The Criminal Law’s Person

Acknowledgements\nContents\nList of Contributors\n1. Introduction: The Criminal Law’s Person\n	I. Criminal Justice: Political Not Metaphysical\n	II. The Criminal Law and the Criminal Law\'s Person(s)\n	III. Contested Sources, Contested Purposes\n	IV. Outline of the Volume\n2. The Criminal Law’s Various Persons\n	I. Introduction\n	II. Ex Ante: Criminalisation, Policing and Prosecution\n	III. Ex Post: Conviction and Sentencing\n	IV. \'Science\' and the Criminal Law\'s Various Persons\n3. The Criminal Law’s Person and Normative Elements in the Legal Definition of Excusing Circumstances\n	I. Introduction\n	II. The Presumption of Guilt in the Normative Concept of the Criminal Law\'s Person\n	III. The Presumption of Guilt and Excusing Circumstances in Criminal Law\n	IV. Conclusions\n4. Standard-Setting versus Tracking ‘Profound’ Blameworthiness: What should be the Role of the Rules for Ascription of Responsibility?\n	I. Introduction\n	II. Criminal Law Backwards and Forwards\n	III. What If? A Flexible Within\n	IV. A Few Examples\n	V. Closing Comments: The Criminal Law and Everyday People\n5. Attributability and Accountability in the Criminal Law\n	I. Two Concepts of Responsibility\n	II. Two Routes to Criminal Responsibility: The Attributability Route\n	III. Two Routes To Criminal Responsibility: The Accountability Route\n	IV. Two Persons of Criminal Responsibility\n	V. Attributability Versus Accountability\n6. In Search of Criminal Law’s Person\n	I. Introduction\n	II. Legal Personality\n	III. Responsible Agency in Criminal Law\n	IV. Conclusion\n7. Victims Who Victimise: Guilt in Political Theory\rand Moral Psychology\n	I. The Problem of Perpetrators as Victims Who Victimise\n	II. Normative Political Theory: The Problem of the Ideal and the Actual\n	III. The Moral Psychology of Guilt: Towards a Moral Grammar\n	IV. The Guilt of Perpetrators as Victims who Victimise\n8. Responsibility Beyond Blame: Unfree Agency and the\rMoral Psychology of Criminal Law’s Persons\n	I. Introduction\n	II. Blame and Blameworthiness\n	III. The Tyranny of the Past\n	IV. Unfree Agency\n	V. The Moral Psychology of Heteronomy\n	VI. The Antinomy of Responsibility\n	VII. Responsibility, Reification and Respect\n	VIII. The Grammar of Taking Responsibility\n9. Implicit Bias, Self-Defence and the Reasonable Person\n	I. Introduction\n	II. Unreasonable Persons and Biased Beliefs\n	III. Racism and Self-Defence\n	IV. US Law and the \'Reasonable-Belief Rule\'\n	V. Evaluating the Reasonable Person Standards\n	VI. English and Welsh Law and the Genuine Belief Rule\n	VII. A Palliative Solution\n	VIII. Concluding Remarks\nIndex