Supposition and the Imaginative Realm: A Philosophical Inquiry

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Introducing supposition: To imagine or not to imagine, that
is the question
	PART I: The facets of supposition
	PART II: The nature of supposition
	Notes
PART I: The Facets Of Supposition
	1. Phenomenology
		1.1 The phenomenology claim
		1.2. A rough taxonomy of the phenomenological realm
		1.3 Different phenomenology claims
		1.4 Summary
		Notes
	2. Emotionality
		2.1 The Emotionality Claim
		2.2 The strong interpretation of EC
		2.3 The weak interpretation of EC
		2.4 Emotional supposition and an indirect reading of EC
		2.5 An output reading of EC
		2.6 Summary
		Notes
	3. Participation
		3.1 The Participation Claim
		3.2 Supposition, imagination and their constraints
		3.3 Different readings of the Participation Claim
		3.4 Summary
		Notes
	4. Features proper to supposition
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 Propositionality
		4.3 Inferentiality
		4.4 The relationship with will and truth
		4.5 Summary
		Notes
PART II: The nature of supposition
	5. Supposition as non-imaginative
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Supposition and entertainment
		5.3 Supposition and the doxastic domain
		5.4 Primitivism and deflationism
		Notes
	6. Supposition as imaginative
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Cognitivism
		6.3 Imaginative primitivism
		Notes
Supposition and the imaginative realm: Remapping the territory
	A psychological suggestion
	Notes
References
Index