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ویرایش: نویسندگان: John M. de Figueiredo, Michael Lenox, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Richard G. Vanden Bergh (Eds.) سری: ISBN (شابک) : 9781786350206 ناشر: Emerals سال نشر: 2016 تعداد صفحات: 540 زبان: English فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود) حجم فایل: 5 مگابایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Strategy beyond markets به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب استراتژی فراتر از بازارها نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
استراتژی فراتر از بازارها از اوایل دهه 1990 یک حوزه فعال تحقیقاتی بوده است. از زمان شروع آن، بورس تحصیلی ناشی از این جریان تحقیقاتی به طور قابل توجهی از نظر کمیت، کیفیت و وسعت رشد کرده است. به همین ترتیب، شرکت ها در سراسر جهان به طور فزاینده ای استراتژی های غیر بازاری گسترده و پیچیده ای را اجرا کرده اند. در استراتژی فراتر از بازارها، تعداد انگشت شماری از حوزه های تمرکز وجود دارد. در سیاست خصوصی، شرکتهایی را مشاهده میکنیم که بیشتر با سازمانهای غیردولتی و سایر گروههای ذینفع خاص همکاری میکنند تا از انتخاب سیاستهای نامطلوب جلوگیری کنند، به بحرانها واکنش سریع نشان دهند و استراتژیهای مسئولیتپذیر اجتماعی را به طور فعال توسعه دهند. در سیاست عمومی، شرکت ها به طور فزاینده ای در استفاده از بودجه مبارزات انتخاباتی، لابی گری، مشارکت در کمیته ها و سایر ابزارها برای تأثیرگذاری بر محیط های سیاسی محلی، ملی و بین المللی پیچیده شده اند. همچنین شرکت هایی که به شدت تحت تأثیر سیاست هستند، به احتمال زیاد استراتژی سیاسی یکپارچه را به عنوان بخشی از یک استراتژی رقابتی جامع تر و/یا استراتژی توسعه بین المللی ایجاد می کنند. علیرغم پیشرفت قابل توجه در ادبیات، ما سه حوزه را برای گسترش و افزایش درک استراتژی فراتر از بازارها شناسایی کردهایم. اول، ما در حال حاضر درک محدودی از ویژگیهای حیاتی برای شرکتها برای ایجاد یک استراتژی غیربازاری پایدار داریم. در حالی که مطالعات بسیار خوبی انجام شده است که اهمیت پیشدستی در سیاست خصوصی، روابط سیاسی در سیاست عمومی، و خرید در انجمن در استراتژی سیاسی یکپارچه را برجسته می کند، مشخص نیست که آیا این نوع عوامل در زمینه پویایی های سیاسی یا بازار پایدار هستند یا خیر. علاوه بر این، مشخص نیست که آیا این عوامل به طور قابلتوجهی با عوامل شناسایی شده در ادبیات استراتژی رقابتی گستردهتر تفاوت دارند (به عنوان مثال، آیا منابع سیاسی اساساً با منابع بازار متفاوت هستند؟ آیا شرکتهایی که منابع سیاسی را سازماندهی میکنند از منطق اساسی متفاوتی نسبت به شرکتها برای سازماندهی منابع بازار استفاده میکنند؟) دوم ، تحقیقات بسیار کمی (اگر وجود داشته باشد) قابل توجهی وجود دارد که استراتژی شرکت را با نتایج غیر بازاری و عملکرد شرکت مرتبط می کند. اکثر تحقیقات تئوری ها و/یا تحلیل های تجربی را توسعه داده اند که عوامل تعیین کننده استراتژی شرکت را فراتر از بازارها بررسی می کند. مطالعات بسیار کمی نشان داده اند که استراتژی یک شرکت عملکرد سیاست را افزایش می دهد. تقریبا هیچ یک رابطه بین سیاست و سودآوری شرکت را نشان نداده اند. سوم، به نظر میرسد حوزههای موضوعی تحلیل محدود است. مسائل زیستمحیطی و مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکتها بر تحقیقات سیاست خصوصی غالب است، شرکتهای به شدت تحت نظارت بر مطالعات سیاست عمومی تسلط دارند، و مطالعات نظری بر تحقیقات در مورد استراتژیهای سیاسی یکپارچه تسلط دارند. با این جلد AiSM ما به دنبال مقالات نظری و/یا تجربی هستیم که با پرداختن به استراتژی فراتر از بازارها در سه حوزه ای که در بالا در زمینه سیاست خصوصی، سیاست عمومی یا استراتژی سیاسی یکپارچه مورد بحث قرار گرفت، ادبیات را گسترش داده و/یا تقویت می کند.
Strategy beyond markets has been an active area of research inquiry since the early 1990s. Since its inception, the scholarship emanating from this research stream has grown substantially in quantity, quality, and breadth. Likewise, firms across the world have increasingly implemented broad and sophisticated non-market strategies. Within strategy beyond markets, there are a handful of focus areas. In Private Politics we observe firms working more closely with NGOs and other special interest groups to preempt unfavorable policy choices, react swiftly to crises, and proactively develop socially responsible strategies. In Public Politics, firms have become increasingly sophisticated in using campaign funding, lobbying, committee participation, and other instruments to influence local, national, and international political environments. Also firms that are heavily influenced by politics are more likely to craft Integrated Political Strategy as part of a more comprehensive competitive strategy and/or international expansion strategy. Despite significant progress in the literature, we have identified three areas for extension and enhancement in understanding strategy beyond markets. First, we currently have limited understanding of the critical attributes for firms to establish a sustainable non-market strategy. While there have been excellent studies highlighting the importance of preemption in Private Politics, political ties in Public Politics, and forum shopping in Integrated Political Strategy, it is unclear if these types of factors are sustainable in the context of political or market dynamics. Furthermore it is unclear whether these factors differ significantly from those identified in the broader competitive strategy literature (e.g., Are political resources different fundamentally from market resources? Do firms organizing political resources use a fundamentally different logic than firms utilize to organize market resources?) Second, there has been very little (if any) significant research linking firm strategy to both nonmarket outcomes and firm performance. Most research has developed theories and/or empirical analyses that explore the determinants of a firm's strategy beyond markets. Very few studies have shown that a firm's strategy increases policy performance; almost none have demonstrated a link between policy and firm profitability. Third, the topical areas of analysis appear to be limited. Environmental issues and corporate social responsibility dominate Private Politics research, heavily regulated firms dominate Public Politics studies, and theoretical studies dominate research on Integrated Political Strategy. With this AiSM volume we seek theoretical and/or empirical articles that extend and/or enhance the literature by addressing strategy beyond markets in the three areas discussed above in the context of Private Politics, Public Politics or Integrated Political Strategy.
Contents List of Contributors Introduction Public Politics Articles Private Politics Articles Integrated Political Strategy Articles Notes References Strategy beyond Markets: A Step Back and a Look Forward Introduction A Stylized (U.S.) History of the Demand for Nonmarket Strategy Nonmarket Strategy Roles of Nonmarket Strategy Levels of Nonmarket Strategy Research The Political Economy Approach The Firm Level Applying the Approach Public Politics Example: Uber Private Politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup Integrated Strategy and Private and Public Politics: The Fast Food Campaign Market and Nonmarket Strategy Strategic Management Nonmarket Strategy Self-Regulation Research Theory Empirical Data and Methods Public Politics Private Politics Normative Notes References Part I: Public Politics Political Risk as a Hold-Up Problem: Implications for Integrated Strategy Introduction The Model Analysis of Model Strategies to Mitigate Political Risk Government Commitment Voluntary Concessions Political Strategies Integrated Strategy: HR, Operations, and Value Chain Management Integrated Strategy: Ownership and Contracts Integrated Strategy: Timing of Profits Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References Incorporating Legislative Effectiveness into Nonmarket Strategy: The Case of Financial Services Reform and the Great Recession Pivotal Politics Theories A Theory of Legislative Effectiveness with Pivotal Politics Who Are the Most Effective Legislators? An Illustration: Banking and Finance in the Great Recession Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References Appendix A Unified Model of Political Risk Introduction Theory: A Unified Model of Political Risk Disaggregating Political Risk Modeling Each Risk Theoretical Model: An Extensive-Form Game with War, Transfer Restrictions, and Expropriation Structure of the Game Investor Incentives Government Incentives Dynamic Intuitions from the Static Model Capabilities of Investors Ability to Resist Level of Information Ease of Exit Mapping Capabilities to Risks War versus Expropriation and Transfer Restriction Transfer Risk versus Expropriation Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References Appendix Proof of Proposition 1 Motivations for Corporate Political Activity Introduction Transactional Nature of Campaign Contributions Motivations for Corporate Political Activity: Strategy or Agency Strategic Behavior of Executives Agency Behavior of PACs Empirical Approach Data Dependent Variables Independent Variables Statistical Models and Their Interpretation Empirical Results Discussion Simultaneous Presence of Strategic and Agency-Motivated Behavior Interorganizational Dynamics in Public Politics Managerial Implications Highly versus Less Regulated Industries Limitations Implications for Future Research Design Conclusion Notes References The Market for Legislative Influence over Regulatory Policy Introduction Research Design Theory and Hypotheses Econometric Specification, Data and Measures Results Discussion and Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References Part II: Private Politics Corporate Reputational Dynamics, Private Regulation, and Activist Pressure Introduction The Model Model Structure The Firm The Activist Comments on the Model Specification Equilibrium Conditions Firm’s Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions Activist’s Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions Equilibrium Conditions Computational Approach Baseline Parameterization Computational Analysis Analysis Equilibrium Behavior with no Activist Equilibrium Behavior with an Activist The Role and Impact of the Activist: A Preliminary Cut Computational Results: Baseline Parameterization Computational Results: Grid Search Over G Comparative Statics of Long-Run Outcomes Activist Efficacy: Variations in α and ω Activist and Firm Patience: Variations in βA and βF Returns to Reputation for Corporate Citizenship: Variations in θ Activist Passion: Variations in ψ Summary and Conclusions Notes References Appendix Second-Order Conditions Firm’s Problem Activist’s Problem Computational Method Proofs of Propositions Proofs of Propositions 1 Proof of Proposition 2 Proof of Lemma 1 Proof of Proposition 4 Proof of Proposition 6 Self-Regulation and Regulatory Discretion: Why Firms May Be Reluctant to Signal Green Introduction The Model Regulatory Flexibility and Firm Compliance Legislative Stage Self-Regulation Uninformed Regulator Offers Flexibility (λ<λ.) Uninformed Regulator Does Not Offer Flexibility (λ>λ.) Numerical Example Discussion Conclusions Notes Acknowledgments References Private Politics Daily: What Makes Firms the Target of Internet/Media Criticism? An Empirical Investigation of Firm, Indust... Introduction Internet/Media Criticism and Activist Campaigns Internet/Media Criticism and Campaigns as Different Aspects of Private Politics Internet/Media Criticism as Early Stage of Activist Campaigns Hypotheses Firm-Specific Factors Industry Factors Country-Specific and Institutional Factors Data and Methods Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables Firm-Level Variables Industry-Level Variables Country-Level Variables Results Results for Model 1 – General Criticism Sample Model 2: Likelihood of Being Severely Criticized Model 3: Determinants of Criticism Intensity Discussion – Conclusion Limitations Notes References Part III: Integrated Political Strategy Navigating Natural Monopolies: Market Strategy and Nonmarket Challenges in Radio and Television Audience Measurement Markets Introduction Market Structures of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets Radio and Television Audience Ratings Overview of the Evolution of Audience Measurement Markets in the United States Economic Characteristics of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets Economies of Scale Value of Comparability Information Imperfections Partially Conflicting Buyer Preferences Summary Firm Strategies, Nonmarket Constraints, and Industry Dynamics Competition for the Market Positioning Pricing and Deep Pockets Acquisitions and Alliances Exploiting Monopoly Maintaining Monopoly Business Practices to Limit Available Customers or Increase Switching Costs Innovation Competition and Displacement of the Incumbent Summary Threats of Governmental Intervention, Self-Regulation, and Negotiation The 1963 Harris Hearings Switching to Local People Meters in the United States, 2002–2009 Summary Alternative Models of Television Audience Measurement Markets Television Audience Measurement in the United Kingdom Television Audience Measurement in Australia Television Audience Measurement in India, 2008–2014 Discussion: No Exit and the Political Economy of Complaints Notes Acknowledgment References The Organization of Nonmarket Strategy Introduction A Typology of Nonmarket Organization Model Integration Specialization Optimal Organizational Form Economy of Scope β Importance of CSR for Output α Manager Valuation of CSR δ Firm Valuation of CSR Non-CSR Nonmarket Functions Relating Theory to Organizational Form in Practice Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References Appendix A: Proofs Appendix B: Organizational form Typology Coding Complementarity in Firms’ Market and Political Capabilities: An Integrated Theoretical Perspective Introduction Political Tactics and Market Capabilities Common Political Tactics and Underlying Political Capabilities Building Political Capabilities from Market Capabilities Information Provision Constituency Building Sustainability of Political Advantage Internal Alignment External Alignment Consistency of Internal and External Alignments Discussion Can Firms Entirely Replace Political Capabilities with Outsourcing? How Far Can Capabilities Travel within the Firm? Theoretical Contributions Limitations and Future Research Conclusion Notes Acknowledgments References How Patent Strategy Affects the Timing and Method of Patent Litigation Resolution Literature Review and Hypotheses Generic Patent Strategies and the Timing of Patent Litigation Resolution Proprietary Patent Strategy Defensive Patent Strategy Leveraging Patent Strategy Data and Methods Dependent Variable Independent Variables Proprietary Strategy: Patentee Stakes and Patent Age Defensive Strategy: Portfolio Citations and Counter-Suit Leveraging Strategy: Size Ratio Control Variables Empirical Model Results Discussion Notes Acknowledgments References About the Authors