Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations (Studies in Brain and Mind, 23)

Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
	1.1 The Quest for a Methodological Grounding
	1.2 Method(ologi)cal Criticism
	1.3 Sketch of Current Method(olog)ical Approaches and Resources
	1.4 Methodological Preliminaries and the Contributions of this Volume
	References
Part I: Philosophy of Science
	Chapter 2: A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 In Need for a Methodology
		2.3 The Problem of Choice
			2.3.1 Explanatory Unification
			2.3.2 Explanatory Pluralism
		2.4 Explanation Types in 4E Research
		2.5 A Spectrum of Integration
			2.5.1 Relation of Conditions and Stances
			2.5.2 Example of Cross-Explanatory Integration
		2.6 Where to Be in the Spectrum of Integration
		2.7 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 3: A Professional Guide to Explanation. Commentary on “A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research”
		References
	Chapter 4: Explanatory Diversity and Embodied Cognitive Science: Reflexivity Motivates Pluralism
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 The Philosophical Problem of Explanatory Diversity
			4.2.1 Explanatory Diversity in Embodied Cognitive Science
		4.3 Explanation and Pluralism(s)
			4.3.1 Problems with Integrationist and Isolationist Pluralisms
			4.3.2 Pluralism of Explanatory Styles
		4.4 Reflexivity, Mind, and Embodiment
			4.4.1 Reflexivity?
			4.4.2 Reflexivity in the Enactive Tradition
			4.4.3 Situated Reflexivity
		4.5 From a Situated Reflexive Stance on Explanatory Diversity to Pluralism of Explanatory Styles
		References
	Chapter 5: Commentary on “Explanatory Diversity and Embodied Cognitive Science: Reflexivity Motivates Pluralism”
		5.1 The Problem of Bypassing the Question
		5.2 The Problem of a 4E Precondition
		5.3 The Problem of a Small Vicious Circle
		5.4 The Incorporation Problem
		References
	Chapter 6: Ecological Psychology, Enaction, and the Quest for an Embodied and Situated Cognitive Science
		6.1 Towards an Embodied and Situated Cognitive Science
			6.1.1 Where Do We Come From?
				6.1.1.1 Ecological Psychology
				6.1.1.2 Enaction
			6.1.2 Where Are We Now?
			6.1.3 What Do We Need?
		6.2 Enaction: Philosophy of Nature or Research Program?
		6.3 Ecological Psychology: A Philosophical and Scientific Framework
			6.3.1 Ecological Psychology as a Philosophy of Nature
			6.3.2 Ecological Psychology as a Research Program and Scientific Framework
		6.4 Conclusion: Following the Ecological Lead
		References
	Chapter 7: Normativity and the Methodology of 4E Cognition: Taking Stock and Going Forward
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Three Claims on Normativity and Cognition
		7.3 Normativity as Constitutive of Cognition: Ontological and Semantic Ascents
		7.4 Folk Psychology and the Normativity of Daily Intentional Concepts
		7.5 Beyond Neuroscience as a Conveyor of Confirmations for 4E Cognition
		7.6 Neuroscience without Folk Psychology, Folk Psychology Without Literalism
		7.7 Conclusion
		References
Part II: Ontology of the Mind
	Chapter 8: Extended Cognition and the Search for the Mark of Constitution – A Promising Strategy?
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Extended Cognition, Constitution & Criteria of Adequacy
		8.3 Property-Based Constitution
		8.4 Diachronic Constitution
		8.5 Mechanistic Constitution
		8.6 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 9: Commentary on “Extended Cognition and the Search for the Mark of Constitution – A Promising Strategy?”
		9.1 What Is Diachronic Constitution?
		9.2 Diachronic Constitution and the Co-location Principle
		References
	Chapter 10: Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy: Diachronic Constitution and the Metaphysics of Extended Cognition
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Preliminary Remarks on Constitution and Causation
		10.3 Two Kinds of Constitution
			10.3.1 Material Constitution
			10.3.2 Diachronic Constitution
		10.4 Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy
		10.5 Saving the Causal-Constitution Distinction
		10.6 Concluding Remarks
		References
	Chapter 11: Why Diachronic Constitution Won’t Help. Commentary on “Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy”
		11.1 Introduction
		11.2 The CC-Fallacy and Diachronic Constitution
		11.3 Mechanistic Constitution
		References
	Chapter 12: Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness: Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head and the DEUTS Argument Won’t Let It Leak Outside
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Predictive Processing and the Free-Energy Principle: A Quick Introduction
		12.3 The DEUTS Argument, Twenty(Ish) Years Later
			12.3.1 The First Step: Dynamical Entanglement
			12.3.2 Dynamical Entanglement and Predictive Processing
			12.3.3 The Second Step: Unique Temporal Signature
			12.3.4 Unique Temporal Signature and Predictive Processing
		12.4 Extended Consciousness in Predictive Processing: Three Problems
			12.4.1 Cultural Practices Do Not Seem to Support Consciousness Vehicle Externalism
			12.4.2 The Markov Blankets of the Conscious Mind
			12.4.3 DEUTS and the Phenomenal Bloat
		12.5 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 13: Commentary on “Predictive Processing and Extended Consciousness”
		13.1 Sensorimotor Enactivism and Predictive Processing
		13.2 Cultural Practices and the Constitution of Phenomenal Experience
		13.3 The Threat of Conscious Bloat
		References
	Chapter 14: Plural Methods for Plural Ontologies: A Case Study from the Life Sciences
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 Mechanistic and Dynamical Explanations
			14.2.1 Mechanistic Explanations
			14.2.2 Dynamical Explanations
		14.3 A Case Study
			14.3.1 Mechanistic Explanation of Orientation in Bird Flocking
			14.3.2 Dynamical Explanation of Velocity in Bird Flocking
		14.4 Ontological Pluralism
		14.5 Conclusion
		References
Part III: Applications
	Chapter 15: Chronic Pain, Enactivism, & the Challenges of Integration
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 The Philosophy of Chronic Pain
			15.2.1 Chronic Pain: Definition & Classification
			15.2.2 A Brief History of Pain Theories
			15.2.3 Neuro-Centrism
			15.2.4 The Biopsychosocial Model
			15.2.5 Five Facets of Integration
		15.3 An Enactive Approach to Chronic Pain: Revisiting the Five Challenges of Integration
			15.3.1 Main Pillars of Enactivism
			15.3.2 Minimal Ontological Assumptions
			15.3.3 Application to Chronic Pain
			15.3.4 Conceptual, Explanatory, Methodological, & Therapeutic Challenges
		15.4 Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 16: Affordances, the Social Environment, and the Notion of Field: State of the Debate and Methodological Insights
		16.1 Introduction
		16.2 Gibson’s Direct Realism and the Role Assigned to Language and Socio-cultural Practices
		16.3 Neo-Gibsonian Interpretations of the Role of Sociality and Cultural Practices
		16.4 The Organism-Environment Mutuality and the Social Context: Is a Reconceptualization Necessary?
		16.5 Empirical Evidence and Further Challenges
		16.6 The Value of Phenomenological Analyses and the Concept of Solicitation in the Study of Perception-Action Cycles
		16.7 The Notion of Field: A Brief History and Its Implications
		16.8 Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Its Methodological Implications: A Phenomenologically-Oriented Proposal
		16.9 Conclusion
		References
Index