The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 9
Introduction......Page 11
Notes......Page 13
1.1 Introduction......Page 15
1.2 Marks of the Mental......Page 16
1.3 The Physical......Page 20
1.4 Mind–Body Relations......Page 21
1.5 The Mind–Body Problem......Page 24
1.6.1 Ontological anti-reductionism......Page 27
1.6.2 Conceptual anti-reductionism......Page 32
1.6.3 Conceptual reduction......Page 34
1.6.4 Irrealism......Page 42
1.7 Conclusion......Page 43
Notes......Page 45
References......Page 55
2.1 Mind–Body Dualism......Page 61
2.2 Behaviorism......Page 62
2.3 The Identity Theory......Page 64
2.4 Machine Functionalism......Page 66
2.5 Homuncular Functionalism and Other Teleological Theories......Page 67
2.6 Problems over Qualia and Consciousness......Page 69
2.7 Problems over Intentionality......Page 71
2.9 Instrumentalism......Page 72
2.10 Eliminativism and Neurophilosophy......Page 74
References......Page 75
3 Physicalism......Page 79
3.1 Formulating Physicalism......Page 80
3.2 Justifying Physicalism......Page 90
3.3 Objecting to Physicalism......Page 92
Notes......Page 95
References......Page 96
4.1 Introduction......Page 99
4.2 The Argument for Predicate Dualism......Page 101
4.3 Why Predicate Dualism leads to Dualism Proper......Page 102
4.4 Is the Talk of “Perspectives” Legitimate?......Page 103
4.6 The Optionality of Non-basic Levels and the Unavoidability of Psychology......Page 104
4.7 Why Bundle Dualism Will Not Do......Page 106
4.8 Two Reflections on this Conclusion......Page 109
4.9 An Objection......Page 110
Notes......Page 112
References......Page 114
5.1 Introduction......Page 116
5.2 The Problem......Page 117
5.3.1 The explanatory argument......Page 118
5.3.2 The conceivability argument......Page 119
5.3.3 The knowledge argument......Page 120
5.3.4 The shape of the arguments......Page 121
5.4 Type-A Materialism......Page 122
5.5 Type-B Materialism......Page 126
5.6 The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Type-B Materialism......Page 129
5.7 Type-C Materialism......Page 133
5.8 Interlude......Page 137
5.9 Type-D Dualism......Page 138
5.10 Type-E Dualism......Page 141
5.11 Type-F Monism......Page 143
5.12 Conclusions......Page 147
Notes......Page 149
References......Page 154
6.1 Overview......Page 157
6.2 A Medium for Thought......Page 158
6.3 Naturalization......Page 160
6.4 Mechanisms of Meaning......Page 163
6.5 Fodor’s Meaning Mechanisms......Page 164
6.6 Dretske’s Meaning Mechanisms......Page 167
Names......Page 170
Uninstantiated properties......Page 171
The disjunction problem – again......Page 172
Too much meaning (semantic promiscuity)......Page 175
Swampman......Page 176
Mind dependence......Page 177
Vacuity......Page 178
6.8 Conclusion......Page 179
Notes......Page 180
References......Page 182
7 Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations......Page 186
7.1 The Systematicity of Inference......Page 187
7.2 The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations......Page 192
7.3 The Compositionality of Representations......Page 194
7.4 Another Systematicity Argument......Page 195
7.5 Can Functional Combinatorialism Explain the Systematic Relations in Thought?......Page 197
Notes......Page 201
References......Page 202
8 Concepts......Page 204
8.1 Definitional Structure......Page 205
8.2 Probabilistic Structure......Page 209
8.3 Theory Structure......Page 212
8.4 Concepts Without Structure......Page 216
8.5 Rethinking Conceptual structure......Page 219
Notes......Page 222
References......Page 225
9.1 The Cartesian Background......Page 228
9.2 Intentionality......Page 231
9.2.1 “Broad” states of mind......Page 233
9.3 Functionalism......Page 234
9.3.1 Multiple realizability......Page 235
9.4 Levels of Reality......Page 237
9.5 Causation and Broad States of Mind......Page 239
9.6 Qualia......Page 240
9.7 Zombies......Page 242
9.8 Conclusion......Page 244
Notes......Page 245
References......Page 247
10.1 Why Does Folk Psychology Play an Important Role in the Philosophy of Mind?......Page 249
10.2 What is Folk Psychology? Two Possible Answers......Page 252
10.3 The Challenge from Simulation Theory......Page 255
10.4 Three Accounts of Mindreading: Information-rich, Simulation-based and Hybrid......Page 257
10.4.1 Inference prediction: a mindreading skill subserved by simulation......Page 258
10.4.2 Desire-attribution: a mindreading skill that cannot be explained by simulation......Page 260
10.4.3 Discrepant belief-attribution: another mindreading skill that cannot be explained by simulation......Page 263
Notes......Page 265
References......Page 267
11.1 Introduction......Page 270
11.2 Getting to Twin Earth: What’s in the Head?......Page 271
11.3 The Cognitive Science Gesture......Page 274
11.4 Functionalism, Physicalism, and Individualism......Page 276
11.5 The Appeal to Causal Powers......Page 277
11.6 Externalism and Metaphysics......Page 278
11.7 The Debate Over Marr’s Theory of Vision......Page 279
11.8 Exploitative Representation and Wide Computationalism......Page 288
11.9 Narrow Content and Marr’s Theory......Page 292
11.10 Individualism and the Problem of Self-knowledge......Page 294
References......Page 299
12.1.1 The feeling theory of emotions......Page 302
12.1.2 Propositional attitude theories......Page 303
12.2.1 Darwin and the emotions......Page 304
12.2.2 The emotions in classical ethology......Page 305
12.2.3 Ekman and “basic emotions”......Page 308
12.2.4 Sociobiology and the emotions......Page 309
12.2.5 Narrow evolutionary psychology and the emotions......Page 310
12.2.6 The transactional theory of emotion......Page 311
12.3.1 Why it matters......Page 313
12.3.3 Social constructionism about emotions......Page 314
12.3.4 Conceptual confusions in the debates over universality......Page 315
12.4.1 The resurgence of the feeling theory......Page 316
12.4.2 Neurological support for twin-pathway models of emotion......Page 317
12.5 Is Emotion a Natural Kind?......Page 318
References......Page 319
13.2 The Core Idea, Classically Morphed......Page 323
13.3 The Core Idea, Non-classically Morphed......Page 325
13.4 Robotics: Beyond the Core?......Page 327
13.5 Emotions and Reason......Page 329
13.6 Global Reasoning......Page 331
13.7 Fast and Frugal Heuristics......Page 332
13.8 Conclusions: Moving Targets and Multiple Technologies......Page 333
References......Page 334
14 Philosophy of Mind and the Neurosciences......Page 336
14.1 Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience......Page 337
14.2 Neurofunctions?......Page 343
14.3 Consciousness and Cellular Neuroscience......Page 347
14.4 Reductionist Neuroscience and “Hard Problems”......Page 358
14.5 Toward Genuinely Interdisciplinary Philosophy and Neuroscience......Page 359
Notes......Page 362
References......Page 363
15.1 The Problems of Personal Identity......Page 366
15.2 Understanding the Persistence Question......Page 369
15.3 Accounts of Our Identity Through Time......Page 372
15.4 The Psychological Approach......Page 373
15.5 The Fission Problem......Page 375
15.6 The Problem of the Thinking Animal......Page 376
15.7 The Somatic Approach......Page 378
15.8 Conclusion......Page 380
References......Page 381
16 Freedom of the Will......Page 383
16.1.2 The Consequence Argument......Page 384
16.1.3 Assessing the argument......Page 386
16.2.1 Frankfurt cases......Page 389
16.2.2 A hierarchical account......Page 390
16.2.3 Capacity accounts......Page 392
16.2.4 A responsiveness view......Page 393
16.3 Libertarian Accounts......Page 395
16.3.1 Non-causal views......Page 396
16.3.2 Non-deterministic event-causal views......Page 398
16.3.3 Agent-causal accounts......Page 403
16.3.4 The existence question......Page 405
16.4 Conclusion......Page 406
Notes......Page 407
References......Page 413
Index......Page 419