The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 4
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Preface......Page 15
Introduction......Page 19
1 Beginning in the middle......Page 21
WHY DO WE NEED AMETAPHYSICS OF ORDINARY THINGS?......Page 24
IDP HENOMENA......Page 29
PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE OF THINGS......Page 31
PRACTICAL REALISM......Page 33
WHAT LIES AHEAD......Page 39
PART I Everyday things......Page 41
MOTIVATION FOR NONREDUCTION......Page 43
THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION......Page 50
IS THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION PLAUSIBLE?......Page 57
THINKING THINGS IN TO EXISTENCE?......Page 61
CONCLUSION......Page 65
AGGREGATES AND ARTIFACTS......Page 67
CONDITIONS FOR BEING AN ARTIFACT......Page 69
A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF ARTIFACTS......Page 71
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MALFUNCTION......Page 73
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ARTIFACTS......Page 77
CONCLUSION......Page 84
THE CONSTITUTION VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONS......Page 85
COMING INTO EXI STENCE : HUMAN ORGANISMS AND HUMAN PERSONS......Page 90
LIFE AND DEATH......Page 100
QUASI-NATURALISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS......Page 103
THREE APPROACHES CONTRASTED......Page 108
CONCLUSION......Page 111
PART II The everyday world......Page 113
5 Commonsense causation......Page 115
JAEGWON KIM’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST NONREDUCTIVE MENTAL CAUSATION......Page 117
DOES KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT GENERALIZE TO ALL MACROCAUSATION?......Page 122
RESPONSE TO KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT......Page 124
AN ACCOUNT OF NONREDUCTIVE CAUSATION......Page 129
SAVING NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM......Page 134
CONCLUSION......Page 137
6 Metaphysical vagueness......Page 139
ARGUMENTS FOR METAPHYSICAL VAGUENESS......Page 141
Argument from semantic indecision......Page 142
Argument from natural processes......Page 144
WHERE IN THE WORLD IS VAGUENESS?......Page 145
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES......Page 146
Spatial vagueness......Page 147
Temporal vagueness......Page 148
THE VAGUENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION RELATION......Page 150
SORITES ARGUMENTS......Page 153
7 Time......Page 160
THE A-SERIES AND THE B-SERIES......Page 161
THE INDISPENSABILITY OF BOTH A- AND B-SERIES......Page 163
A THEORY OF TIME......Page 167
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS......Page 170
BEYOND PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM......Page 172
CONCLUSION......Page 173
PART III Metaphysical underpinnings......Page 175
8 Constitution revisited......Page 177
DEFINITION OF ‘‘X CONSTITUTES Y AT T’’......Page 178
UNITY WITHOUT IDENTITY......Page 184
THE SAMEF......Page 187
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES......Page 190
9 Mereology and constitution......Page 199
SUMS AND CONSTITUTION......Page 200
A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF PARTS......Page 205
ARE PARTS MORE BASIC THAN WHOLES?......Page 208
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF SUMS......Page 209
SOME PHILOSOPH ICAL PUZZLES......Page 212
CONCLUSION......Page 215
THREE-DIMENSIONALISM V S. FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM......Page 217
THE ARGUMENT FROM VAGUENESS......Page 219
‘‘PARADOXES OF COINCIDENCE’’......Page 226
REASONS TO PREFER THREE-DIMENSIONALISM......Page 231
CONCLUSION......Page 235
AN ACCOUNT OF ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE......Page 236
TIME AND EXISTENCE......Page 244
ONTOLOGICAL LEVELS......Page 252
EMERGENCE......Page 255
CONCLUSION......Page 257
Select bibliography......Page 259
Index......Page 268