The Currency of Solidarity: Constitutional Transformation during the Euro Crisis

Cover
Half-title
Series information
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Contents
Series Editors' Preface
Preface
Acknowledgements
Previously Published Work
Table of Cases
	European Union
		Court of Justice
		General Court
	Austria
	Estonia
	Ireland
	Germany
	Poland
	United States
Prologue
	When the Banks Stopped Dancing ...
	Sovereign Despair
	The Transformation
	Solidarity
Part I Solidarity between the Member States
	1 The Concept of Solidarity
		1.1 Introduction
		1.2 Aristotelean Friendship
		1.3 Rousseau's Social Contract
		1.4 Durkheim's Mechanical and Organic Solidarity
		1.5 Parsons's Normative Solidarity
		1.6 Conclusion
	2 Solidarity between the Member States
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 Political Obligations in States and between Them
			2.2.1 The Nature of Political Obligation
			2.2.2 Joint Commitments As Emergent Phenomena
			2.2.3 Commitment and Political Obligation
		2.3 The Solidary Cohesion between the Member States
			2.3.1 Time, Commitment and Solidarity
			2.3.2 The Strands of Solidarity
		2.4 Commitment and Union Law
		2.5 Conclusion
Part II The Original Stability Conception
	3 Committing to Stability
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Calling for Monetary Union
			3.2.1 The Hague, 1-2 December 1969
			3.2.2 Hannover, 27-28 June 1988
		3.3 The Stability Perspective
			3.3.1 Explaining the Original Set-Up
			3.3.2 Price Stability As the Overriding Aim
		3.4 The Constitutional Position of the European Central Bank
			3.4.1 The Stability Argument for Independence
			3.4.2 Legal Safeguards for Independence
		3.5 Economic Policy: Fiscal Prudence As a Safeguard for Stability
			3.5.1 Hopes and Fears for a gouvernement économique
			3.5.2 Primary Law and the Logic of Discipline
				3.5.2.1 The Logic of Discipline
				3.5.2.2 Market Discipline
				3.5.2.3 Public Discipline
			3.5.3 Secondary Law and the Logic of Discipline
				3.5.3.1 Waigel's Proposal for a Stability Pact
				3.5.3.2 The Stability and Growth Pact
		3.6 Accession to the Currency Union
			3.6.1 Negotiating Accession: Stability versus Inclusiveness
			3.6.2 The Balance between Stability and Inclusiveness
			3.6.3 The Stability Focus of the 'Outs'
		3.7 Conclusion
	4 Law and Economic Wisdom
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 The Whimsicality of Markets
			4.2.1 From Extreme Tranquillity to Absolute Panic
			4.2.2 Searching for an Explanation . . .
			4.2.3 . . . That Fits Central Bank Action
		4.3 The Weakness of Public Discipline
			4.3.1 Fiscal Politics under the Original Pact
			4.3.2 Testing Public Discipline in Court
			4.3.3 Changing the Pact: Flexibility versus Discipline
		4.4 The Fixation on Fiscal Policy
			4.4.1 The Private Roots of Fiscal Problems
			4.4.2 The Stifling Embrace between States and Banks
		4.5 The Narrow Reading of Stability
			4.5.1 Financial Stability and the Lender of Last Resort
			4.5.2 The Search for a Lender of Last Resort for Banks . . .
			4.5.3 . . . And Possibly for States Too
		4.6 Conclusion
Part III The New Stability Conception
	5 The Shift in Solidarity
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Saving Greece
			5.2.1 Changing the Contract
			5.2.2 Specifying the Change
			5.2.3 The 'Greek' Facility
		5.3 Saving the Currency Union
			5.3.1 The Call for a Crisis Fund
			5.3.2 The Mechanism
			5.3.3 The Facility
			5.3.4 The Search for 'Flexibility'
		5.4 Incorporating the Shift in the Treaties
			5.4.1 The Chiefs Back at the Steering Wheel
			5.4.2 A Stroll on the Shores of Deauville
			5.4.3 Scaling Back Ambitions
			5.4.4 The Permanent Mechanism
		5.5 Conclusion
	6 Contractual Change and Central Bank Action
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Crossing the Rubicon
		6.3 Calling for a 'Compact'
		6.4 Doing Whatever It Takes
		6.5 Conclusion
	7 Reconciling the Contract with the Treaties
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Accommodating the Shift in Solidarity
			7.2.1 The Boundary between Economic and Monetary Policy
			7.2.2 The Court's Struggle with History
				7.2.2.1 Reading the Ban on Bailout
				7.2.2.2 The Struggle with History
			7.2.3 Union Assistance and the Deal of Cameron
		7.3 Approving Central Bank Action
			7.3.1 Weidmann's Replay
			7.3.2 The Policy Nature of Bond Purchases
				7.3.2.1 The Battle over Objectives
				7.3.2.2 The Futility of the Battle
			7.3.3 The Court's Struggle with the Present
			7.3.4 Courts and Central Banks in a Stability Community
		7.4 Conclusion
Conclusion: Preserving the Contract in an Emergency
	C.1 The Euro's Rescue, the Court and Legal Justification
	C.2 Emergency and Constitution
	C.3 Solidarity, Loyalty and the Contract
	C.4 The Contract and the Court
Bibliography
	Books, Articles, Speeches (Alphabetical)
	Newspaper Articles (Chronological)
Index