The Existence Puzzles: An Introduction to Population Ethics

Cover
The Existence Puzzles
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of principles
List of cases and figures
Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Recent history and current perplexed state of population ethics
	1.1 Population variability and the inquiry into existential status
	1.2 The case of Jaime versus Harry
	1.3 A quick turn back to the traditional total view
	1.4 More than one way to maximize: Granulation versus aggregation, person-based consequentialism
	1.5 Are hormones to blame?
	1.6 Conceptual necessities also puzzle pieces; more inventive approaches on hold
	1.7 The puzzle method, the role of intuition, the off ramp
	1.8 Accessibility relation, connection thesis
		1.8.1 Distinction between accessible futures and logically possible futures
		1.8.2 Connection between evaluating choices and comparing futures in respect of moral betterness
	1.9 Five existence puzzles
2 The asymmetry puzzle
	2.1 The miserable child case, the happy child case,   and some intuitions
	2.2 The puzzle
	2.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle that go nowhere
		2.3.1 Moral presentism
		2.3.2 Moral actualism
		2.3.3 Moral necessitarianism
		2.3.4 Moral existencism
		2.3.5 What has gone wrong?
	2.4 The existence-​sensitive solution to the asymmetry
		2.4.1 Where existential status matters and where it doesn’t
		2.4.2 The existence condition
		2.4.3 Application of the existence condition to the asymmetry, the Pareto reduction principle
		2.4.4 Application of the existence condition to addition   plus and double wrongful life
	2.5 Objections and replies
		2.5.1 Doesn’t the existence-​sensitive solution relocate, rather than solve, the puzzle?
		2.5.2 Doesn’t the existence-​sensitive solution assume an irrational (ad hoc, arbitrary) distinction?
3 The Pareto puzzle
	3.1 The three option case
	3.2 The puzzle
	3.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle by tossing out some of the puzzle pieces
		3.3.1 Reject the basic existential intuition, reject the existence condition
		3.3.2 Reject transitivity of betterness relation
		3.3.3 Reject trichotomy in favor of incommensurability
	3.4 The Pareto minus solution to the Pareto puzzle
		3.4.1 A skeptical look at the mere addition principle
		3.4.2 When the additional worth-​having existence makes things worse
	3.5 Objection and reply: Doesn’t the Pareto minus solution violate the principle of the independence of irrelevant alternatives?
4 The addition puzzle
	4.1 The puzzle
	4.2 Why we love addition
		4.2.1 The raw addition principle, inconsistency with existence condition
		4.2.2 Obstacles to doing away with addition
		4.2.3 Summing up
	4.3 Inversive existence-​sensitive solution to the   addition puzzle
		4.3.1 Perennial concerns about the raw addition principle
		4.3.2 Strategy: Addition without raw addition
		4.3.3 Implementation: Contributive value and value inversion
	4.4 Objection and reply: Isn’t inversive existence-​sensitive addition circular?
	4.5 Applications of inversive existence-​sensitive addition
		4.5.1 The two paths to zero wellbeing case
		4.5.2 Infinite population problems
		4.5.3 The tradeoff to exist case
	4.6 Wouldn’t it be simpler to “minimize aggregate complaints”?
5 The anonymity puzzle
	5.1 Simple and indefinitely iterated addition and reversal
	5.2 The case of indefinitely iterated addition and reversal;  the puzzle
	5.3 When the cures are worse than the disease
		5.3.1 Accept repugnant conclusions across the board
		5.3.2 Accept anti-​natalism
	5.4 Identity-​sensitive solution to the anonymity puzzle
		5.4.1 Strategy
		5.4.2 Implementation
	5.5 Objections and replies
		5.5.1 Wouldn’t the mere addition principle provide a simpler way to avoid anti-​natalism?
		5.5.2 Doesn’t the identity-​sensitive solution imply moral actualism?
		5.5.3 Isn’t unrestricted anonymity itself a critical piece  of the puzzle?
6 The better chance puzzle
	6.1 Probability and moral evaluation
		6.1.1 The better chance case
		6.1.2 The puzzle
	6.2 Expected value: The wrong way to make a wrong a right
		6.2.1 The concept of expected value; extending the existence condition to take probability into account
		6.2.2 Avoiding overreach
		6.2.3 The case of the all-​but-​known disaster
	6.3 Probable value: A better way to make a wrong a right
		6.3.1 A closer look at expected value
		6.3.2 The concept of probable value
		6.3.3 Missing results?
		6.3.4 The probable value solution to the better   chance puzzle
		6.3.5 Summing up
	6.4 Objections and replies
		6.4.1 The nonidentity problem
		6.4.2 The case of the all-​but-​known success
7 Person-​based consequentialism: A new way of doing the best we can
Appendix A: Nonexistence comparability
Appendix B: The loss distinction thesis
Appendix C: Broome on the neutrality intuition
Bibliography
Index