The Moral Problem (Philosophical Theory)

Cover
The Moral Problem
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Contents
Preface
1 What is the Moral Problem?
	1.1 Normative Ethics vs. Meta-Ethics
	1.2 Meta-Ethics Today
	1.3 The Moral Problem
	1.4 Towards a Solution to the Moral Problem
	1.5 Summary and Preview
2 The Expressivist Challenge
	2.1 Descriptivism vs. Expressivism
	2.2 An Apparent Dilemma Facing Descriptivists
	2.3 Ayer’s Objection to Non-Naturalism
	2.4 Non-Naturalism and Epistemology
	2.5 Ayer’s Objection to Naturalism
	2.6 The Open Question Argument and Metaphysical Naturalism
	2.7 The Open Question Argument and Definitional Naturalism
	2.8 What are the Platitudes Surrounding our Moral Concepts?
	2.9 Subjective vs. Non-Subjective Definitional Naturalism
	2.10 Definitional Naturalism as the Search for Network Analyses of our Moral Concepts
	2.11 How Network Analyses can be Defective: The Permutation Problem
	2.12 Can We Provide Network Analyses of Moral Terms?
	2.13 Can We Avoid Ayer’s Dilemma?
	2.14 Summary and Preview
3 The Externalist Challenge
	3.1 Internalism vs. Externalism
	3.2 Rationalism as a Conceptual Claim vs. Rationalism as a Substantive Claim
	3.3 Brink’s ‘Amoralist’ Challenge
	3.4 Reply to Brink’s Claim that Amoralists Really Make Moral Judgments
	3.5 An Argument for the Practicality Requirement
	3.6 Foot’s ‘Etiquette’ Challenge
	3.7 Reply to Foot’s Claim that Morality and Etiquette are Analogous
	3.8 Reply to Foot’s Objection to the Rationalists’ Conceptual Claim
	3.9 An Argument for the Rationalists’ Conceptual Claim
	3.10 Summary and Preview
4 The Humean Theory of Motivation
	4.1 Two Principles
	4.2 Motivating Reasons vs. Normative Reasons
	4.3 A Preliminary Objection from Nagel
	4.4 Why Should We Believe the Humean Theory?
	4.5 Desires and Phenomenology
	4.6 Desires, Directions of Fit and Dispositions
	4.7 Desires, Directions of Fit, Goals and Motivating Reasons
	4.8 Summary of the Entire Argument So Far and Preview
5 An Anti-Humean Theory of Normative Reasons
	5.1 From Motivating Reasons to Normative Reasons
	5.2 The Intentional and the Deliberative
	5.3 Some Differences between Valuing and Desiring
	5.4 The Puzzle
	5.5 Davidson on Valuing as Desiring
	5.6 Gauthier on Valuing as a Mode of Desiring
	5.7 Lewis on Valuing as Desiring to Desire
	5.8 Valuing as Believing
	5.9 The Analysis of Normative Reasons
	5.10 The Puzzle Solved
	5.11 Summary and Preview
6 How to Solve the Moral Problem
	6.1 An Analysis of Rightness in Terms of Facts about our Normative Reasons
	6.2 The Solution to the Moral Problem
	6.3 Are There Any Moral Facts?
	6.4 How the Analysis of Rightness Enables Us to Reply to Standard Objections to Rationalism
	6.5 Conclusion
Notes
References
Index