The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism

Cover
Endorsement Page
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
	Notes
	References
Part I: Genocide and genocide denialism
	Chapter 1: On genocide denial
		1.1 What is “genocide”?
			1.1.1 Legal definition
			1.1.2 Conceptual use of “genocide”
			1.1.3 Intentional destruction
			1.1.4 The group condition
			1.1.5 Identification of groups as targets
		1.2 Denial as a constant feature of genocide
			1.2.1 Preceding and execution phases
			1.2.2 Aftermath
				1.2.2.1 The Right to Justice
				1.2.2.2 Guarantees of non-recurrence
				1.2.2.3 Right to reparations
				1.2.2.4 Right to know
			1.2.3 Long-term “consolidative” denial
		1.3 The epistemic perniciousness of genocide denial
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 2: An epistemology of genocide denialism
		2.1 Denial and denialism
			2.1.1 Motivated cognition and rationalization
			2.1.2 Denialism as a collective achievement
		2.2 Denialism: epistemology of ignorance and epistemic vices
			2.2.1 From doxastic state to substantive epistemic practice
			2.2.2 Active ignorance, epistemic arrogance, and closed-mindedness
			2.2.3 Nationalist education and the cultivation of epistemic vices
			2.2.4 Genocide denialism: not non-recognition, but misrecognition
		2.3 Against the argument from “forgetting” and “amnesia” or: acknowledging different kinds of silence
		Notes
		References
Part II: The epistemic injustice of genocide denialism
	Chapter 3: The wrong of discriminatory epistemic injustice
		3.1 Introducing epistemic injustice
		3.2 Testimonial injustice
		3.3 Hermeneutical injustice
		3.4 New concepts and conceptualizations of epistemic injustice(s)
		3.5 On epistemic domination and oppression
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 4: Genocide denialism, misremembrance, and hermeneutical oppression
		4.1 The functions and values of (collective) genocide remembrance
			4.1.1 Genocide remembrance as resistance
			4.1.2 The moral value of genocide remembrance
		4.2 Reconstructive memory as complex ethical/epistemological achievement
			4.2.1 Genocide and/as heritage
			4.2.2 Remembering responsibly
		4.3 Genocide misremembrance: wilful hermeneutical ignorance and hermeneutical oppression
			4.3.1 Conceptual distortions of genocide
			4.3.2 The concept of “just memory”
			4.3.3 “Scholarly Humanism”: misconceptions about historiographical research
		4.4 On the mutually reinforcing relationship between testimonial and hermeneutical oppression
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 5: Conversational genocide denial and testimonial oppression
		5.1 Towards an ethico-epistemology of testimony
		5.2 Conversational genocide denial and testimonial smothering
		5.3 Consequences of resisting testimonial smothering
		5.4 The epistemic harms of testimonial oppression
		5.5 Individual culpability and responsibility for genocide denial
		Notes
		References
Concluding remarks
Index