.7 Absolute Ordinal Definability
	2.8 Final Remarks
	References
3 Reply to Steel
	References
4 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence in Set Theory
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 The Iterative Concept of Set
	4.3 Zermelo\'s Concept of Set and His Categoricity Theorem
	4.4 Intrinsic Evidence
	References
5 Reply to Martin
	References
6 Maddy on Classes
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 The Need for Classes
	6.3 Combinatorial Versus Logical Conceptions of Collection
	6.4 Maddy\'s Development of the Logical Conception
	6.5 Stability as a Way to Do Better
	References
7 Reply to Linnebo
	References
8 A General Framework for a Second Philosophy Analysis of Set-Theoretic Methodology
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 Some Comments on Meta-Philosophy
		8.2.1 Is A Procedural Framework Desirable?
		8.2.2 Methodology and Practice
		8.2.3 Means-Ends Relations
	8.3 Two Case Studies From Maddy
		8.3.1 Cantor\'s Introduction of Sets
		8.3.2 Zermelo\'s Defense of his Axiomatization
	8.4 A General Framework for a Second Philosophy Analysis of Set-Theoretic Methodology
		8.4.1 The Core Procedure
		8.4.2 The Evaluative Apparatus
		8.4.3 Analysing the Second Philosopher\'s Methodology
	8.5 Applying the General Framework
	References
9 Reply to Antos and Kant
	References
10 Maddy\'s Notion of `Maximize\'  and Strong Theories of Sets
	10.1 Introductory Remarks
	10.2 Axiom Selection and Maddy\'s Notion of `Maximize\'
	10.3 Contemporary Axiom Candidates: A Fork in the Road
	10.4 A New Maximality Result in Axiom Selection
	10.5 Conclusion
	References
11 Exploring the Generous Arena
	11.1 Foundations and Organization
	11.2 Two Scaffolds
		11.2.1 The Model Theoretic Approach
		11.2.2 Category Theoretic Approach
	11.3 Foundations
		11.3.1 Size
		11.3.2 Material and Structural Set Theories as Foundations
	11.4 Comparisons
	References
12 Reply to Baldwin
	References
Part II Realism, Anti-Realism and Thin Realism
13 Second Philosophy and Realism
	13.1 Introduction
	13.2 Second Philosophy and Skepticism
	13.3 Second Philosophy and Mathematics
		13.3.1 Mathematics in General
		13.3.2 Robust Realism
		13.3.3 Thin Realism
		13.3.4 Arealism
	13.4 Realism and Second Philosophy
	13.5 Conclusion
14 Reply to Blanchette
	14.1 On Thin Realism
	14.2 On Arealism
	14.3 On the Epistemology of Depth
	14.4 Blanchette’s Alternative
	References
15 Meditations on Second Philosophy: Anti-Nominalist Reflections on Maddy’s Semi-Nominalism
	15.1 Introduction
	15.2 Routleyism
	15.3 Naturalism and Arealism
	15.4 Mathematical Existence Theorems in Physics
	15.5 Fictions in Social Science
	15.6 Fictions in Mathematics
	15.7 Convention
	15.8 Phonemes and Genotypes
	References
16 Reply to Burgess
	References
17 Enhanced ‘If-Thenism’, Fictionalism, and Realist Anti-Platonism
	References
18 Reply to Leng
	References
19 Logical Realism—A Tale of Two Theories*
	19.1 Basic Questions and Methodology
	19.2 Grounding Logic in the World and the Standing of Logical Necessity
	19.3 Relation Between Logic and Mathematics
	19.4 The World
	References
20 Reply to Sher
21 Trumping Naturalism Revisited
	21.1 Beyond the Platitude
	21.2 Preliminaries
	21.3 First Objection: No Clash
	21.4 Second Objection: Definitional Failure
	21.5 Third Objection: The Failure of Science
	21.6 Fourth Objection: Good Philosophy is Scientific
	21.7 Fifth Objection: The Idle Wheel
	21.8 Sixth Objection: No Dogmatism
	21.9 Seventh Objection: Schools
	21.10 Summary
	References
22 Reply to Paseau
	Reference
Part III History of Philosophy
23 What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore (and Wittgenstein) II
	23.1 Coliva on Maddy’s Moore
	23.2 Maddy on Coliva’s Moore
	References
24 Reply to Coliva
	24.1 The Nature of the Skeptical Challenge
	24.2 The Role of the KK Principle
	24.3 The Comparative Strategy
	References
25 A Carnapian Solution to the Puzzle  of Extrinsic Justifications
	25.1 Introduction
	25.2 The Puzzle of Extrinsic Justifications
	25.3 Maddy\'s Solution
	25.4 A Carnapian Solution
	25.5 Conclusion
	References
26 Reply to Soysal
	References
27 Wittgenstein\'s Wayward Student: The Unauthorized Autobiography
	27.1 First Things
	27.2 No Laughing Matter
	27.3 Naturalism
	27.4 Turtles All The Way Down
	27.5 Science
	27.6 Second Philosophy
	27.7 Mathematics
	27.8 The Last Word
	References
28 Reply to Franks
Part IV Mathematical Practice
29 Realizing Infinity
	References
30 Second Philosophy and the Depth Metaphor
	30.1 Introduction
	30.2 Rorty and the Literalization of Metaphor
	30.3 Wittgenstein\'s Treatment of the Mathematical Metaphor
	30.4 Maddy\'s Use of the Depth Metaphor
	References
31 Reply to Kennedy
	References
32 The Flight from Application
	Notes
33 Reply to Wilson
	References
Part V Conversations on Set Theory
34 A Conversation Between Penelope Maddy and Menachem Magidor
	References
35 A Conversation with David Asperó
36 A Conversation with Hugh Woodin
37 On Multiversism
	37.1 Background
	37.2 A Partial Taxonomy of Multiversisms
		37.2.1 Metaphysical Multiversism
		37.2.2 Axiomatic Multiversism
		37.2.3 Heuristic Multiversism
	37.3 Multiversism and the Arealist
	37.4 Digression: Two Contrasting Multiversisms
	37.5 Conclusions
	References
Name Index
Subject Index