The Federal Design Dilemma: Congress and Intergovernmental Delegation

Cover
Half title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 The Federal Design Dilemma: A Puzzle of Intergovernmental Delegation
	Delegation?
	Intergovernmental Policy and State Political Context
	Importance
	Background
		Federalism and Distribution of Authority
		Congressional Delegation of Authority
		Political Incentives and Decentralization
		Unanswered Questions
	Contribution
	Plan of the Book
2 A Theory of Federal Delegation Design
	Foundational Assumptions
		Delegation
		Principal Agent Framework
		Legislator Motivations
		Discretion and Implementation
		Federalism Beliefs
	The Models
		Aggregate Model of Congress
		Individual-Level Bargaining Model
		Intergovernmental Authority as an Offer
		Play of the Game
		Solution
		Importance of Time
		House Solution
		The Super-Majoritarian Senate
	Political Uncertainty
	Theoretical Predictions
	Appendix
3 Measuring the Federal Allocation of Authority
	Federal Allocation of Authority
		Unit of Analysis
		Source
		Coding Definitions
		Coding Reliability
		Coding Choices
	Descriptive Statistics
	Alternative Arguments for Decentralization
	Policy Area Specifics
	Comparison with Other Data
	Limitations
	Joint Policies
	Conclusion
	Appendix
4 Intergovernmental Context and Congressional Coalition
	House Coalitions
	Senate Coalitions
	Evaluating Support for the Theory
		Dependent Variable
		Explanatory Variables
		Control Variables
		Alternative Explanations
	Empirical Analyses
	House Results
	Senate Results
	Discussion and Conclusion
	Appendix
5 Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation of Authority
	Testing the Theory
	Intergovernmental Delegation
	Operationalization of Theoretical Variables
		Preferences
		The Concept and Aggregation of Party
		Measuring Distance
		Considerations Regarding Averaging Distances
		Implications Regarding Party Distances
		Pivotal Legislator
		Replacement Risk
		Alternative Arguments’ Variables
		Control Variables
	Empirical Analyses
	Results
	Discussion and Conclusion
	Appendix
6 Intergovernmental Options and the Politics of Health Insurance Reform
	Context of Health Insurance Reform
	Theory of Federal Policy Design
	Research Design and Methods
	Federal Authority Allocation
	Data Analysis
		Institutions and Actors in the 111th Congress
		Congressional Deliberations Unfold
		State Delegation
		Intergovernmental Context
		Chamber Rules
		House–Senate Interactions
		Theory of Intergovernmental Design and Rival Arguments
		Electoral Concerns
		Data Analysis Summary
	Discussion and Conclusion
	Appendix
7 The Intergovernmental Context of Federal Policy Design
	Future research
		Passive States
		Joint Policies
		Inequities in Devolved Policies
	Implications
		Representation
		States’ Rights
		Accountability
		States as Policy Innovators
	Conclusion
References
Index