Shaping the Normative Landscape

Cover
Contents
Introduction
	1. Choice-dependent obligations
	2. Normative interests
	3. Making sense
	4. Deontic value
Part I: Interests
	1. Blame and Guilt
		5. Blame as anger
		6. Aptness and accuracy
		7. Blame without anger?
		8. The scope of blame and the nature of guilt
	2. Wronging
		9. Wrongs and wrongings
		10. Wrongings and forgiveness
		11. Remissive interests
		12. Wrongings and interests
	3. Obligation
		13. The sanction theory
		14. Scanlon on wrong
		15. Policies and habits
		16. The conscientious agent
		17. Blame, exclusion, and conflicts of obligation
	4. Obligation and Involvement
		18. Friendship and other forms of involvement
		19. Custom, choice, and involvement
		20. Friendship and benefaction
		21. Involvements and deontic interests
		22. Conclusion to Part I
Part II: Powers
	5. The Problem with Promising
		23. The problem of bare wronging
		24. The problem of normative power
		25. Practice theories: Hume and Rawls
		26. Social co-ordination
	6. The Promissory Interest
		27. The function of a promise
		28. The authority interest
		29. Promises and practices
		30. Obligation and convention
		31. The genealogy of promise
	7. The Possibility of Consent
		32. Consent and choice
		33. Consent and normative interests
		34. Permissive interests
		35. Conclusion to Part II
Part III: Practices
	8. What is a Promise?
		36. Promising and normative powers
		37. The purity of promising: prophylactic promises
		38. The purity of promising: promises assuming release
		39. Diagnosis
		40. When have we promised?
	9. The Promissory Bond
		41. Predicting and promising
		42. The expectation theory: Scanlon
		43. The relational structure of a promise
		44. The solemnity of a promise
	10. Which Promises Bind?
		45. Wronging the promisor
		46. The fragility of a promise
		47. Voluntariness and normative interests
		48. Promising to do what you ought not to do
Conclusion
References
Index
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