Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea

Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW
II THE REGIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
	Claims and Activities (Plates 1 and 2)
	The "Oil" Factor
III ANALYZING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CLAIMS UNDER
	The Sovereignty Issues
		China's Claim to the Spratly Islands
		Weaknesses in China's Claim to the Spratly Islands
		Does China Claim Maritime Zones Based on Its Claims to the Spratly Islands?
		Does China Also Claim the Waters and Resources of the South China Sea? China's "Nine Interrupted-Lines" Historic-Waters Claim (Plate 4)
		The Role of Taiwan
		Vietnam's Claim to the Spratlys
		Weaknesses in Vietnam's Claim
		The Philippines' Claim
		Weaknesses in the Philippines' Claim
		Malaysia's Claim
		Weaknesses in Malaysia's Claim
		Brunei's Claim
		Weaknesses in Brunei's Claim
	Application of International Law Principles to These Sovereignty Claims
	Boundary Delimitation Issues
		What Is the Relevance of the Law of the Sea Convention in This Dispute?
		Features That Are Submerged at High Tide Cannot Generate
		Do Any of the Spratly Islets Have the Capacity under Article 121 to Generate EEZs or Continental Shelves?
		Should Some of the Spratly Features Be Characterized as "Artificial Islands," and, If So, What Would Their Legal Status Be?
		Can Any of the Claimant Nations Claim the Area as Archipelagic Waters?
		Are the Spratly Islets That Are Above Water at High Tide Entitled to Generate 12-Nautical Mile Territorial Seas?
		What Continental Shelf Claims Can Be Made by the Claimant
		What Is the Role of the Continental Shelf Commission?
		What Principles Govern the Delimitations of Maritime Boundaries?
		The Provisional Arrangement Requirement
		Will High Seas Areas Remain After the Maritime Boundaries Are Delimited, and, If So, How Will This Area Be Governed?
		A Shared Regional "Common Heritage"?
		The Claimant States Have a Duty to Cooperate in Managing the Resources and Protecting the Environment of a Semi-Enclosed Sea
		The Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States Have Certain Rights to Share in the Harvests of the Living Resources in the South China Sea
		Navigational Freedoms Appear to be Respected by All Claimant States
	Summary and Conclusion
		Each Claimant's Position Is Weak Under International Law and Thus Each Should Consider a Shared Management Approach
IV THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE DISPUTES
	China: A Question of Intent
		The Mischief Reef Incident
		Why Is China Behaving the Way It Is?
		A Glimmer of Hope?
		China/Vietnam
		China/Taiwan
		China/Asean
		Conclusions and Considerations for a Solution
V APPROACHES AND HALF-MEASURES
	The South China Sea Track Two Process: Fear Racing Hope
	An Eminent Persons Group?
	Preventive Diplomacy
	Bilateral Negotiation of Provisional Arrangements
	Institutionalization of the Multilateral Dialogue
	Miscellaneous CBMs
	A Code of Conduct
	A South China Sea Institute for Marine Resources Management (SCIMARE)
	Joint Assessment and Survey of Hydrocarbon and Mineral Potential in the Multiple Claim Area under CCOP
	A Maritime Safety and Surveillance Regime
VI THE DANGER OF THE STATUS QUO
VII THE ALLOCATION OPTION
	Allocation of Only the Features
	Allocation of the Features and Maritime Space
		Legal and Geographic Analysis
		General Direction Lines and Equidistance
	Allocation Scenarios
		Scenario 1
		Scenario 2
		Scenario 3
		Scenario 4
		Scenario 5
VIII THE REGIONAL MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE REGIME OPTION: MANAGED SHARING OF A REGIONAL COMMONS
	Relevant Precedents and Lessons Learned
		Marine Regionalism
	International Organizations
		Structure
		Authority
		Secretary-General
		Secretariat
		Council
		Voting
		Chambers
		Consensus
	A Survey of Individual Organizations
		UN (United Nations)
		IMO (International Maritime Organization)
		ILO (International Labour Organization)
		INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite)
		IMF (International Monetary Fund)
		ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
		Conclusions
	The Antarctic and Svalbard Treaties
		The Antarctic Treaty System
			The Original Treaty
			The Amendments
			The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and the Protocol on Antarctic Environmental Protection
			Third World Objections
			Relevance of the Antarctic Treaty System
			The Svalbard Treaty
	Joint Development Precedents
	The Role of a Marine Park or Preserve
IX AN IDEAL MARITIME REGIME
	Origin and Elements
		Principles
		Objectives
		General Observations on Asia-Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)
		The Critical and Controversial Elements
		Definition of the Area
		Organizational Structure
		Membership
		Decision-Making
		Allocation of Executive Positions
	Sample Regimes and Allocation of Costs and Benefits
		1 A Robust Spratly Management Authority Governing the Equidistant Area
			Weighted Voting with General and Weighted Votes
			A Combined Chambered System
			Claims Set Aside, But Not Abandoned
			Demilitarization and Nonnuclearization of the Features
			Resolving the Remaining Issues
		2 The Equidistant Area and Multiple Joint Development
		3 The "Archipelagic Option" with a Robust Spratly Management
	Conclusion
Appendix 1: Descriptions of Spratly Features
Appendix 2: Proposals for Cooperation Emanating from the South China Sea Dialogue
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Plates
Index
About the Authors
Publications on Ocean Development